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Abstract
The thesis presents logic-based formalisms for modelling and reasoning about resource-bounded
multi-agent systems. In the field of multi-agent system, it is well-known that temporal logics such
as CTL and ATL are powerful tools for reasoning about multi-agent systems. However, there is
no natural way to utilise these logics for expressing and reasoning about properties of multi-agent
systems where actions of agents require resources to be able to perform. This thesis extends logics
including Computational Tree Logic (CTL), Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal
Logic (ATL) which have been used to reasoning about multi-agent systems so that the extended
ones have the power to specify and to reason about properties of resource-bounded multi-agent
systems. While the extension of CTL is adapted for specifying and reasoning about properties of
systems of resource-bounded reasoners where the resources are explicitly memory, communication
and time, the extensions of CL and ATL are generalised so that any resource-bounded multi-agent
system can be modelled, specified and reasoned about. For each of the logics, we describe the
range of resource-bounded multi-agent systems they can account for and axiomatisation systems
for reasoning which are proved to be sound and complete. Moreover, we also study the satisfiability
problem of these logics.
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Actions are costly. An action such as “purchase a Ferrari” can be performed only if there are suf-
ficient funds available. The aim of this thesis is to study logic-based formalisms for describing,
specifying, reasoning about, and ultimately verifying properties of multi-agent systems where ac-
tions of agents are associated with certain costs.
This chapter is devoted to discussing the motivation for establishing such formalisms and
the research objectives. At the end of the chapter is an outline of the remainder of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
In the field of multi-agent systems, logic-based formalisms are powerful tools to specify multi-
agent systems and to reason about them. There have been many logics defined and developed either
for computational systems in general, such as LTL, CTL [Emerson, 1990] or specially for multi-
agent systems including CL [Pauly, 2001, Pauly, 2002] and ATL [Alur et al., 2002]. Most of those
formalisms are developed in the setting where agents are provided a number of actions and a system
moves from one state to another by the fact that every agent of the system decides to perform an
action. While logics such as LTL and CTL allow us to specify properties of multi-agent systems
which describe the behaviour of a system as a whole, CL and ATL enable the possibility to specify
properties relating to the power of agents or groups of agents.
However, these logics have failed to naturally model the effect of resource bounds on the
strategic abilities of individuals or groups of individuals in multi-agent systems. Let us consider
memory as a common resource in reasoning systems where it is refered to by other common termi-
nologies such as knowledge and beliefs. It has been captured well by epistemic logics [Hintikka,
1962] which notoriously lead to the problem of logical omniscience [Hintikka, 1978]. This problem
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means that there is no boundary on the memory which is used to store beliefs of agents described
by certain epistemic logics. In order to model beliefs of agents in dynamic systems, there have
been several works which extend temporal logics with epistemic modalities such as ATEL [van der
Hoek &Wooldridge, 2003]. However, agents specified by ATEL predictably suffer from the logical
omniscience problem. There have been other logics proposed for modelling memory bounds of
multi-agent systems where there are two common approaches to characterise the effects of mem-
ory bounds on agent abilities. The first one restricts strategic abilities by limiting the amount of
information which are available to agents about systems states and choices in the past. Examples
of logics following this approach are variants of ATL such as ATLIr, ATLir [Schobbens, 2004],
ATL-R∗ [Jamroga & van der Hoek, 2004], ATLBM [A˚gotnes & Walther, 2009]. Another approach
is to interpret formula about beliefs by using syntactic structures [Fagin et al., 1995] such as in Lmin
and L◇min [Agotnes & Alechina, 2006], SSEL and DSEL [A˚gotnes, 2004], BML [Alechina et al.,
2006a]. Nevertheless, memory is only one aspect of a long story of resource-bounded multi-agent
systems. There are many other resources which can be used by agents and affect significantly their
abilities such as processing power, communication bandwidth, time, electrical power, etc. This fact
gives rise to the need of a logical framework for modelling and reasoning about effects of bounds
of resources used by a system of multiple agents.
This thesis is an effort to provide logic-based formalisms for bounded-resource multi-
agent systems. We start by extending BML to the case of multi-agent systems where agents have
limited memory and communication. In this approach, the amount of resources available for every
agent in a system is recorded in each state. By moving from one state to another, the differences in
the amount of resources between those states reflect the cost of action that every agent performs to
make that move of the system. In other words, there is no need to attach costs to actions in the model
of multi-agent system as they can be inferred from the relation between states and the information
of resources encoded in each state. This approach has the following two disadvantages:
1. It can only use to model multi-agent systems where every agent is endowed with an initial
amount of resources and while these systems evolve, the amount of resources allocated to
every agent reduces gradually, that effectively makes models to shape like trees and increase
the number of states in a model.
2. Moreover, using CTL as the background of the formalism prevent us from expressing prop-
erties of individual agents and sub-groups of agents.
Therefore, the thesis also presents a converse approach where it does not require the information
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of available amount of resources in every state. Instead, costs are associated with every action and
we extend CL and ATL so that the resulting logic-based formalisms allow expressing the properties
about the abilities of individual agents or a sub-group of agents such as the following:
● Given an amount of resources, a sub-group of agents can cooperate to produce a certain result,
● A sub-group of agents can cooperate to maintain some condition until a certain result is
produced without spending more than an amount of resources,
● A sub-group of agents can cooperate to maintain some condition forever without spending
more than an amount of resources.
Such an approach is much different from those restricting strategic abilities in the fact that it can
naturally express properties of resource-bounded multi-agent systems, where, for logics restricting
strategic abilities such as ATLIr, ATLir and ATLBM, it is harder to determine the limitation of the
amount of information about system states and choices in the past to agents from the bounds on
memory.
1.2 Research objectives and contribution
The research objectives which are addressed in this thesis are listed below:
1. To extend the logic BML to the case of system of multiple agents which are memory-bounded
and communication-bounded.
2. To define computational models for the logics above.
3. To develop a logic-based formalism for resource-bounded multi-agent systems based on the
computational models for CL where costs are associated with actions in the models.
4. To develop a logic-based formalism for resource-bounded multi-agent systems based on the
computational models for ATL where costs are associated with actions in the models.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
The study of logic-based formalisms for computational models, especially multi-agent systems, has
been carried out since the beginning day of Computer Science. In the next chapter, we review some
of those formalisms. In Chapter 3, the extension of BML is presented. The resulting logic allows
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specifying properties of multi-agent systems with bounded memory and communication. After that,
in Chapter 4 and 5, we step-by-step introduce two logics which allow us to express properties of
abilities of sub-groups of agents under resource bounds. Finally, Chapter 6 completes the thesis by
some conclusions and some directions for future work. In the following, we give the summary of
the remaining chapters.
Chapter 2 - Background: This chapter provides a literature review of logic-based formalisms which
have been established for modelling computational models. We will pay attention to those for-
malisms which are used especially for the case of multi-agent systems such as normal modal
logics, CTL, CL and ATL.
Chapter 3 - Bounded Memory and Communication Logics: We study an extension of BMLwhich
allows reasoning about systems of multiple agents under bounds on memory, time and com-
munication. In particular, we present the syntax and semantics of the resulting logics to-
gether with related results such as satisfiability problem, soundness and completeness. The
chapter is based on the results from [Alechina et al., 2008c] and partly on [Alechina et al.,
2008a,Alechina et al., 2008b,Alechina et al., 2009c].
Chapter 4 - Resource-bounded Coalition Logic: This chapter introduces a coalition logic for rea-
soning about multi-shot games in resource-bounded multi-agent systems. Besides the syntax
and semantics of the logical languages, we also look at satisfiability problem, sound and com-
plete results. The chapter is based on [Alechina et al., 2009b] and partly on [Alechina et al.,
2009a].
Chapter 5 - Resource-bounded ATL: This chapter studies an extension of ATL for the case of
resource-bounded multi-agent systems. We extend ATL to allow reasoning about strategies
of resource-bounded multi-agent systems. After introducing the syntax and semantics of the
logical language, we study the satisfiability problem and the sound and complete result. The
chapter is based on [Alechina et al., 2010a] and [Nguyen, 2010].
Chapter 6 - Conclusion and Future work: finally, this chapter finishes the thesis with some con-
clusions and points out some directions for the future work.
5CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we review the literature of logic-based formalisms for specifying multi-agent sys-
tems. The chapter begins with a fundamental logic, namely modal logic, which has been used to
express many aspects of agents such as mental states, actions and time. Later in the chapter, we
concentrate on temporal logics. The content of this chapter is based on [Blackburn et al., 2002]
for modal logic, [Emerson, 1990] for CTL, [Pauly, 2002,Pauly, 2001] for coalition logic, and [Alur
et al., 2002,Goranko, 2001,Goranko & van Drimmelen, 2006] for ATL.
2.1 Modal logic
Originally, philosophers developed Modal Logic to study different levels of truth. Apart from true
and false, a fact is possibly true if there is a world on which it is evaluated to be true. In the field of
multi-agent systems, modal logic has been used to express many aspects of agents such as beliefs,
effects of actions and time. For example, an agent is said to believe a fact if the fact is true in every
world that the agent considers possible.
2.1.1 Syntax of modal logic
Formulas in modal logic are defined using the usual logical operators such as negation, conjunction
and disjunction together with modalities ◻ and ◇. Given a finite set Prop such as {p, q, . . .} of
propositional variables, the syntax of Modal Logics is as follows:
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ψ ∣ ◻ϕ
where p ∈ Prop. The cases of other logical operators are defined as follows: ⊺ ≡ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ where
⊺ represents true,  ≡ ¬⊺ where  represents false, ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), ϕ → ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ,
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ϕ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ) and◇ϕ ≡ ¬ ◻ ¬ϕ.
As mentioned above, an application of modal logics is to characterise many aspects of
agents. For example, to express that an agent believes that p is true, we use the formula ◻p. In
the case of beliefs, the modality ◻ is usually renamed by B. Hence, the previous formula becomes
Bp. Let us consider another example which expresses the effect of action, we use the formula ◻p to
express that after the agent performs an action, p becomes true. If we know the name of the action,
such as a, then the formula is often rewritten as [a]p.
2.1.2 Semantics of modal logic
Formulas of modal logic are interpreted by means of Kripke models. A Kripke model M =
(S,R,V ) is composed of a non-empty set S of possible worlds (or we often call states), a binary
relation R over the set S and a truth mapping V ∶ Prop → 2S which assigns for every propositional
variable a subset of possible worlds on which it is true. The truth of a formula in Modal Logic is
evaluated at a possible world w in a Kripke model M by induction on the structure of the formula
as follows:
● M,w ⊧ p iff w ∈ V (p),
● M,w ⊧ ¬ϕ iffM,w /⊧ ϕ,
● M,w ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iffM,w ⊧ ϕ orM,w ⊧ ψ,
● M,w ⊧ ◻ϕ iff for every w′ ∈ S such that (w,w′) ∈ R,M,w′ ⊧ ϕ.
In the last case, a formula ◻ϕ is true at a possible world w if ϕ is true at every possible world
w′ which is related to w by R, that is (w,w′) ∈ R. When Model Logic is used to reasoning about
beliefs of agents, the relationR specifies worlds that an agent considers possible. For example, from
the current world w, an agent considers that w1, w2 and w3 are possible, this situation is described
as (w,wi) ∈ R for every i ∈ {1,2,3}. If ϕ is true in all wi’s, i.e. M,wi ⊧ ϕ, then the agent believes
ϕ at the current world w, i.e. M,w ⊧ Bϕ.
A formula ϕ is satisfiable iff there exists a model M and a possible world w of M such
that ϕ is true at w, that isM,w ⊧ ϕ. A formula ϕ is valid in a modelM iff ϕ is true at any possible
world w of M ; in this case, we shall write M ⊧ ϕ. A formula ϕ is valid in a class of models F
iff ϕ is valid in every model M ∈ F ; in this case, we shall write F ⊧ ϕ. A formula ϕ is valid
iff ϕ is valid in every model M ; in this case, we shall write ⊧ ϕ. In the next sections, we recall
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how to syntactically generate valid formulas of modal logics and how to determine if a formula is
satisfiable.
2.1.3 Axiomatisation systems
In Modal Logic, there is an interesting question: is there any syntactic way to generate all valid
formulas with respect to a class of models? It turns out that one way to answer is to define Hilbert-
like axiom systems which allow us to reason about those classes of models. Intuitively, all formulas
generated by an axiom system define a logic. Given such an axiomatisation system X , a generated
formula ϕ is called provable by the system, and we shall denote ⊢X ϕ.
The smallest system is K. It contains all propositional tautologies together with the fol-
lowing schema (K)
◻(ϕ→ ψ) → (◻ϕ→ ◻ψ) (K)
as axioms and two following inference rules
Modus Ponens: given ⊢K ϕ→ ψ and ⊢K ϕ, imply ⊢K ψ,
Generalisation: given ⊢K ϕ, imply ⊢K ◻ϕ.
In the following, we familiarise ourselves with some notions relating to axiomatisation
systems. A K-proof is a finite sequence of formulas each of which is either an axiom or the result
of applying an inference rule upon one or more formulas occurred previously in the sequence. A
formula ϕ is proved in K if it is the last element of some K-proof, written as ⊢K ϕ. The set of all
provable formulas in K is called the logic K. Sometimes, we call elements of K as K-theorems. A
formula ϕ is said to be K-consistent iff its negation is not provable, i.e. /⊢K ¬ϕ.
We say that an axiomatisation system is sound with respect to a class of models if formulas
provable by the system are valid in the class of models. Conversely, an axiomatisation system is
complete with respect to a class of models if any valid formula in the class of models is provable
by the system. In particular, K is sound and complete with respect to the class of Kripke models
(for example, see [Blackburn et al., 2002, p.33, p.193, p.199]). In order to prove the soundness, it is
not hard to show that (K) is valid in any Kripke models. Thinking of modality ◻ as characterising
beliefs, it is intuitive for (K) to be true. Let us consider the following schema:
B(ϕ→ ψ) → (Bϕ→ Bψ) (2.1)
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The schema (2.1) characterises a property of beliefs where if an agent believes ϕ → ψ and ϕ, it
also believes ψ is expressed. Whether we are interested in other properties of beliefs about which
we would like to reason? For example, it is intuitive to believe in what we already believe. This
property can be characterised by the following schema:
Bϕ→ BBϕ (2.2)
It is more interesting that there is a correspondence between (2.2) and the class of transitive Kripke
models, that is (2.2) is valid in a model iff the model is transitive. Similarly, there are other schemas
each of which corresponds to a class of models. In Table 2.1, we list other schemas and their
corresponding classes of models. The definition of each class of models in Table 2.1 is defined as
Name Schema Corresponding class
T ◻ϕ→ ϕ Reflexive Kripke models
D ◻ϕ→◇ϕ Serial Kripke models
4 ◻ϕ→ ◻◻ϕ Transitive Kripke models
5 ◇ϕ→ ◻◇ϕ Euclidean Kripke models
TABLE 2.1: Schemas and the corresponding classes of models
follows:
● A modelM = (S,R,V ) is reflexive iff for every w ∈ S, (w,w) ∈ R.
● A modelM = (S,R,V ) is serial iff for every w ∈ S, ∃w′ ∈ S such that (w,w′) ∈ R.
● A modelM = (S,R,V ) is transitive iff for every w,w′,w′′ ∈ S, if (w,w′) and (w′,w′′) ∈ R
then (w,w′′) ∈ R.
● A modelM = (S,R,V ) is euclidean iff for every w,w′,w′′ ∈ S, if (w,w′) and (w,w′′) ∈ R
then (w′,w′′) ∈ R.
From the correspondence between schemas and classes of models, it is straightforward to have the
soundness and completeness of logics which are extensions of K with a subset of schemas (T),
(D), (4) and (5). For example, the logic extending K with the schema (T) is sound and complete
with respect to the class of reflexive models. When a logic is composed of K and additional axiom
schemas Σ1, Σ2, . . . , Σn, it is usually given the name KΣ1Σ2 . . .Σn. Because some of them are so
widely used, they have been given special names such as T for KT, S4 for KT4, weak-S5 for KD5
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and S5 for KT5. A logic A is smaller than a logic B, written as A ⊆ B, iff theorems of A are also
theorems of B. It is worth noticing that the more axiom schemas a logic has, the larger the logic is.
In this sense, K is the smallest modal logic; we also have K ⊆ T ⊆ S4 ⊆ weak-S5 ⊆ S5.
2.1.4 The satisfiability problem of Modal Logic
The problem of determining whether a formula is satisfiable is called satisfiability problem. A
logic is decidable iff its satisfiability problem is decidable and the complexity of its satisfiability
problem is the complexity of the logic. It is well-known that K it is decidable and the complexity is
PSPACE-complete (see, for example, [Blackburn et al., 2002, p.392]).
2.1.5 The logical omniscience problem
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, one application of modal logic is to describe and reason about beliefs
of agents, or more practically, about the contents of the memory of agents. Then, ◇ is rewritten as
B which stands for what an agent believes and a formula of the form Bϕ is interpreted as an agent
believes that ϕ is true, or ϕ is in its memory. In a model of this modal logic, a set of states to
which we have access to from an actual one can be characterised as a freezing moment which gives
us all the beliefs of the agent. Each state in the set is considered as a possible world and a belief
of the agent must be true at all of its possible worlds. However, axiom (K) gives us the problem
of logical omniscience [Hintikka, 1978] where logical consequences of the agent’s beliefs are also
what the agent beliefs. Only by considering logical tautologies, such amount of beliefs is already
unacceptable for an agent in real life. For example, by knowing about all the rules of the chess
game, anyone could have instantly known about a winning strategy, which is unrealistic.
In order to overcome the problem of logical omniscience, an approach is to interpret
formulas about beliefs of agents by using syntactic structure [Fagin et al., 1995] such as in Lmin and
L◇min [Agotnes & Alechina, 2006], BML [Alechina et al., 2006a], SSEL and DSEL [A˚gotnes, 2004].
Since our first attempt in this thesis is inspired by this approach, let us briefly recall the definition
of Lmin which is simple enough but still fully describes it.
In Lmin, belief formulas (such as Bϕ) is considered as an atomic, and models for inter-
preting formulas are syntactic structures. Given a set of propositional variables Prop, the syntax of
Lmin is as follows:
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ψ ∣ Bϕ ∣min(n)
where p ∈ Prop and n ∈ N. The set of formulas of the form Bϕ is denoted as LB . A model of Lmin
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is a syntactic structureM = (S,V ) where S is a non-empty set of states and V ∶ S → ℘(Prop∪LB)
is a valuation mapping which determines what is true in a state. Given aM = (S,V ), let us denote
V B(s) = {ϕ ∣ Bϕ ∈ V (s)}; then, the truth of a formula ϕ of Lmin at a state s of M is defined by
induction on the structure of ϕ as follows:
● M,s ⊧ p iff p ∈ V (s),
● M,s ⊧ Bψ iff ψ ∈ V B(s),
● M,s ⊧min(n) iff ∣V B(s)∣ ≥ n,
● M,s ⊧ ¬ψ iffM,s /⊧ ψ,
● M,s ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iffM,s ⊧ ϕ orM,s ⊧ ψ.
It has been shown in [Agotnes & Alechina, 2006] thatLmin is sound and complete, and its satisfiabil-
ity problem is NP-complete. [Agotnes & Alechina, 2006] also proves that Lmin is expressive enough
to characterise the know-at-least and only-know modalities (△,∇) of SSEL [A˚gotnes, 2004].
2.2 Computation Tree Logic
Computation Tree Logic (CTL) is a widely used logic for reasoning about concurrent programs.
As systems of multiple agents can be seen as a set of concurrent programs, CTL can also be used
for reasoning about multi-agent systems. Models of CTL are temporal structures where each state
corresponds to a time point and has several possible future states. Each state may be related to others
by transitions which correspond to the possible moves of the system. From this point of view, time
in CTL is branching to express the non-deterministic nature of systems such as multi-agent systems.
In a multi-agent system, each agent may have more than one action to perform at a time. Depending
on which action each agent decides to perform, the system may move to different states.
2.2.1 Syntax of CTL
CTL is an extended modal logic of which the modality ◻ describes the relationship with states in
the distance of one step of time. Moreover, there are also other modalities to express properties
overtime which span on more than one step of time. Given a finite set Prop = {p, q, . . .}, the syntax
of CTL is as follows.
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ψ ∣ AXϕ ∣ AϕUψ ∣ EϕUψ
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We also use other logical operators such as ∧ and → which are defined in a similar way as Modal
Logics. That is ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) and ϕ → ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. The modality AX is similar to the
modality ◻ in Modal Logic. Moreover, we also have EX in CTL which is defined like ◇, that is





Let us now informally explain the meaning of each modality in CTL. The formula AXϕ means that
whatever move a system makes, ϕ will be true in the next state. The modality EX is similar to◇ in
Modal Logic where EXϕ is to say that there exists a move by the system so that in the next state,
ϕ is true. The other modalities speak about properties over longer future. The formula AϕUψ says
that for any sequence of moves by the system, ϕ is true until ψ is true. Likewise, the formula EϕUψ
says that there is a sequence of moves by system where ϕ is true until ψ is true. The formula AFϕ
means that for any sequence of moves, ϕ is eventually true. The formula EFϕ means that there is
a sequence of moves where ϕ is eventually true. The formula AGϕ means that for any sequence of
moves, ϕ is globally true. The formula EGϕ means that there is a sequence of moves where ϕ is
globally true.
2.2.2 Semantics of CTL
Semantics of CTL is defined by means of total Kripke structures which are Kripke structures with
an additional requirement where each state are related to at least one other in the binary relation of
the structure. The binary relation over set of states in a total Kripke structure now has a temporal
meaning, when two states are related in the binary relation; this means the system can make a move
from one state to another in one step of time. Then, the modalities AX and EX, which corresponds
to ◻ and ◇ in Modal Logic, respectively, are used to describe what happens after one step in the
future. The other modalities are for the case of longer future, their semantics are defined with the
help of the notion of paths in total Kripke structures.
Given a Kripke model M = (S,R,V ), a path in M is a (possibly infinite) sequence
λ = s0s1 . . . of states such that (si, si+1) ∈ R for any i ≥ 0. Given a path λ = s0s1 . . . of M , we
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denote λ[i] = si for any i ≥ 0 and λ[i, j] = sisi+1 . . . sj for any j ≥ i ≥ 0. Then, the truth of a CTL
formula ϕ at a state s ∈ S is defined by induction on the structure of ϕ as follows:
● M,s ⊧ p iff s ∈ V (p),
● M,s ⊧ ¬ϕ iffM,w /⊧ ϕ,
● M,s ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iffM,s ⊧ ϕ orM,s ⊧ ψ,
● M,s ⊧ AXϕ iff for every s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′) ∈ R,M,s′ ⊧ ϕ,
● M,s ⊧ AϕUψ iff for every path λ ofM such that λ[0] = s, there exists i ≥ 0whereM,λ[i] ⊧
ψ and for every 0 ≤ j < i,M,λ[j] ⊧ ϕ,
● M,s ⊧ EϕUψ iff there exists a path λ ofM where λ[0] = s such that there exists i ≥ 0 where
M,λ[i] ⊧ ψ and for every 0 ≤ j < i,M,λ[j] ⊧ ϕ.
As we can see from the definition of the semantics for the modality AX, it is just the same for the
case of the modality ◻ in Modal Logic. However, the last two cases of the semantics are different.
The first thing is that we need to make use of the notion paths in the models. Intuitively, a path from
one state represents a possible future of a system along time where the system travels from state to
state. The formulas AϕUψ says that for any future of the system starting from a state, the formula
ψ will be eventually true and at all the moments before that happens, ϕ remains true. Meanwhile,
the formula EϕUψ relaxes the condition as comparing to AϕUψ, it requires only the existence of a
future. For the other modalities, it is not hard to show the following:
● M,s ⊧ EXϕ iff there is a state s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′) ∈ R, andM,s′ ⊧ ϕ.
● M,s ⊧ AFϕ iff for every path λ ofM such that λ[0] = s, there exists i ≥ 0whereM,λ[i] ⊧ ϕ.
● M,s ⊧ EFϕ iff there exists a path λ of M where λ[0] = s such that there exists i ≥ 0 where
M,λ[i] ⊧ ψ.
● M,s ⊧ AGϕ iff for every path λ ofM and i ≥ 0,M,λ[i] ⊧ ϕ.
● M,s ⊧ EGϕ iff there exists a path λ ofM such that for any i ≥ 0,M,λ[i] ⊧ ψ.
We say that a formula ϕ of CTL is satisfiable iff there exists a model M and a state s in
M such thatM,s ⊧ ϕ. Similarly, a formula ϕ of CTL is valid iff for any modelM and a state s in
M , we haveM,s ⊧ ϕ.
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2.2.3 Axiomatisation system for CTL
We present in this section a sound and complete axiomatisation system for CTL. The axiomatisation
system allows us to generate any valid formula of CTL. Similar to Modal logic, it has a set of axiom
schemas each of which characterises the meaning of a temporal modality and inference rules. The
axiom schemas of CTL [Emerson, 1990] are listed as follows:




Ax4. EX(ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ EXϕ ∨ EXψ
Ax5. AX(ϕ) ↔ ¬EX¬ϕ
Ax6. EϕUψ↔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ EXEϕUψ)
Ax7. AϕUψ↔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧AXAϕUψ)
Ax8. EX⊺ ∧AX⊺
Ax9a. AG(θ → (ψ ∧ EXθ)) → (θ → ¬AϕUψ)
Ax9b. AG(θ → (ψ ∧ EXθ)) → (θ → ¬AFψ)
Ax10a. AG(θ → (ψ ∧ (ϕ→ AXθ))) → (θ → ¬EϕUψ)
Ax10b. AG(θ → (ψ ∧AXθ)) → (θ → ¬EFψ)
Ax11. AG(ϕ→ ψ) → (EXϕ→ EXψ)
The two inference rules of CTL [Emerson, 1990] are listed as follows:
● Given ⊢CTL ϕ→ ψ and ⊢CTL ϕ, imply ⊢CTL ψ
● Given ⊢CTL ϕ, imply ⊢CTL AGϕ
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The above axiomatisation system for CTL has been proved to be sound and complete with respect
to total Kripke structures [Emerson & Halpern, 1982, Emerson, 1990]. Moreover, we have the
complexity result of CTL that the satisfiability problem of CTL is EXPTIME-complete [Emerson,
1990]. The model checking problem is to determine whether a given CTL formula is true or not at
a given state of a given model. From [Clarke & Emerson, 1982], we have the complexity result that
the model checking problem for CTL is in deterministic polynomial time.
2.3 Coalition Logic
CTL logic is a powerful logic for reasoning about the ability of a multi-agent system as a whole.
However, it is difficult to use CTL to reason about the ability of individuals or subsets of individuals
in a multi-agent system. In this section, we introduce coalition logic [Pauly, 2002] (or CL), which
allows us to do so. We first present concepts of Game Frame which are used to defined semantics
of CL. Later after that is the syntax and semantics of CL. At the end of the section, we recall some
results of axiomatisation system, complexity and model checking for CL.
2.3.1 Game Frames
Coalition logic allows reasoning about Game Frames which explicitly contain individual agents and
their abilities at every state of the frames. A Game Frame is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A Game Frame G is a tuple (N,{Σi ∣ i ∈ N}, S, T, o) in which
● N is a non-empty finite set of agents
● Σi is a non-empty set of actions for each agent i ∈ N
● S is a non-empty set of states
● T ∶ S ×N → ℘(⋃i∈N Σi) is a mapping which assigns the available actions for every agent
i ∈ N at a state s ∈ S and satisfies the following conditions:
1. T (s, i) ⊆ Σi
2. T (s, i) /= ∅
● o ∶ S×Πi∈NΣi → S is a partial mapping which assigns the outcome of a joint action (ai)i∈N ∈
Πi∈NΣi, where ai ∈ T (s, i), at a state s ∈ S.
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Let us discuss the definition of game frames. A game frameG = (N,{Σi ∣ i ∈ N}, S, T, o)
contains a non-empty set of states on which the system of multiple agents inN operates. The system
moves from one state to another by the fact that each agent decides an action which is available at
the starting state. The set of action available to each agent at a state is determined by the function
T . The first condition on T , saying that T (s, i) ⊆ Σi, means that actions available to an agent must
be among those belonging to the agent. Then, the second condition T (s, i) /= ∅ implies that at any
state, every agent must be able to perform some action. We can see that this condition is similar
to the total condition in models of CTL, so that systems never stuck at a state. After every agent
decides an action to perform, the destination state from the current one is determined by the partial
output mapping o. For convenience, we denote a joint action for a coalition C ⊆ N as aC = (ai)i∈C .
We also extend the function T for the case of coalitions as follows:
T (s,C) = {aC = (ai)i∈C ∣ ∀i ∈ N ∶ ai ∈ T (s, i)}
In CL, the property of interest to reason about is the ability of individual agents or groups of in-
dividual agents; that is whether there is an action for an individual agent or a joint action for a
group of agents to perform so that the systems moves to a state among those of interest without car-
ing about which actions all other agents perform. Formally, we state the property in the following
way: at a state s, can a coalition C ⊆ N be effective in achieving a set of states X ⊆ S? Given a
game frame G, the notion of effectivity for a coalition C can be captured by the effectivity function
EG ∶ S → ℘(N) → ℘(℘(S)) which is defined as follows:
X ∈ EG(s)(C) iff ∃aC ∈ T (s,C)∀aC¯ ∈ T (s, C¯) ∶ o(s, (aC , aC¯)) ∈X
In other words, EG(s)(C) contains all sets of states for which the coalition C is effective at state s.
We may notice for the extreme case, when C = ∅, it is straightforward to see thatEG(s)(∅) defines
all sets of states that is unavoidable for the system, that is givenX ∈ EG(s)(∅), for any joint action
aN , the system will move to a state within X .
Given an effectivity function EG of a game frame G, we can easily find some trivial
properties of EG such as S ∈ EG(s)(C) for any s ∈ S and C ⊆ N . Apart from those, the effectivity
structure EG also has the following properties with given names:
● Outcome-monotonicity:
∀s ∈ S,∀C ⊆ N,∀X ⊆X ′ ⊆ S ∶X ∈ EG(s)(C) ⇒X ′ ∈ EG(s)(C)
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● Coalition-monotonicity:
∀s ∈ S,∀C ⊆ C ′ ⊆ N,∀X ⊆ S ∶X ∈ EG(s)(C) ⇒X ∈ EG(s)(C ′)
● C-Regularity:
∀s ∈ S,∀X ⊆ S ∶X ∈ EG(s)(C) ⇒ X¯ ∉ EG(s)(C¯)
EG is regular if it is C-regular for all C ⊆ N .
● C-Maximality:
∀s ∈ S,∀C ⊆ N,∀X ⊆ S ∶X ∉ EG(s)(C) ⇒ X¯ ∈ EG(s)(C¯)
EG is maximal if it is C-maximal for all C ⊆ N .
● Superadditivity:
∀s ∈ S,∀C1, C2 ⊆ N and C1 ∩C2 = ∅,∀X1,X2 ⊆ S ∶
X1 ∈ EG(s)(C1) and X2 ∈ EG(s)(C2) ⇒X1 ∩X2 ∈ EG(s)(C1 ∪C2)
It turns out that studying properties of effectivity functions originated from game frames is useful
for defining axiomatisation systems of CL. Given an effectivity function in general, i.e. an arbitrary
function E ∶ S → ℘(N) → ℘(℘(S)), we call it playable iff it has the following properties:
1. ∀C ⊆ N : ∅ ∉ E(C),




We have the following result about the correspondence between playable effectivity function and
game frames in [Pauly, 2002].
Lemma 1. 1 An effectivity functionE is playable iff it is the effectivity function of some game frame.
1Strictly speaking, Lemma 1 fails due to a flaw in Pauly’s proof. In fact, the definition of playable effectivity function
needs at least one more requirement which we shall call N -determinacy and present in Section 4.4.4.
2. BACKGROUND 17
What Lemma 1 tells us is twofold. Firstly, playable effectivity functions and game frames
are interchangeable. As we will see later when defining semantics of CL, we use playable effectivity
functions to define models of CL instead of game frames. Secondly, the lemma also reveals axiom
schemas for the axiomatisation system of CL.
2.3.2 Syntax and semantics
CL contains modalities which have the form of [C] where C ⊆ N . A formula of the form [C]ϕ
expresses the property that the coalition C has a joint action to force ϕ true in the next state, in-
dependently on the decisions of other agents out of C. Given a finite set Prop of propositional
variables and a finite set N of agents, the syntax of CL is as follows:
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ψ ∣ [C]ϕ
where p ∈ Prop and C ⊆ N . The other logical operations are defined as usual: ϕ∧ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ∨¬ψ),
ϕ→ ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
Formulas of CL are interpreted by means of effectivity models. An effectivity model M
is a tuple (S,E,V ) where:
● S is a non-empty set of states,
● E ∶ S → ℘(N)→ ℘(℘(S)) is a playable effectivity function,
● V ∶ Prop → ℘(S) is a mapping which assigns truth of propositional variables at each state in
S.
Given a effectivity modelM = (S,E,V ), the truth of a formula in CL is defined at a state
of the model by induction on the structure of the formula as follows:
● M,s ⊧ p iff s ∈ V (p),
● M,s ⊧ ¬ϕ iffM,s /⊧ ϕ,
● M,s ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iffM,s ⊧ ϕ orM,s ⊧ ψ,
● M,s ⊧ [C]ϕ iff {s′ ∣M,s′ ⊧ ϕ} ∈ E(s)(C).
In the definition of semantics for CL, the last case says that the formula [C]ϕ is true at a state s
iff it is effective for the coalition C to force the system to go to a state where ϕ is true. Using the
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effectivity function E in the model, this requirement is equivalent to the condition {s′ ∣ M,s′ ⊧
ϕ} ∈ E(s)(C). Because of Lemma 1, we can also define semantics of CL by means of game
models. A game model M is a pair (G,V ) where G = (N,{Σi}i∈N , S, T, o) is a game frame and
V ∶ Prop→ ℘(S) is a mapping which assigns the truth of propositional variables at each state in S.
Then, the last case of the semantics is defined as follows:
● M,s ⊧ [C]ϕ iff ∃aC ∈ T (s,C) such that ∀aC¯ ∈ T (s, C¯): M,o(s, (aC , aC¯)) ⊧ ϕ
As usual, a formula ϕ in CL is satisfiable iff there exists an effectivity model M and a
state s such that M,s ⊧ ϕ. ϕ is valid in a model M iff M,s ⊧ ϕ for any state s of M . Then, ϕ is
valid iff it is valid in any effectivity model.
2.3.3 Axiomatisation system
Given a set N of agent, the axiomatisation system allows us to generate valid formulas of Coalition





(M) [C](ϕ ∧ ψ)→ [C]ϕ
(S) [C1]ϕ1 ∧ [C2]ϕ2 → [C1 ∪C2](ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) where C1 ∩C2 = ∅
Inference rules
Modus Ponens Given ⊢CL ϕ→ ψ and ⊢CL ϕ, imply ⊢CL ψ
Equivalence Given ⊢CL ϕ↔ ψ, imply ⊢CL [C]ϕ↔ [C]ψ
A formula ϕ is a theorem of CL iff ⊢CL ϕ. ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ is not a theorem of CL. We have
the result from [Pauly, 2002] that the above axiomatisation system of CL is sound and complete with
respect to effectivity models. The proof is done by constructing a canonical effectivity model of ϕ
and showing that the effectivity function embodied in the canonical model is playable. Moreover,
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also from [Pauly, 2002], we have the complexity result of CL that the satisfiability problem for CL
is PSPACE-hard.
2.4 Alternating-time Temporal Logic
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [Alur et al., 2002] is an extension of CTL for modelling
multi-agent systems. The quantifiers over future paths in CTL are parametrised by sets of agents
in ATL for expressing the selective quantification over possible futures as a result of the interaction
between a coalition and its complement. In other words, ATL allows us to model the existence of
strategies for coalitions of agents in a system to achieve certain goals in short (one step computa-
tions) and long (many step computations) futures. When a system contains only one agent, ATL is
equivalent to CTL. Moreover, CL can also be seen as a fragment of ATL as CL only expresses the
existence of strategies for coalitions to achieve goals in one step futures.
Semantics of ATL is initially defined by means of Alternating-time Transition Systems
(ATS) which is later generalised to Concurrent Game Structures (CGS). It is worth noticing that
both ATSs and CGSs are equivalent to Game Frames and Effectivity Models which were used in the
previous section to define the semantics of CL. In this section, we briefly review ATL by looking
at the definition of CGS, then, the syntax and semantics of ATL. Finally, we recall some essential
results of ATL including the axiomatisation system for ATL, its complexity for the satisfiability
problem and the model-checking problem.
2.4.1 Concurrent Game Structures
A Concurrent Game Structure describes a multi-agent system where the system transits from one
state to another as the result of performing a joint action by all the agents in the systems. In this
section, we review the concept of CGSs together with related notions.
Definition 2. A Concurrent Game Structure S is a tuple (n,Q,Prop, V, d, σ) where
● n is the number of agents in the system. For convenience, the agents are identified with the
number 1,. . . ,n and we denote the set of agent by N = {1, . . . , n}.
● Q is a non-empty set of states.
● Prop is the set of propositional variables.
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● V ∶ Prop → ℘(Q) is a mapping which assigns the truth of propositional variables at each
state in Q.
● d ∶ Q ×N → N is a mapping which assigns the number of actions available to each agent at
every state of Q. It is required that d(q, i) ≥ 1 for all q ∈ Q and i ∈ N . For convenience, the
actions available to an agent i at a state q is identified with the numbers 1,. . . ,d(q, i). Then,
we write D(q) to denote the set Πi=1,n{1, . . . , d(q, i)} of all joint actions of agents in N .
● Given a state q ∈ Q and a ∈ D(q), σ(q, a) defines the result state when agents in N perform
the joint action a at q.
CGSs have a requirement on the mapping d which defines the number of actions available
for every agent that d(q, i) ≥ 1 where i ∈ N and q ∈ Q. It is similar to the requirement of Game
Frames on the mapping T which determines the set of actions available for every agent at a state
where the returning sets by the mapping T are non-empty. This means from any state in the system,
it is always possible to transit to another one by some joint action of every agent.
Given a CGS S , we denote the set of available actions for each agent at a state asD(q, i) =
{1, . . . , d(q, i)}. Similarly, we denote the set of joint actions of a coalition A ⊆ N at a state as
D(q,A) = Πi∈AD(q, i). When A = N , we simply write D(q) to denote the set of available joint
actions for all agents in the system.
We define that a state q ∈ Q is a successor of another state q′ ∈ Q iff there exists a joint
action a ∈D(q) such that σ(q, a) = q′. Then, a computation in S is an infinite sequence λ = q0q1 . . .
of states in Q where for every i ≥ 0 we have that qi+1 is the successor of qi. For convenience, we
denote λ[i] = qi, λ[i, j] = qi . . . qj for any j ≥ i ≥ 0.
Given an joint action aA ∈ D(q, a) of a coalition A at state q ∈ Q, we define the set of
possible outcomes by the action aA as follows:
out(q, aA) = {q′ ∈ Q ∣ ∃aA¯ ∶ σ(q, (aA, aA¯) = q′}
The last concept we mention in this section is strategies. It is essential to define the
semantics of ATL. Given a CGS S , we define a strategy FA for a coalition A ⊆ N as a mapping
from the set Q+ of finite and non-empty sequences of states to an joint action for A such that
FA(λq) ∈ D(q,A). When the coalition A follows the strategy FA starting from some state q0,
agents in A decide to perform the joint action FA(q0). Because agents out of A may have many
actions available to perform, each joint action by the complement coalition of A can transit the
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system to a different state q1. From each state q1, agents in A decide to perform the joint action
FA(q0q1) and joint actions available to the complement coalition of A once again transit the system
to different states q2. This happens again and again to form a set of possible computations of the
strategy FA. Formally, we define the set of possible computations of a strategy FA, starting from a
state q0 ∈ Q, as follows:
out(q0, FA) = {q0q1 . . . ∣ ∀i ≥ 0 ∶ qi+1 ∈ out(qi, FA(q0 . . . qi))}
2.4.2 Syntax and Semantics of ATL
ATL is an extension of CTL to express properties of coalitional abilities in short and long time
futures. Given a finite set N of agents and a set Prop of propositional variables, the syntax of ATL
is defined as follows:
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ψ ∣ ⟪A⟫◯ϕ ∣ ⟪A⟫◻ϕ ∣ ⟪A⟫ϕUψ
where p ∈ Prop and A ⊆ N . As usual, other logical operators are defined as abbreviations: ϕ ∧ ψ ≡
¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), ϕ→ ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
As we mentioned in the previous section, the semantics of ATL is defined by means of
CGSs. Given a CGS S = (n,Q,Prop, V, d, σ), the truth of a formula in ATL at a state of S is defined
inductively on the structure of the formula as follows:
● S, q ⊧ p iff s ∈ V (p).
● S, q ⊧ ¬ϕ iffM,s /⊧ ϕ.
● S, q ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iffM,s ⊧ ϕ orM,s ⊧ ψ.
● S, q ⊧ ⟪A⟫◯ϕ iff there exists a strategy FA for the coalition A such that for every λ ∈
out(q,FA), we have that S, λ[1] ⊧ ϕ.
● S, q ⊧ ⟪A⟫◻ϕ iff there exists a strategy FA for the coalition A such that for every λ ∈
out(q,FA) and for every i ≥ 0, we have that S, λ[i] ⊧ ϕ.
● S, q ⊧ ⟪A⟫ϕUψ iff there exists a strategy FA for the coalition A such that for every λ ∈
out(q,FA), there is a number i ≥ 0 where S, λ[i] ⊧ ψ and for any i > j ≥ 0, we have that
S, λ[j] ⊧ ϕ.
2. BACKGROUND 22
For the formula ⟪A⟫◯ϕ, an equivalent way to define its semantics is to use joint actions.
That is S, q ⊧ ⟪A⟫◯ϕ iff there is a joint action aA ∈ D(q,A) such that for all q′ ∈ out(q, aA), we
have that S, q′ ⊧ ϕ. Therefore, one can see that the modality ⟪A⟫◯ is equivalent to the modality
[A] in CL. In the extreme case when A = ∅, the formula ⟪∅⟫◯ϕ expresses the property that it
is unavoidable that ϕ is true after the system transits to another state. That is for any joint action
available to the grand coalition N , ϕ is true in the next state.
The ◻ modality in ATL has the semantics which is similar to that of G operator in CTL.
A formula ⟪A⟫◻ϕ is true at a state of a CGS iff there exists a strategy for the coalition A such that
ϕ is true along any possible computation of the strategy. In the case when A is the empty coalition,
the formula ⟪∅⟫◻ϕ has the same meaning as the formula AGϕ in CTL, that is ϕ unavoidable for
the whole system. The last form of formula ⟪A⟫ϕUψ in ATL says that there exists a strategy for
the coalition A to keep ϕ true until ψ is eventually true.
As usual, a formula ϕ in ATL is satisfiable iff there exists a CGS and a state where ϕ is
true. ϕ is valid in a CGS iff it is true at any state of the CGS; and ϕ is valid iff it is valid in any CGS.
2.4.3 Axiomatisation system
An axiomatisation system to generate valid formulas of ATL has been introduced in [Goranko &
van Drimmelen, 2006]. We have mentioned that CL is a fragment of ATL, therefore there is no
surprise that axioms for CL also appears as axioms for ATL. In the following, we list all the axioms
and inference rules of the axiomatisation system for ATL. Notice that A,A1,A2 ⊆ N are arbitrary
coalitions of agents.
Axioms:
(PL) Tautologies of propositional variables
() ¬⟪A⟫◯
(⊺) ⟪A⟫◯⊺
(N ) ¬⟪∅⟫◯ϕ→ ⟪N⟫◯¬ϕ
S ⟪A1⟫◯ϕ1 ∧ ⟪A2⟫◯ϕ2 → ⟪A1 ∪A2⟫◯(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) where A1 ∩A2 = ∅
FP◻ ⟪A⟫◻ϕ↔ ϕ ∧ ⟪A⟫◯⟪A⟫◻ϕ
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GFP◻ ⟪∅⟫◻(θ → (ϕ ∧ ⟪A⟫◯θ)) → ⟪∅⟫◻(θ → ⟪A⟫◻ϕ)
FPU ⟪A⟫ϕUψ↔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ⟪A⟫◯⟪A⟫ϕUψ)
LFPU ⟪∅⟫◻((ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ⟪A⟫◯θ)) → θ) → ⟪∅⟫◻(⟪A⟫ϕUψ → θ)
Inference rules:
Modus Ponens: Given ⊢ATL ϕ→ ψ and ⊢ATL ϕ, implies ⊢ATL ψ
⟪A⟫◯-monotonicity: Given ⊢ATL ϕ→ ψ, implies ⊢ATL ⟪A⟫◯ϕ→ ⟪A⟫◯ψ
⟪∅⟫◻-necessitation Given ⊢ATL ϕ, implies ⊢ATL ⟪∅⟫◻ϕ
As usual, we have the notions of theorem and consistency in ATL. A formula ϕ is a the-
orem of ATL iff ⊢ATL ϕ. ϕ is consistent iff its negation is not a theorem of ATL, i.e. /⊢ATL ¬ϕ.
The soundness and completeness of the above axiomatisation system for ATL have been proved
in [Goranko & van Drimmelen, 2006]. In order to prove the completeness of ATL, the idea
in [Goranko & van Drimmelen, 2006] is to construct a tree-like model for a consistent formula
where each agent has a fix number of available actions at every state of the model. We also have the
result of the satisfiability problem for ATL in [Goranko & van Drimmelen, 2006] that the complexity





This chapter presents a logic, namely Bounded Memory-Communcation Logic (BMCL), to model
and reason about systems of multiple reasoning agents whose resources of memory and communi-
cation are bounded. We extend the logic BML introduced in [Alechina et al., 2006a] which is for
reasoning about systems of a single memory-bounded reasoner to the case of systems of multiple
reasoning agents. Sometimes we also refer to reasoning agents as reasoners.
BML is used for reasoning about systems of single agents, the logic does not support
modelling communication as well as reasoning about the effects of communication bounds on the
abilities of the single agent. Since BMCL is an extension of BML where we take into account the
fact multiple reasoning agents in a system can communicate with each other to exchange infor-
mation. Communication between agents can be vital to them when some information, which they
cannot derive by themselves, is needed in the middle of their reasoning processes. In such systems,
communication is considered as a resource where the limitation on the total amount of exchanging
information can affect the ability of some agents, hence, the whole system.
By setting the limitation on both memory of reasoners in the systems, i.e. the amount of
information that each reasoner can hold in its memory at a time, and communication, i.e. the total
amount of information that each reasoner can send and receive from other agents in the system,
the logic BMCL, which is based on CTL, allows us to reason about the ability of the system to
derive certain results possibly within a restriction of time. This section is organised as follows. In
the next section, we discuss in more detail the models of systems of multiple reasoners. After that
are the syntax and the semantics of the logic BMCL. Then, we study the satisfiability problem of
BMCL. Although the problem of satisfiability of BML was missing in [Alechina et al., 2006a], the
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approach that we introduced in this chapter serves well for the case of BML. Finally, we introduce
an axiomatisation system for BMCL which is shown to be sound and complete. Since BMCL is
an extension of BML, this soundness and completeness result of BMCL also works well for the
counterpart of BML.
3.2 Systems of multiple reasoners
We begin this section by a motivating example. Assume that we are requested to deploy a safety-
critical system in a new building measuring environmental indexes such as temperature, humidity,
the amount of carbon dioxide gas and the amount of leaking household gas. The system consists
of multiple detecting agents (detectors) which are distributed within the building. For convenience,
each detector must be relatively small in size, and can perform some simple forms of reasoning such
as to infer the level of danger based on measurements of the environment. In order to increase the
effectiveness and sensitivity of the system, detectors can communicate with each other to exchange
their reasoning results. Because of the size requirement, each detector has a limitation on the mem-
ory to hold information, on the battery which leads to the limitation on how many messages they
can send and receive through communication. During the design phase of the system, it is important
to verify the correctness and effectiveness of the system such as how many detectors are necessary?
Can it operate correctly (raise alarm when and only when some measurement bypass a threshold of
safety)? How long can a detector operate without changing the battery?
In this section, we abstract such systems as systems of multiple reasoners about which the
logic BMCL reasons. Formally, a system of multiple reasoners consists of a finite number n ∈ N
of reasoners. Each reasoner has an internal memory and a set of inference rules for the purpose
of reasoning about new information. Moreover, each reasoner is associated with a knowledge base
whose size is considerably larger, so that it cannot fit into the internal memory. In order to derive a
goal, a reasoner fetches necessary premises from its knowledge base, then applies an inference rule
to derive the goal or intermediate results. If necessary, the reasoner repeats fetching more premises
from the knowledge base and performing other inference rules again and again until the goal is
achieved.
We have mentioned the size of the internal memory which holds formulas including
premises from the knowledge base, intermediate results and possibly goals of a reasoner. Intu-
itively, one may assume that each cell of an internal memory can store a single symbol used in
a formula, then the size of the internal memory is defined as the number of cells in the internal
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memory. In this situation, if we have a memory of 5 cells, it can hold only two formulas, p → q
which contains three symbols and p (which contains one symbol). One may also prefer having an
empty cell to separate these two formulas in the internal memory, hence, it is required that the total
number of cells used to store two formulas is exactly 5, i.e. the internal memory is full and cannot
hold another formula of any size. The internal memory cannot also hold two formulas p → q and
q → r because the number of symbols in both formulas is six which bypasses the size of the internal
memory. However, we take into account a simpler way to to calculate the size of a internal memory
where cells of the internal memory is defined in a different way. We assume that each cell of an
internal memory can hold one formula of arbitrary length. This means an internal memory of size 5
can hold at most 5 formulas. By using this definition of cell, the representation of any result relat-
ing to the logic BMCL is also technically simpler than the case when a cell can hold only a single
symbol. Therefore, we make an assumption in this chapter that each cell of the internal memory
of a reasoning agent can hold a formula of arbitrary length and the size of the internal memory is
the maximal number of formulas which it can hold at the same time, i.e. the number of cells of
the internal memory. It is worth noticing that the results of the logic BMCL where each cell of an
internal memory is defined to hold only a single symbol can be adapted from the results we present
in this chapter, however, the representation will be unnecessarily more complicated.
In a multi-agent system, agents have the ability to share reasoning results by exchanging
information with each other. Such a communication ability might help an agent to reduce time
for deriving a certain goal. For example, an agent i can carry out the derivation of a result which
is one of the intermediate requirements for another agent j to conclude its goal. Then, while the
agent j attempts to generate intermediate results, the agent i helps j to have one of them. This
reduces the amount of time j needs to conclude the goal in comparison with the situation when j
has to derive all the intermediate results by its own. To model the communication between agents,
the common approach is to define a protocol which specifies how agents establish the connection
between themselves and how to exchange information. A simple and usual way is to use the ask-tell
protocol as presented in [Alechina et al., 2006b]. In ask-tell protocol, an agent requests information
from another by sending an askmessage where it specified the information that it would like to have.
Let us assume that this action cost one step of time. If the other agent are holding the requested
information, it simply replies to the asking agent a tell message where it the requested information
is confirmed. Again, the replying action is assumed to consume another step of time. Overall, a
successful communication by the ask-tell protocol requires at least two steps of time to complete.
We further simplify the ask-tell protocol by introducing the copy protocol where the actions of
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sending an ask message and replying a tell message, which span in two steps of time, are combined
into a single one. In the copy protocol, if an agent asks another for information and the other has
that information, it will reply immediately. The asking and replying are combined into one action,
namely copy, which can be carried out by an “asking” agent if and only if the requested information
is available in the internal memory of the agent to be asked. Although the copy protocol may reduce
the amount of time for an agent to derive a goal, it still can simulate the ask-tell protocol where
the ability of performing the copy action corresponds to a “reply” action replying the ask message
which could be sent some steps previously. When an agent is unable to perform the copy action,
this would mean the asked agent does not have an answer (because either it is deriving the answer
or it is impossible to do so) for an ask message which is sent some steps previously. Notice that
using the ask-tell protocol, it is usually required to have a buffer in the model of each agent to hold
the information which are requested by the others. However, it is not required when using the copy
protocol. Hence, using the copy protocol also simplify the model of agents and communication
between agents. Communication between agents can be restricted by setting a maximal amount
of information which can be exchanged. Similar to the case of memory, the maximal amount of
information can be understood as either the maximal number of symbols used to formalise formulas
exchanged between agents or, in a simpler approach, the maximal number of messages an agent can
send to others. In the case when we use the copy protocol to model communication between agents,
we set the limitation on communication by restricting the maximal number of times each agent can
perform a copy action.
In such a system of multiple reasoners, each reasoning agent has an internal memory
whose size is bounded by some number. We assume that each agent also has the following actions:
Read: An agent retrieves a premise from its knowledge base and places it in some cell of its internal
memory by using a read action. If the cell is not empty, the premise will overwrite the formula
stored in the cell.
Infer: An agent uses an infer action to apply some inference rule over some premises in its internal
memory. Similar to the read action, the resulting formula obtained by applying the inference
rule is placed into the internal memory which may overwrite some formula if the chosen cell
is not empty.
Copy: An agent performs a copy action if it wants to copy a formula which is stored in the internal
memory of another agent into its memory. Similar to two actions above, storing a formula
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may overwrite some formula in the internal memory of the agent which performs the copy
action if the chosen cell is not empty.
Idle: This action is given to every agent for the case when they do not want to do anything. When
an agent performs the idle action, its state, i.e. the content of the internal memory, remains
unchanged.
Let us consider an example of a system of two reasoning agents, namely agent 1 and agent
2. Each agent has an internal memory of size 2. The restriction on communication is 2, i.e. each
agent can perform the copy action at most twice. They have the ability to reason within propositional
logic and share the same set of inference rules which contains only conjunction introduction and





ϕ1 → ϕ2 ϕ1
ϕ2
Informally, the conjunction introduction inference rule means that if an agent has two
formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2 in its memory, it concludes a new formula ϕ1∧ϕ2 and places ϕ1∧ϕ2 somewhere
in its internal memory. Similarly, an agent performs the modus ponens inference rule if it has two
formulas of the forms ϕ1 → ϕ2 and ϕ1, then the agent concludes ϕ2 and places it ϕ2 somewhere in
its internal memory.
Two agents also share the same knowledge base which contains the following formulas:
● A1, A2, A3, A4
● A1 ∧A2 → B1, A3 ∧A4 → B2
● B1 ∧B2 → C
The goal for the system of these two agents is to conclude that C is true. Intuitively, C should
be the case by implying B1 and B2 from A1, A2, A3 and A4 with the help of both inference
rules: conjunction introduction and modus ponens. However, with the restriction on the size of
the internal memory for both agents, it is impossible for one of them to imply C only by itself.
The problem is that, once an agent obtains either B1 or B2, it must reserve one cell in the internal
memory to hold this intermediate result. In order to imply C, the agent needs to have also the
other intermediate result, either B2 or B1, respectively. However, it is required to have two cells
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of memory to do so in order to load either A3 and A4 or A1 and A2, respectively, into the internal
memory. Nevertheless, with the cooperation of both agents, the system can conclude C. Figure 3.1
illustrates one of possible traces for the system to conclude C where each line describes the state of
Step Memory Op. Memory Op.
0 {} Read {} Read
1 {A3} Read {A1} Read
2 {A3,A4} Infer {A1,A2} Infer
3 {A3,A3 ∧A4} Read {A1 ∧A2,A2} Read
4 {A3 ∧A4 → B2,A3 ∧A4} Infer {A1 ∧A2,A1 ∧A2→ B1} Infer
5 {A3 ∧A4 → B2,B2} Copy {A1 ∧A2,B1} Idle
6 {B1,B2} Infer {A1 ∧A2,B1} Idle
7 {B1,B1 ∧B2} Read {A1 ∧A2,B1} Idle
8 {B1 ∧B2 → C,B1 ∧B2} Infer {A1 ∧A2,B1} Idle
9 {C,B1 ∧B2} {A1 ∧A2,B1}
FIGURE 3.1: Two agents cooperate to derive C.
the internal memory for each agent and actions which are chosen correspondingly to perform. The
result of these actions is the internal memory of two agents in the next line. At the initial step, i.e.
step 0, both agents have empty memories and decide to perform a read action where agent 1 and
2 read the formulas A3 and A1 from their knowledge bases, respectively. At step 1, they perform
another read action so that in the next step, A4 andA2 are added into the internal memory of agent 1
and 2, respectively. At this point, agent 1 and 2 perform the conjunction introduction inference rule
to produce A3 ∧A4 and A1 ∧A2, respectively. These intermediate results overwrite the formula A4
in the internal memory of agent 1 andA1 in the internal memory of agent 2, notice that the selection
of formulas to be overwritten is arbitrary. Then, two agents load the “rule” formulas A3 ∧A4 → B2
and A1 ∧A2 → B1 and apply the modus ponens inference rule to conclude B2 and B1, respectively.
At step 5, agent 1 performs a copy action to retrieve B1 from the internal memory of agent 2. Then,
it applies another conjunction introduction inference rule to obtain B1 ∧B2 at step 6. After that, it
loads the rule formulaB1∧B2 → C and performs the modus ponens inference rule to conclude C at
step 9. Notice that from step 5, agent 2 does nothing. It constantly performs the idle action and the
reasoning task of concluding C after step 5 is done only by agent 1. The above trace of computation
is one of possible traces for the system to conclude C, it is easy to draw another trace where both
agents or only agent 2 concludes C at the end.
In this example, it is easy to see that 9 steps of time is the minimal time required for the
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system to conclude C. This minimal time can change if we alter the restriction on memory and
communication. For example, if we forbid communication by setting the limitation of communi-
cation to 0, it is not possible for the system to conclude C as both agents do not have the ability
to conclude C on their own. We can relax the restriction on memory by increasing the size of the
internal memories to 3. In this configuration, the minimal time to conclude C also increases to 13
steps of time, as depicted in Figure 3.2.
Step Memory Op. Memory Op.
0 {} Read {} Idle
1 {A3} Read {} Idle
2 {A3,A4} Infer {} Idle
3 {A3,A3 ∧A4} Read {} Idle
4 {A3 ∧A4 → B2,A3 ∧A4} Infer {} Idle
5 {A3 ∧A4 → B2,B2} Read {} Idle
6 {A1,A3 ∧A4 → B2,B2} Read {} Idle
7 {A1,A2,B2} Infer {} Idle
8 {A1 ∧A2,A2,B2} Read {} Idle
9 {A1 ∧A2,A1 ∧A2 → B1,B2} Infer {} Idle
10 {A1 ∧A2,B1,B2} Infer {} Idle
11 {B1 ∧B2,B1,B2} Read {} Idle
12 {B1 ∧B2,B1 ∧B2 → C,B2} Infer {} Idle
13 {C,B1 ∧B2 → C,B2} {}
FIGURE 3.2: Agent 1 concludes C by itself.
In general, the ability of systems of reasoning agents varies depending on different settings
on the restriction of memory and communication. Hence, the trade-offs are possible between the
size of the internal memory, the restriction of communication and the required time for a derivation.
When the restriction of communication between agents is tighter, agents tend to operate by its
own and require more space for the internal memory to complete reasoning tasks. Furthermore,
this setting also increases the required time to complete derivations. When the size of the internal
memory decreases, agents often need help from others to produce intermediate results, which leads
to the increasing of messages exchanged between them. However, the cooperation between agents
helps their system to solve most problems faster, which reduces the required time to complete
derivations.
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3.3 Syntax and semantics of BMCL
In this section, we present a family of logics, namely, BMCL, each of which allows reasoning
about a system of multiple reasoners as described in the previous section. Let us assume a system
of multiple reasoners consisting of n agents, the set of agents in this system is denoted by N =
{1, . . . , n}. For simplicity, we also assume that all agents in the system agree on a logical language
L, which they use for reasoning, and a finite set IR of inference rules. For simplicity, we assume
that L is a finite set of of formulas. This assumption is reasonable since, in the context of resource
bounds, an agent should not be able to hold in its internal memory a formula of arbitrary length. If
we fix a maximal length for formulas, the language L must be finite. Each inference rule r ∈ IR is
defined as a pair (prer, conr) where:
● prer ⊆ ℘(L) is a set of subsets of required formulas for the rule to be applicable.
● conr ∶ prer → L is a function which specifies the conclusion when the rule r is applied.
We denote the memory bounds, the communication bounds and the knowledge bases for
agents in N by three mappings nmem, ncom andK, respectively, where
● nmem, ncom ∶ N → N are two mappings which specify the restrictions of memory and commu-
nication for each agent in N .
● K ∶ N → ℘(L) is a mapping which defines the knowledge base for each agent in N .
3.3.1 Syntax
The primitive formulas of BMCL are defined as follows:
● Formulas of the form Biα where α ∈ L and i ∈ N : the meaning of the formula Biα is that α
is one of the formulas which are held in the internal memory of the agent i. For convenience,
we define for each i ∈ N that Lmem(i) = {Biα ∣ α ∈ L}, and Lmem = ⋃i∈N Lmem(i).
● Formulas of the form cki where k ∈ N such that 0 ≤ k ≤ ncom(i) and i ∈ N : the meaning of
the formula cki is that the agent i has communicated (or performed the copy action) exactly
k times. For convenience, we define for every i ∈ N , Lcom(i) = {cki ∣ 0 ≤ k ≤ ncom(i)} and,
Lcom = ⋃i∈N Lcom(i). Then, Lcom is called the set of message counters.
3. BOUNDED MEMORY-COMMUNICATION LOGIC 32
Let us now present the syntax of BMCL which is based on CTL.
ϕ ∶∶= ⊺ ∣ Biα ∣ cki ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ψ ∣ EXϕ ∣ E(ϕUψ) ∣ A(ϕUψ)
As usual, the cases of other logical operators are defined in terms of equivalence: ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∨
¬ψ), ϕ→ ψ ≡ ¬ϕ∨ψ and ϕ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ→ ψ)∧(ψ → ϕ). Moreover, we also define other modalities
as in the case of CTL as follows:
AXϕ ≡ ¬EX¬ϕ
AFϕ ≡ A(⊺Uϕ) EFϕ ≡ E(⊺Uϕ)
AGϕ ≡ ¬EF¬ϕ EGϕ ≡ ¬AF¬ϕ
The formula AXϕ is the dual of EXϕ. Its meaning is that for any move a system performs,
ϕ is true in the next state of the system. In other words, this formula epxresses a property which is
unavoidable for the system. Similar to this formula, AFϕ also expresses an unavoidable property
of systems of multiple reasoners. A system has this propety iff for any execution, ϕ is finally true.
The formula EFϕ is used to express the ability of the whole system. It is true when all reasoners in
the system can cooperate so that ϕ is finally true. The last two formulas express properties which
are globally true. The formula AGϕ means ϕ is globally true in a system, for any execution of the
system, meanwhile the formula EGϕ is to express the property where all reasoners in the system
can cooperate to maintain ϕ true forever. Let us give some examples of properties expressed in
BMCL. We reconsider the example of the system of two agents which use conjunction introduction
and modus ponens for reasoning in page 28 of the previous section. We express the property that
the system can conclude C by the following formula:
EF(B1C ∨B2C)
Let us define the modality EXk where k ∈ N by the following equivalence:
EXkϕ ≡ ⋁
0≤i≤k
EX . . .EX´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
i times
ϕ
Then, we can express the property for the restriction of 10 steps of time for the system to conclude
C by the following formula:
EX10(B1C ∨B2C)
From the example, we already knew that it is impossible for the system to conclude C in less than
9 steps of time. Therefore, the formula EX6(B1C ∨B2C) is not a property of the system.
3. BOUNDED MEMORY-COMMUNICATION LOGIC 33
3.3.2 Semantics
Similar to CTL, semantics of BMCL is defined by Kripke structure.
Definition 3. A BMCL transition system is a tripleM = (S,R,V ) where:
1. S is a non-empty set of states.
2. R is a total binary relation on S
3. V ∶ S ×N → ℘(L ∪Lcom).
Semantics of BMCL is defined by means of BMCL transition systems. A transitions
system contains three components: a non-empty set of states S, a set R of transition relations in S
and a mapping which assigns to each state in S and an agent i in N a subset of formulas from the
reasoning language L and message counters in Lcom(i). The subset of formulas is used to describe
the memory of the agent i and the message counters are used to record the number of copy actions
which the agent i has performed. For convenience, we denote Vmem(s, i) = V (s, i) ∩ L as the
memory of an agent i and Vcom(s, i) = V (s, i) ∩Lcom(i) as message counters for the agent i.
Given a BMCL transition system M = (S,R,V ), we define a path in M as an infinite
sequence (s0, s1, s2, . . .) where (si, si+1) ∈ R for all i ≥ 0. The truth of a formula at a state of the
BMCL transition systemM is defined by induction as follows:
● M,s ⊧ ⊺.
● M,s ⊧ Biα iff α ∈ V (s, i) for any α ∈ L and i ∈ N .
● M,s ⊧ cki iff cki ∈ V (s, i) for any i ∈ N .
● M,s ⊧ ¬ϕ iffM,s /⊧ ϕ.
● M,s ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iffM,s ⊧ ϕ orM,s ⊧ ψ.
● M,s ⊧ EXϕ iff there exists s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′) ∈ R andM,s′ ⊧ ϕ.
● M,s ⊧ E(ϕUψ) iff there exists a path (s0 = s, s1, s2, . . .) inM and k ≥ 0 such thatM,si ⊧ ϕ
for all i = 0, . . . , k − 1 andM,sk ⊧ ψ.
● M,s ⊧ A(ϕUψ) iff for any path (s0 = s, s1, s2, . . .) in M , there exists k ≥ 0 such that
M,si ⊧ ϕ for all i = 0, . . . , k − 1 andM,sk ⊧ ψ.
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Given a model M = (S,R,V ), for convenience, we write V (s) = {ϕ ∣ M,s ⊧ ϕ} to
denote the set of all formulas which are true at s ofM .
A formula ϕ is satisfiable iff there exists a model M such that ϕ is true at some state of
M . ϕ is satisfiable in a class of models iff there exists a model M of this class where ϕ is true at
some state of M . ϕ is valid in a model M iff it is true at every state of the model. Finanlly, ϕ is
valid iff it is valid in any model.
3.3.3 Models for systems of multiple agents
To reason about systems of multiple reasoning agents, we are interested in formulas which are
valid in any model of systems of multiple reasoning agents. In this section, we present the class of
BMCL transition systems which correspond to systems of multiple reasoning agents as defined in
Section 3.2. In order to do so, we define several notions in a BMCL transition system to describe
bounds on memory and communication, actions and the applicability of an action.
Given a BMCL transition system M = (S,R,V ), the bounds of memory are defined by
restricting the cardinality of Vmem(s, i) for all agents i ∈ N and states s ∈ S. In other words, for each
agent i ∈ N , the bound of memory is expressed by the condition ∣Vmem(s, i)∣ ≤ nmem(i). Moreover,
at each state, there should be only one counter for each agent to record the number of times an agent
has performed the copy action. This condition is obtained by setting the constraint ∣Vcom(s, i)∣ = 1.
We define the set Act of actions for each agent i inN which contains the following actions
where α,β ∈ L and Γ ⊆ L.
● readi,α,β : Agent i loads a formula α from its knowledge base into its internal memory. The
formula β indicates which formula in the internal memory will be overwritten, especially in
the case when the internal memory is full. If β is not in the internal memory of the agent i, α
will be put into an empty cell of its memory.
● inferri,Γ,α,β: Agent i performs the inference rule r ∈ IR over the set of formulas Γ to conclude
α. Similar to the previous action, the formula β is overwritten by α if it is in the internal
memory of the agent i, otherwise α is loaded into an empty cell of the internal memory.
● copyi,j,α,β: Agent i copies a formula α from the internal memory of another agent j ∈ N
(i /= j). Similar to actions read and infer, the formula β is overwritten by α if it is the
memory of the agent j, otherwise α is loaded into an empty cell of the internal memory.
● Idlei: Agent i performs an idle action when it decides to not do anything.
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We define the set Acts,i of applicable actions for each agent i ∈ N at a state s ∈ S, assume
that α,β ∈ L and Γ ⊆ L.
● readi,α,β ∈ Acts,i iff α ∉ Vmem(s, i), α ∈Ki and if ∣Vmem(s, i)∣ ≥ nmem(i) then β ∈ Vmem(s, i).
● inferri,Γ,α,β ∈ Acts,i iff Γ ∈ prer, α = conr, α ∉ Vmem(s, i), Γ ⊆ Vmem(s, i) and if ∣Vmem(s, i)∣ ≥
nmem(i) then β ∈ Vmem(s, i).
● copyri,j,α,β ∈ Acts,i iff α ∉ Vmem(s, i), α ∈ Vmem(s, j) and if ∣Vmem(s, i)∣ ≥ nmem(i) then
β ∈ Vmem(s, i).
● Idlei is always in Acts,i.
Except the case of the action Idlei, which is available to all agents at any state of a system,
other actions require certain requirements to be applicable. The action readi,α,β is applicable when
α is available from the knowledge base of agent i. Moreover, when the internal memory of the agent
i is full, β must be one of the formulas in the internal memory of the agent so that it is replaced
with α. In the case of inferri,Γ,α,β , it is applicable when agent i has formulas required to fire the rule
r ∈ IR. It is also required β to be one of the formulas in the internal memory when it is full. Finally,
the action copyri,j,α,β is applicable when the agent j has α in the internal memory so that i can copy
α into its internal memory.
When an action is available for an agent to perform at a state of the system, the system
moves to another state where changes of the internal memory and the message counter of the agent
express the effect of the action. In the following, we define the effect of an action a by introducing
its corresponding binary relation Ra ⊆ S × S.
● (s, t) ∈ Rreadi,α,β iff readi,α,β ∈ Acts,i and Vmem(t, i) = Vmem(s, i) ∖ {β} ∪ {α}.
● (s, t) ∈ Rinferri,Γ,α,β iff inferri,Γ,α,β ∈ Acts,i and Vmem(t, i) = Vmem(s, i) ∖ {β} ∪ {α}.
● (s, t) ∈ Rcopyr
i,j,α,β
iff copyri,j,α,β ∈ Acts,i and Vmem(t, i) = Vmem(s, i) ∖ {β} ∪ {α} and
Vcom(t, i) = {cn+1i } where Vcom(s, i) = {cni }
● (s, t) ∈ RIdlei iff V (t, i) = V (s, i).
The action Idlei keeps the internal memory and message counter unchanged. Other ac-
tions only allow the formula α to be added into the internal memory of the agent, if β also appears
in the internal memory, it will be overwritten by α.
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Then, we define the class of models describing systems of multiple reasoning agents as
follows.
Definition 4. The class BMCM(Ki, nmem(i), ncom(i))i∈A of models describing systems of multi-
ple reasoning agents consists of BMCL transition systems M = (V,R,S) satisfying the following
conditions:
1. ∣Vmem(s, i)∣ ≤ nmem(i) and ∣Vcom(s, i)∣ = 1 for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S.
2. ∀(s, t) ∈ R, there exists an joint action (a1, . . . , an) where ai ∈ Acts,i for all i ∈ N such that
(s, t) ∈ Rai for all i ∈ N .
3. Conversely, for all s ∈ S and an joint action (a1, . . . , an) where ai ∈ Acts,i for all i ∈ N , there
exists t ∈ S such that (s, t) ∈ R and (s, t) ∈ Rai for all i ∈ A.
The definition of the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) requires that a BMCL transition sys-
tem is a model for a system of multiple reasoning agents when it satisfies three conditions. The first
condition establishes bounds on memory and communication for agents in the system. It requires
that the set of formulas which depicts the internal memory of an agent does not exceed the maximal
bound on the internal memory of the agent. Then, the model is required to have only one message
counter for each agent. The last two conditions are applied to the binary relation R. A state s ∈ S is
related to another state t ∈ S by R if there is a joint action by agents of the system such that t is the
resulting state of the joint action at state s. Moreover, models in the class are also required in the
last condition that for each joint action which is available for the agents, there must be another state
where the system will move to by performing the joint action.
In the remainder of this chapter, we present the satisfiability problem for formulas of
BMCL by which we show that BMCL is decidable and a sound and complete deductive system for
reasoning in BMCL about systems of multiple reasoning agents.
3.4 The satisfiability problem of BMCL
In this section, we present a procedure to decide the satisfiability of a formula of BMCL in the class
BMCM(K,nmem, ncom). The procedure bases on a characteristic of the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom)
where there is a unique model used as a representative to determine the satisfiability of formulas.
Notice that it is still possible to make use of the procedure for the decidability of CTL [Emerson,
1990] with suitable extensions corresponding to requirements for models in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom).
3. BOUNDED MEMORY-COMMUNICATION LOGIC 37
We omit this approach with the purpose to emphasise the characteristic which models in BMCM(K,
nmem, ncom) share.
3.4.1 The canonical model of BMCM(K,nmem, ncom)
Let us consider an arbitrary modelM = (S,R,V ) in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom). At a state s inM , the
mapping V describes the state of the internal memory and the message counter for each agent in the
system. Moreover, the definition of BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) determines path starting from s. That
is, in a different model M ′ = (S′,R′, V ′) of BMCM(K,nmem, ncom), if there is a state s′ which
replicates s, i.e. V (s, i) = V (s′, i) for all i ∈ N , we have the same set of paths starting from s′ as
those starting from s in M when we do not differentiate states with the same value of V and V ′,
respectively. This property of models in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) suggests considering a canonical
model in the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) which “contains” all models in the class.
Definition 5. The canonical model CM is a triple (Sc,Rc, V c) where
1. Sc = Πi∈N(Li × {0, . . . , ncom(i)}) where Li = {Γ ⊆ L ∣ ∣Γ∣ ≤ nmem(i)}
2. V c((Γj , nj)j∈N , i) = Γi ∪ {cnii } for all i ∈ N .
3. For all s, t ∈ Sc, (s, t) ∈ Rc iff there are ai ∈ Acts,i for all i ∈ N such that (s, t) ∈ Rcai for all
i ∈ N .
We firstly show that CM is in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom).
Lemma 2. CM is a model of the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom).
Proof. The last two conditions in the definition of the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) follow directly
from the definition of CM. To complete the proof, we show the following:
By defintion, for any s ∈ Sc and i ∈ N , V cmem(s, i) = Γ for some Γ ∈ Li. Hence,
∣Γ∣ ≤ nmem(i).
Similarly, for any s ∈ Sc and i ∈ N , V ccom(s, i) = {cni } for some i ∈ {0, . . . , ncom(i)}.
Obviously, we have ∣{cni }∣ = 1.
In the following, we prove that the satisfiability of a formula in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom)
can be determined by only checking the satisfiability of the formula on the canonical model CM.
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Lemma 3. A formula is satisfiable in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) iff it is satisfied by the canonical
model CM.
Proof. Let ϕ be a formula, M = (S,R,V ) a modal in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom). For any state s of
M , assume that Vmem(s, i) = Γsi and Vcom(s, i) = {cn
s
i
i } for all i ∈ N , we define sc = (Γsi , nsi )i∈N ∈
Sc and say that sc corresponds to s. To prove the lemma, we show by induction on the structure of
ϕ that for any s ofM , we haveM,s ⊧ ϕ iff CM, sc ⊧ ϕ.
● If ϕ = Biα, we have
M,s ⊧ Biα⇔ α ∈ Vmem(s, i) = Γsi = V cmem(sc, i)
⇔ α ∈ V cmem(sc, i)
⇔ CM, sc ⊧ Biα
● If ϕ = cki , we have
M,s ⊧ cki ⇔ cki ∈ Vcom(s, i) = {cki } = V ccom(sc, i)
⇔ cki ∈ V ccom(sc, i)
⇔ CM, sc ⊧ cki
● If ϕ = ¬ψ, we have
M,s ⊧ ¬ψ⇔M,s /⊧ ψ
⇔ CM, sc /⊧ ψ by the induction hypothesis
⇔ CM, sc ⊧ ¬ψ
● If ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ϕ2, we have
M,s ⊧ ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 ⇔M,s ⊧ ϕ1 orM,s ⊧ ϕ2
⇔ CM, sc ⊧ ϕ1 or CM, sc ⊧ ϕ2 by the induction hypothesis
⇔ CM, sc ⊧ ϕ1 ∨ϕ2
● If ϕ = EXψ, we have
M,s ⊧ EXψ⇔∃t ∈ S ∶ (s, t) ∈ R andM, t ⊧ ψ
⇔ tc ∈ CM and (sc, tc) ∈ Rc and CM, tc ⊧ ψ
by the definition of CM and the induction hypothesis
⇒ CM, sc ⊧ EXψ
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For the reverse direction, let us assume that CM, sc ⊧ EXψ, this means ∃tc ∈ Sc ∶ (sc, tc) ∈
Rc and CM, tc ⊧ ψ. By the definition of CM, there are ai ∈ Actsc,i such that (sc, tc) ∈ Rcai for
all i ∈ N . However, this also implies that ai ∈ Acts,i for all i ∈ N and there exists t ∈ S such
that (s, t) ∈ Rai for all i ∈ N (hence, (s, t) ∈ R) and tc corresponds to t. Since CM, tc ⊧ ψ,
by the induction hypothesis, we have thatM, t ⊧ ψ. Therefore,M,s ⊧ EXψ.
● If ϕ = E(ϕ1Uϕ2), we have
M,s ⊧ E(ϕ1Uϕ2) ⇔ ∃ a path (s0, . . . , sk, . . .) ofM where
s0 = s,M, sk ⊧ ϕ2 andM,sj ⊧ ϕ1 for all 0 ≤ j < k
⇔ (sc0, . . . , sck, . . .) is a path of CM with
sc0 = s
c,CM, sck ⊧ ϕ2 and CM, scj ⊧ ϕ1 for all 0 ≤ j < k
by the definition of CM and the induction hypothesis
⇒ CM, sc ⊧ E(ϕ1Uϕ2)
For the reverse direction, let us assume that CM, sc ⊧ E(ϕ1Uϕ2), this means there exists
a path (sc0, . . . , sck) of CM where sc0 = sc, (scj−1, scj) ∈ Rc for all 0 < j ≤ k, CM, scj ⊧ ϕ1
for all j < k and CM, sck ⊧ ϕ2. By the definition of CM, for each scj (where j < k), there
are aj,i ∈ Actsc
j
,i such that (scj , scj+1) ∈ Rcaj,i for all i ∈ N . However, this also implies that
a0,i ∈ Acts0,i (where s0 = s) for all i ∈ N and there exists s1 ∈ S such that (s0, s1) ∈ Ra0,i
for all i ∈ N (hence, (s0, s1) ∈ R) and sc1 corresponds to s1. Similarly, we prove that there
are also s2, . . . , sk where (sj−1, sj) ∈ Raj−1,i for all i ∈ N (hence, (sj−1, sj) ∈ R) and scj
corresponds to sj , for all 2 ≤ j ≤ k. Since CM, scj ⊧ ϕ1 for all j < k and CM, sck ⊧ ϕ2, by the
induction hypothesis, we have that CM, sj ⊧ ϕ1 for all j < k and CM, sk ⊧ ϕ2. Therefore,
M,s ⊧ E(ϕ1Uϕ2).
● If ϕ = A(ϕ1Uϕ2),M,s ⊧ A(ϕ1Uϕ2) iff for any path (s0, s1, . . .) starting from s (i.e. s0 = s),
there exists k ≥ 0 such thatM,sk ⊧ ϕ2 andM,sj ⊧ ϕ1 for all 0 ≤ j < k.
We consider an arbitrary path (sc0, sc1, . . .) in CM starting from sc (i.e. sc0 = sc). Since
(sc0, sc1) ∈ Rc, there must be a state s1 of M such that (s0, s1) ∈ R and sc1 corresponds to
s1 according to the definition of BMCM(K,nmem, ncom). Repeating the same argument, we
have that for all j > 0, there exists sj ∈ S such that (sj−1, sj) ∈ R and scj corresponds to
sj . Figure 3.3 illustrates that there exists a path (s0, s1, . . .) in M corresponding to the path
(sc0, sc1, . . .) in CM. Then, (s0, s1, . . .) where s0 = s is a path in M , therefore we have hat
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FIGURE 3.3: Each path is CM has a corresponding path inM .
there exists k ≥ 0 such that M,sk ⊧ ϕ2 and M,sj ⊧ ϕ1 for all 0 ≤ j < k. By the induction
hypothesis, we also have CM, sck ⊧ ϕ2 and CM, scj ⊧ ϕ1 for all 0 ≤ j < k. As the path
(sc0, sc1, . . .) is arbitrary, we conclude that CM, sc0 ⊧ A(ϕ1Uϕ2).
For the reverse direction, let us assume that CM, sc ⊧ A(ϕ1Uϕ2), this means for any path
(sc0, sc1, . . .) of CM where sc0 = sc, (scj−1, scj) ∈ Rc for all 0 < j ≤ k, there exists k ≥ 0 such
that CM, scj ⊧ ϕ1 for all j < k and CM, sck ⊧ ϕ2.
Consider an arbitrary path (s0, s1, . . .) in M starting from s0 = s. Since (sj , sj+1) ∈ R, we
much have scj corresponds to sj and (scj , scj+1) ∈ Rc for all j ≥ 0. Then, (sc0, sc1, . . .) is a path
of CM. Since we have that CM, scj ⊧ ϕ1 for all j < k and CM, sck ⊧ ϕ2 for some k ≥ 0, by the
induction hypothesis, we have that CM, sj ⊧ ϕ1 for all j < k and CM, sk ⊧ ϕ2. Therefore,
M,s ⊧ A(ϕ1Uϕ2).
Since we have shown thatM,s ⊧ ϕ iff CM, sc ⊧ ϕ, the proof of the lemma is straightfor-
ward.
The proof of the above lemma shows that there is a bisimulation [Blackburn et al., 2002,
ch2.] between the canonical model CM and a model in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom). Lemma 3 sug-
gests us to use a model-checking algorithm for CTL to determine the satisfiability in the class
BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) where the canonical model and the candidate formula are inputs of the
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algorithm.
3.4.2 Checking satisfiability on CM
[Katoen, 1998] presented a model-checking procedure for CTL which decides whether a formula
ϕ0 is satisfied by a certain model. In principle, the procedure calculates the set of states satisfying
the formula and replies yes if and only if that set is non-empty. For the satisfiability problem of
BMCL, we utilise the model-checking algorithm procedure for CTL to determine the satisfiability
of a formula on the canonical model CM.
In order to make this section to be self-contained, we recall the decision procedure for the
model checking problem. For the correctness of this procedure, please refer to [Katoen, 1998]. Be-
cause we use the algorithm to check the satisfiability of ϕ only on the canonical model CM, CM is
placed directly into the procedure rather than be used as the input of the procedure. In the following,
we divide the algorithm into three sub-procedures. The Sat procedure is responsible for calculating
the set of states in CM which satisfy the input formula. When the input formula is primitive, the
procedure simply looks for states in CM where their valuation contains the input formula. When
the input formula is composed by logical operators such as negation (¬) and disjunction (∨), the
procedure calculates the set of state satisfying the sub-formulas of the input formula and uses the
corresponding set operators to produce the result. The last two cases for formulas of the forms
E(ϕ1Uϕ2) and A(ϕ1Uϕ2) are dealt with by using two sub-procedures SatEU and SatAU, respec-
tively.
The procedure Sat which calculates the set of states in Sc satisfying an input formula ϕ
is defined in Figure 3.4.
In the procedure Sat, the last two cases corresponding to formulas of the forms E(ϕ1Uϕ2)
and A(ϕ1Uϕ2), respectively, are dealt with the help of two sub-procedures SatEU and SatAU. The
procedure SatEU computes the set of states where ϕ2 is satisfied and other states each of which is
connected with one of the states satisfying ϕ2 by a path along which ϕ1 is satisfied before reaching
the state satisfying ϕ2. Figure 3.5 illustrates the procedure SatEU.
The procedure SatAU operates by collecting all states satisfying ϕ2 and others where ϕ1
is satisfied along any path starting from them satisfy before reaching a state satisfying ϕ2. SatAU is
presented in Figure 3.6.
As the procedure Sat calculates the set of states satisfying the input formula ϕ, we can
determine the satisfiability of ϕ by checking whether the output of the procedure Sat is not empty.
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input : A formula ϕ
output: The set of states in Sc satisfying ϕ
1 begin
2 switch ϕ do
3 case ⊺ return Sc;
4 case Biα return {sc ∈ Sc ∣ α ∈ V cmem(sc, i)};
5 case cni return {sc ∈ Sc ∣ cni ∈ V ccom(sc, i)};
6 case ¬ψ return Sc ∖ Sat(ψ);
7 case ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 return Sat(ϕ1) ∪ Sat(ϕ2);
8 case EXψ return {sc ∈ Sc ∣ ∃tc ∈ Sat(ψ) ∶ (sc, tc) ∈ Sc};
9 case E(ϕ1Uϕ2) return SatEU(ϕ1, ϕ2);
10 case A(ϕ1Uϕ2) return SatAU(ϕ1, ϕ2);
11 endsw
12 end
FIGURE 3.4: The procedure Sat.
If it is not empty, ϕ is satisfied in the canonical model CM; by Lemma 3, ϕ is satisfiable in the class
BMCM(K,nmem, ncom). Before ending this section, let us discuss how difficult it is to solve the sat-
isfiability problem of BMCL. Using the more efficient procedure presented in [Clarke et al., 1986], it
is well-known that the time complexity of the model-checking problem for CTL isO(∣ϕ∣.(∣S∣+∣R∣))
where ϕ is the input formula and S and R are the set of states and the relation of the input model,
respectively. Therefore, we determine roughly the size of the canonical model in order to provide
an upper-bound for the time complexity of the satisfiability problem of BMCL. For simplicity, let us
assume that there are a fixed number n of agents, the size of the logical language is a fixed number
l, all agents have the same knowledge base of fixed size r. Moreover, we also assume that agents
share the same bounds m for memory and c for communication. Then, the cardinality of the set of






Roughly, this number is bounded by cn × (ln)m. To estimate an upper-bound for the size of the
relation of the canonical models, we determine the maximal number of actions available for each
agent at every state. For reading a formula from the knowledge base, there are maximally r possible
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input : Two formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2
output: The set of states in Sc satisfying E(ϕ1Uϕ2)
1 begin
2 Q ∶= Sat(ϕ2);
3 Q′ ∶= ∅; while Q /= Q′ do
4 Q′ ∶= Q;




FIGURE 3.5: The procedure SatEU.
formulas to read. For applying inference rules, each subset of the formulas in the internal memory
of the agent may trigger an inference rule (assume that for any inference rule applied on each
subset, there is only one possible conclusion), hence there are maximally 2m possible ways to apply
inference rules. Finally, for the action Copy, there are at most (n−1)m different formulas which can
be copied from the internal memories of other agents, where n is the number of agents in the system,
which is assumed to be a fixed number. In total, there are maximally (r+2m+(n−1)×m) different
actions. However, we also need to take into account the fact each action also needs to choose which
formula in the memory to be deleted to reserve the space for the new coming formula; therefore,
the actual number of actions available for an agent is limited by (r + 2m + (n − 1) × m) × m.
Then, from a state, there are maximally ((r + 2m + (n − 1) × m) × m)n out-going transitions.
Roughly, we may estimate the upper-bound for the number of transitions in the canonical model as
cn×(ln)m×((r+2m+(n−1)×m)×m)n. As we assume that l, r and n are fixed numbers, this upper-
bound can be written as O((c ×m)n × ((2l)n)m). Overall, we set up an approximate upper-bound
for the time complexity of the satisfiability problem of BMCL as O(∣ϕ∣ × (c ×m)n × ((2l)n)m).
3.5 Axiomatisation for BMCL
In this section, we present a deductive system which allows us to reason about systems of multiple
reasoning agents. In a given system of n agents, the knowledge base, bounds on memory and
communication are characterised by the functionsK, nmem and ncom, respectively. We define a logic
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input : Two formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2
output: The set of states in Sc satisfying A(ϕ1Uϕ2)
1 begin
2 Q ∶= Sat(ϕ2);
3 Q′ ∶= ∅;
4 while Q /= Q′ do
5 Q′ ∶= Q;




FIGURE 3.6: The procedure SatAU.
BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) which allows reasoning about the above system. Because BMCL is based
on CTL, the axiomatisation for BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) contains all axioms and inference rules of
CTL. Moreover, it also contains axioms which correspond to properties of BMCM(K,nmem, ncom)
3.5.1 Axioms
Let us introduce some notations. For each state sc = (Γi, ni)i∈N ∈ Sc in the canonical model CM of
the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom), we denote






¬Biα ∧ cnii )
This means the formula ⋀ sc is the conjunction of all primitive formulas in V c(sc). We write
Rc(sc) = {tc ∈ Sc ∣ (sc, tc) ∈ Rc} to denote the set of all states related to sc by the relation Rc.
The axiomatisation for BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) contains all axioms and inference rules of CTL (see
Section 2.2.3), together with the following additional axioms:
A1 ⋀α∈ΓBiα → ¬Biα′ for all i ∈ N , Γ ⊆ L and ∣Γ∣ > nmem(i), and α′ ∈ L.
A2a ⋁n∈{0,...,ncom(i)} cni for all i ∈ N .
A2b cki → ¬ck′i for all i ∈ N , k, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , nC(i)} and k /= k′.
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A3a ⋀ sc → EX(⋀ tc) for every sc, tc ∈ Sc and (sc, tc) ∈ Rc.
A3b ⋀ sc → AX(⋁tc∈Rc(sc)(⋀ tc)) for every sc ∈ Sc.
It is worth noticing that the additional axioms correspond to exactly the requirements of
models in the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) and they will facilitate showing the soundness and com-
pleteness of the axiomatisation. In particular, the axiom A1 makes sure that any agent in the system
can hold in its internal memory maximally nmem(i) formulas. The axiom A2a states that there is a
message counter for each agent while the axiom A2b says that if there is a message counter for an
agent, the agent must not have another message counter. Hence, the axioms A2a and A2b together
make sure that there is exactly one message counter for each agent. The axiom A3a corresponds
to the requirement of models in the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) that for every joint action for the
agents in the system, there is move by the system to another state by performing this action. Sim-
ilarly, the axiom A3b is about the requirement of models in the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) that
for from a state, the system can move to another state only by performing a joint action which is
available for the agents.
As usual, we define that a formula ϕ is a theorem iff it can be proved in the axiomatisation,
written as ⊢BMCL ϕ. The logic BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) is defined to be the set of all theorems in
BMCL(K,nmem, ncom). Moreover, ϕ is consistent iff its negation is not proved, i.e. /⊢BMCL ¬ϕ.
We have the following result.
Theorem 1. The logic BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) is sound and complete with respect to the class
BMCM(K,nmem, ncom).
In the next of this section, we present the proof of Theorem 1.
3.5.2 The Soundness and Completeness of BMCL
We show the soundness of BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) by proving that all the additional axioms are
valid in the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom). According to Lemma 3, a formula is satisfiable in
BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) iff it is satisfied in the canonical model CM. This is similar to say that
a formula is valid in BMCM(K,nmem, ncom) iff it is valid in the canonical model CM. Therefore,
we show that all additional axioms are valid by using the canonical model. In the following, we
show the validity of each additional axiom.
Let us consider the formula ϕ = ⋀α∈ΓBiα → ¬Biα′ where i ∈ N and α′ ∈ L, for some
Γ ⊆ L such that ∣Γ∣ > nmem(i). Let sc be an arbitrary state in Sc, as ∣V cmem(sc, i)∣ ≤ nmem(i), there
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exists α ∈ Γ such that α ∉ V cmem(sc, i). Hence, we have that CM, sc /⊧ Biα. This implies CM, sc /⊧
⋀α∈ΓBiα, hence CM, sc ⊧ ϕ. This means ϕ is true in any state of CM, i.e. ⋀α∈ΓBiα → ¬Biα′ is
valid in CM.
Let us consider the formula ϕ = ⋁k∈{0,...,ncom(i)} cki where i ∈ N . Let sc be an arbitrary
state in Sc, as V ccom(sc, i) = {cki } for some k ∈ {0, . . . , ncom(i)}, CM, sc ⊧ cki , hence CM, sc ⊧
⋁k∈{0,...,ncom(i)} cki . This means ϕ is true in any state of CM, i.e. ⋁k∈{0,...,ncom(i)} cki is valid in CM.
Let us consider the formula ϕ = cki → ¬ck′i where i ∈ N , k, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , nC(i)} and





com(sc, i), which implies CM, sc ⊧ ¬ck′i . Therefore, CM, sc ⊧ cki → ¬ck′i . This means ϕ is
true in any state of CM, i.e. cki → ¬ck′i is valid in CM.
Let us consider the formula ϕ = ⋀ sc → EX(⋀ tc) where sc, tc ∈ Sc and (sc, tc) ∈ Rc.
Since only at state sc, CM, sc ⊧ ⋀ sc, CM, uc ⊧ ⋀ sc → EX(⋀ tc) for all uc /= sc. In the case of
sc, as (sc, tc) ∈ Rc and we have that CM, tc ⊧ ⋀ tc, this implies CM, sc ⊧ ⋀EXtc. Therefore,
CM, sc ⊧ ⋀ sc → EX(⋀ tc). This means ϕ is true in any state of CM, i.e. ⋀ sc → EX(⋀ tc) is valid
in CM.
Let us consider the formula ϕ = ⋀ sc → AX(⋁tc∈Rc(sc)(⋀ tc)) where sc ∈ Sc. Since
only at state sc, CM, sc ⊧ ⋀ sc, CM, uc ⊧ ⋀ sc → AX(⋁tc∈Rc(sc)(⋀ tc)) for all uc /= sc. In
the case of sc, for each uc ∈ Rc(sc), we have that (sc, uc) ∈ Rc and CM, uc ⊧ ⋀uc, this im-
plies CM, uc ⊧ ⋀⋁tc∈Rc(sc)(⋀ tc), hence CM, sc ⊧ ⋀AX(⋁tc∈Rc(sc)(⋀ tc)). Therefore, CM, sc ⊧
⋀ sc → AX(⋁tc∈Rc(sc)(⋀ tc)). This meansϕ is true in any state ofCM, i.e. ⋀ sc → AX(⋁tc∈Rc(sc)(⋀ tc))
is valid in CM.
We have shown the validity of all additional axioms for BMCL(K,nmem, ncom).
In the following, we prove the completeness of the axiomatisation. The usual approach
to address the completeness (such as CTL [Emerson, 1990]) is to prove that any consistent formula
is satisfiable. However, as shown by Lemma 3, a formula is satisfiable if and only if it is satisfiable
in the canonical model CM. This suggests to us to show that any consistent formula is satisfiable in
the canonical model CM rather than build a model in the class BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) to satisfy it.
In order to show that a consistent formula of BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) is satisfiable in the
canonical model, we make use of the following result.
Lemma 4. For any formula ϕ and a state sc ∈ Sc, either ⋀ sc → ϕ or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ is valid in the
class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom).
Proof. Let us prove this lemma by using the canonical model CM. Notice that, to show a formula ϕ
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is valid in the class BMCM(K,nmem, ncom), we only need to prove that ϕ is valid in the canonical
model CM.
Obviously, CM, tc /⊧ sc for any tc /= sc. Therefore, either ⋀ sc → ϕ or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ is valid
if and only if one of them is true at sc.
Let us assume to the contrary that both formulas are not true at sc. That is CM, sc /⊧
⋀ sc → ϕ and CM, sc /⊧ ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ. This implies that CM, sc /⊧ ¬ϕ and CM, sc /⊧ ϕ, respectively,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, either ⋀ sc → ϕ or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ is true at sc. Hence, either
⋀ sc → ϕ or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ is valid in the canonical model CM.
The above lemma implies that the conjunction of primitive formulas at a state of the
canonical model contains enough information to conclude the truth of any formula, even those
which contain temporal modalities such as AX, EX and other where the truth also depends on the
truth of formulas at other states of the canonical model. This is not true in modal logic. For example,
if we consider Prop = {p, q} and a formula ◇p, then both formulas p ∧ q → ◇p and p ∧ q → ¬◇ p
are not valid by modelsM1 andM2, respectively, as depicted in Figure 3.7. In particular, we have
thatM1, s /⊧ p ∧ q →◇p andM2, s /⊧ p ∧ q → ¬◇ p.
FIGURE 3.7: Models falsify p ∧ q →◇p and p ∧ q → ¬◇ p.
Furthermore, the validity of either⋀ sc → ϕ or⋀ sc → ¬ϕ suggests that either of them is a
theorem of BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) for any formula ϕ. If this can be proved, we have a consequence
that any maximally consistent set of BMCL(K,nmem, ncom) is determined by the primitive formulas
in the set. This means if there are two maximally consistent sets which share the same set of
primitive formulas, they must be the same. We show this by assuming to the contrary that this
two sets Γ1 and Γ2 are not the same. That is there is a formula ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Γ1 and ¬ϕ ∈ Γ2.
Because Γ1 and Γ2 share the same set of primitive formulas Γ, we have that either ⋀ψ∈Γψ → ϕ or
⋀ψ∈Γψ → ¬ϕ is a theorem. Without loss of generality, we assume that ⋀ψ∈Γψ → ϕ is the case,
which implies that ϕ ∈ Γ2 which contradicts to the fact that Γ2 is consistent. Therefore, Γ1 and Γ2
must be the same. Notice that the argument we have so far is based on the assumption that we can
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prove either ⋀ sc → ϕ or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ is a theorem. If it is the case, we can select suitable states in
the canonical model to satisfy a consistent formula which completes the proof of completeness for
the logic BMCL(K,nmem, ncom). Before showing that, let us prove our desired result.
Lemma 5. For any formula ϕ and a state sc ∈ Sc, either ⋀ sc → ϕ or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ is a theorem of
the logic BMCL(K,nmem, ncom).
Proof. The proof is done by the induction on the structure of the formula ϕ.
● Assume that ϕ is a primitive formula of the form Biα where i ∈ N and α ∈ L. If α ∈
V cmem(sc, i), then Biα is one of the conjuncts in the formula ⋀ sc. Hence, by propositional
tautologies, we have that ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → Biα.
Otherwise, α ∉ V cmem(sc, i), then ¬Biα is one of the conjuncts in the formula ⋀ sc. Hence, by
propositional tautologies, we have that ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ¬Biα.
● Assume that ϕ is a primitive formula of the form cki where i ∈ N and k ∈ {0, . . . , ncom(i)}. If
cki ∈ V ccom(sc, i), then cki is one of the conjuncts in the formula ⋀ sc. Hence, by propositional
tautologies, we have that ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → cki .
Otherwise, cki ∉ V ccom(sc, i), then ck′i for some k′ /= k is one of the conjuncts in the formula
⋀ sc. Hence, by axiom A2b and propositional tautologies, we have that ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ¬cki .
● Assume that ϕ is of the form ¬ψ. By the induction hypothesis, we have that either ⋀ sc → ψ
or ⋀ sc → ¬ψ is a theorem of the logic BMCL(K,nmem, ncom). If ⋀ sc → ¬ψ is a theorem,
the proof is immediate. If ⋀ sc → ψ is a theorem, then by propositional tautologies, we have
that ⋀ sc → ¬¬ψ is also a theorem.
● Assume that ϕ is of the form ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. By the induction hypothesis, we have that either
⋀ sc → ϕ1 or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ1 and either ⋀ sc → ϕ2 or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ2 are theorems of the logic
BMCL(K,nmem, ncom).
If either ⋀ sc → ϕ1 or ⋀ sc → ϕ2 is a theorem, by propositional tautologies, we have that
⋀ sc → ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 is a theorem.
If both of⋀ sc → ¬ϕ1 or⋀ sc → ¬ϕ2 are theorems, by propositional tautologies, we have that
⋀ sc → ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 is a theorem. This implies that ⋀ sc → ¬(ϕ1 ∨ϕ2) is a theorem.
● Assume that ϕ is of the form EXψ. By the induction hypothesis, we have that either⋀ tc → ψ
or ⋀ tc → ¬ψ is a theorem where tc ∈ Rc(sc).
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If there exists tc ∈ Rc(sc) such that ⋀ tc → ψ is a theorem, we have the following proof:
1. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ψ
2. ⊢BMCL EX⋀ tc → EXψ by 1 and CTL
3. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → EX⋀ tc by axiom A3a
4. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → EXψ by 2, 3 and propositional tautologies
If ⋀ tc → ¬ψ is a theorem for all tc ∈ Rc(sc), we have the following proof:
1. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ¬ψ for all tc ∈ Rc(sc)
2. ⊢BMCL ( ⋁
tc∈Rc(sc)
(⋀ tc)) → ¬ψ by 1 and propositional tautologies
3. ⊢BMCL AX( ⋁
tc∈Rc(sc)
(⋀ tc)) → AX¬ψ by 2 and CTL
4. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → AX ⋁
tc∈Rc(sc)
(⋀ tc) by axiom A3b
5. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → AX¬ψ by 3, 4 and propositional tautologies
6. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ¬EXψ by 5 and CTL
● Assume that ϕ is of the form E(ϕ1Uϕ2). In order to prove that ⋀ sc → E(ϕ1Uϕ2) is a
theorem, we attempt to construct a path which witnesses the fulfilment of E(ϕ1Uϕ2) from
sc. We start the construction from sc. By the induction hypothesis, we must know that
either ⋀ sc → ϕ1 or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ1 and either ⋀ sc → ϕ2 or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ2 are theorems. If
⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ϕ2, sc is enough to conclude that ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → E(ϕ1Uϕ2). Otherwise,
for ⋀ sc → E(ϕ1Uϕ2) to be a theorem, we must at least have that ⋀ sc → ϕ1 is a theorem and
pass the checking of the fulfilment for E(ϕ1Uϕ2) on some successors of sc (since we do not
know which successor is the right choice, we try all of them). For each successor, we repeat
the checking as we did with sc. The construction terminates when either we reach a state tc
where ⋀ tc → ϕ2 is a theorem or there is no successor to consider.
Let us consider an example of the construction as depicted in Figure 3.8. In this example,
we draw a state s as a circle to assume that ⋀ s → ϕ1 is a theorem and as a solid black
circle to assume that ⋀ s → ϕ2 is a theorem. States s where we assume both ⋀ s → ¬ϕ1 and
⋀ s→ ¬ϕ2 are theorems are marked with the symbol “x”. We start the construction at a state
s0. Since ⋀ s0 → ϕ1 is a theorem, we continue considering all successors of s0 which are
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FIGURE 3.8: The construction of a path for the fulfilment of E(ϕ1Uϕ2).
s01, s02, s03 and s04. Because only ⋀ s01 → ϕ1 and ⋀ s03 → ϕ1 are theorems, we continue
considering successors of s01 and s03 which are s011, s031 and s032. When we reach s032, the
construction terminates as ⋀ s032 → ϕ2 is a theorem. Let us define the construction formally
as follows. We say that a state sc ∈ Sc is potential for E(ϕ1Uϕ2) if either ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ϕ1
or ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ϕ2. Given a sub-set of states∆ ⊆ Sc, we denote
REc(∆) = {tc ∈ Sc ∣ ∃uc ∈∆ ∶ and tc ∈ Rc(uc)}
Informally, REc(∆) determines the set of successor states of some state in ∆ according to









c) ∪ {tc ∈ Sc ∖ REci(sc) ∣ t
c ∈ REc(REci(sc)) and
tc ∈ Sc is potential for E(ϕ1Uϕ2)
}
At each step of the construction, we add into REci+1(sc) states which are potential to satisfy
E(ϕ1Uϕ2) and also related to some states in REci(sc). The construction terminates when
either there exists a state tc ∈ REci+1(sc) such that ⋀ tc → ϕ2 is a theorem or REci+1(sc) =
REci(sc) for some i ≥ 0. Since Sc is finite, the construction must terminate at some i = l ∈ N.
We define REc∗(sc) = REcl (sc).
For convenience, we define a binary relation
Ec(REc∗(sc)) = {(tc, uc) ∈ Rc ∣ ∃j < l ∶ tc ∈ REcj(sc) and uc ∈ REcj+1(sc) ∖ REcj(sc)}
The binary relation Ec(REc∗(sc)) is a subset of Rc over states in REc∗(sc) where loops are
eliminated. This fact facilitates the following argument. According to the definition of
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REc∗(sc), for any tc ∈ REc∗(sc), there must be a path s0s1 . . . sk in Ec(REc∗(sc)) such that
s0 = sc and sk = tc where (sj , sj+1) ∈ Ec(REc∗(sc)) for all j < k.
If there exists tc ∈ REc∗(sc) such that ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ϕ2 is a theorem, there must be a path
s0s1 . . . sk inE
c(REc∗(sc))where s0 = sc and sk = tc, and hence we have the following proof:
1. ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → EX⋀ si+1 for all i ≤ k, by axiom A3a
2. ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → ϕ1 for all i < k
3. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk → ϕ2
4. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk → E(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 3 and CTL
5. ⊢BMCL EX⋀ sk → EXE(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 4 and CTL
6. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → EX⋀ sk from 1
7. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → EXE(ϕ1Uϕ2) from 5, 6 and propositional tautologies
8. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → ϕ1 from 2
9. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → ϕ1 ∧ EXE(ϕ1Uϕ2) from 7, 8 and propositional tautologies
10. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → E(ϕ1Uϕ2) from 9 and CTL
⋮
11. ⊢BMCL ⋀ s0 → E(ϕ1Uϕ2) by repeating 4,. . . ,10 until s0, notice that s0 = sc
Hence, ⋀ sc → E(ϕ1Uϕ2) is a theorem.
If, for all tc ∈ REc∗(sc), ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ¬ϕ2 is a theorem, according to the definition of
REc∗(sc), we have that for every tc ∈ REc(REc∗(sc)) ∖ REc∗(sc), both ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ¬ϕ1
and ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ¬ϕ2 are theorems, otherwise tc must be in REc∗(sc). We denote θ1 ≡
⋁tc∈REc∗(sc)⋀ tc and θ2 ≡ ⋁tc∈REc(REc∗(sc))∖REc∗(sc)⋀ tc. Let θ ≡ θ1 ∨ θ2, for any tc ∈ REc∗(sc),
we have that Rc(tc) ⊆ REc∗(sc) ∪ REc(REc∗(sc)), hence ⋁uc∈Rc(tc)(⋀uc) → θ is a theorem.
We have the following proof:
1. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ϕ1 for all tc ∈ REc∗(sc)
2. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ¬ϕ2 for all tc ∈ REc∗(sc)
3. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ¬ϕ1 for all tc ∈ REc(REc∗(sc)) ∖ REc∗(sc)
4. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ¬ϕ2 for all tc ∈ REc(REc∗(sc)) ∖ REc∗(sc)
5. ⊢BMCL θ1 → ϕ1 by 1 and propositional tautologies
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6. ⊢BMCL θ1 → ¬ϕ2 by 2 and propositional tautologies
7. ⊢BMCL θ2 → ¬ϕ1 by 3 and propositional tautologies
8. ⊢BMCL θ2 → ¬ϕ2 by 4 and propositional tautologies
9. ⊢BMCL θ → θ1 ∨ θ2
10. ⊢BMCL (θ ∧ϕ1) → (θ1 ∧ϕ1) ∨ (θ2 ∧ϕ1) by 9 and propositional tautologies
11. ⊢BMCL (θ2 ∧ϕ1) →  by 7 and propositional tautologies
12. ⊢BMCL (θ ∧ϕ1) → (θ1 ∧ϕ1) by 10, 11 and propositional tautologies
13. ⊢BMCL (θ ∧ϕ1) → θ1 by 12 and propositional tautologies
14. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → AX( ⋁
uc∈Rc(tc)
(⋀uc)) for all tc ∈ REc∗(sc), by axiom A3b
15. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → AXθ for all tc ∈ REc∗(sc), by 14, CTL and propositional tautologies
16. ⊢BMCL θ1 → AXθ by 15 and propositional tautologies
17. ⊢BMCL (θ ∧ϕ1) → AXθ by 13, 16 and propositional tautologies
18. ⊢BMCL θ → (ϕ1 → AXθ) by 17 and propositional tautologies
19. ⊢BMCL θ → ¬ϕ2 by 6, 8 and propositional tautologies
20. ⊢BMCL θ → (¬ϕ2 ∧ (ϕ1 → AXθ)) by 18,19 and propositional tautologies
21. ⊢BMCL AG(θ → (¬ϕ2 ∧ (ϕ1 → AXθ))) by 20 and CTL
22. ⊢BMCL θ → ¬E(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 21 and CTL
23. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → θ by propositional tautologies
24. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ¬E(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 22, 23 propositional tautologies
Hence, ⋀ sc → ¬E(ϕ1Uϕ2) is a theorem.
● Assume that ϕ is of the form A(ϕ1Uϕ2). In order to prove that ⋀ sc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2) is a
theorem, we attempt to construct a sub-graph of the canonical model starting from sc which
contains the prefixes of any path starting from sc in CM, and show that at all leaves s of the
sub-graph, we have ⋀ s → ϕ2 is a theorem and at other states t in the sub-graph, ⋀ t → ϕ1 is
a theorem. We start the construction from sc, by the induction hypothesis, we must know that
either ⋀ sc → ϕ1 or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ1 and either ⋀ sc → ϕ2 or ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ2 are theorems. If ⋀ sc →
ϕ2, it is enough to conclude that ⋀ sc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2). Otherwise, for ⋀ sc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2)
to be a theorem, we must at least have that ⋀ sc → ϕ1 is a theorem and pass the checking
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of the fulfilment for A(ϕ1Uϕ2) on all successors of sc. For each successor, we repeat the
checking as we did with sc. The construction terminates when either we reach a state tc
where ⋀ tc → ¬ϕ1 and ⋀ tc → ¬ϕ2 are theorems or there is no successor to consider.
FIGURE 3.9: The construction of a sub-graph for the fulfilment of A(ϕ1Uϕ2).
Let us consider an example of the construction as depicted in Figure 3.9. Similar to the
example in Figure 3.8, we also draw a state s as a circle to assume that⋀ s→ ϕ1 is a theorem,
and as a solid black circle to assume that ⋀ s → ϕ2 is a theorem. States s where we assume
both ⋀ s → ¬ϕ1 and ⋀ s → ¬ϕ2 are theorems are marked with the symbol “x”. We start
the construction at a state s0. Since ⋀ s0 → ϕ1 is a theorem, we continue considering all
successors of s0 which are s1, s2 and s3. Because only ⋀ s1 → ϕ2 is a theorem, we continue
considering successors of s2 and s3 which are s4, s5, s6 and s7. When we reach s7, the
construction terminates because both ⋀ s7 → ¬ϕ1 and ⋀ s7 → ¬ϕ2 are theorems. In fact, s7
can be used as a witness to prove that ⋀ s0 → ¬A(ϕ1Uϕ2) is a theorem.
We say that a state sc ∈ Sc is potential for A(ϕ1Uϕ2) if either ⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ϕ1 or
⊢BMCL ⋀ sc → ϕ2. Given a sub-set of states∆ ⊆ Sc, we define
∆ϕ1 = {tc ∈∆ ∣⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ϕ1 and /⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ϕ2}
RAc(∆) = {tc ∈ Sc ∣ ∃uc ∈∆ϕ1 ∶ tc ∈ Rc(uc)}
The set RAc(∆) facilitates the construction by introducing candidate states at each step of the
construction. We contruct the set RAci(sc) of states where i ∈ N incrementally as follows.
RAc0(sc) ={sc}
RAci+1(sc) =RAci(sc) ∪ {tc ∈ Sc ∖ RAci(sc) ∣ tc ∈ RAc(RAci(sc))}
3. BOUNDED MEMORY-COMMUNICATION LOGIC 54
The above construction terminates when either a state swhich is not potential for for A(ϕ1Uϕ2)
is added into RAci(sc) or RAci+1(sc) = RAci(sc). Since Sc is finite, the construction must ter-
minate at some step i = l ∈ N. We define RAc∗(sc) = RAcl (sc).
We define a binary relation
Ac(RAc∗(sc)) = {(tc, uc) ∈ Rc ∣ tc ∈ RAc∗(sc) and uc ∈ RAc∗(sc)}
According to the definition of RAc∗(sc), for any tc ∈ RAc∗(sc)), there must be a path s0s1 . . . sk
in RAc(RAc∗(sc)) such that s0 = sc and sk = tc where (sj , sj+1) ∈ Ac(RAc∗(sc)) for all j < k.
The distance from sc to tc is the length of the longest path from sc to tc.
We say that a path (s0, . . . , sk) in RAc∗(sc) is a ϕ1-cycle iff si ∈ RAc∗(sc) for all i ≤ k,
(si, si+1) ∈ Rc for all i < k, (sk, s0) ∈ Rc, ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → ϕ1 for all i ≤ k and ⊢BMCL ⋀ si →
¬ϕ2 for all i ≤ k.
If there is a ϕ1-cycle (t0, . . . , tk) in RAc∗(sc), according to the construction of RAc∗(sc), there
must be a finite path (s0, . . . , sl) for some l ∈ N where s0 = sc, sl = t0, (si, si+1) ∈ Rc
for all i < l, ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → ϕ1 for all i ≤ l and ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → ¬ϕ2 for all i ≤ l. Let
θ = ⋁i≤l(⋀ si) ∨ ⋁i≤k(⋀ ti). We have the following proof:
1. ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → ϕ1 for all i ≤ l
2. ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → ¬ϕ2 for all i ≤ l
3. ⊢BMCL ⋀ ti → ϕ1 for all i ≤ k
4. ⊢BMCL ⋀ ti → ¬ϕ2 for all i ≤ k
5. ⊢BMCL θ → ϕ1 by 1, 3 and propositional tautologies
6. ⊢BMCL θ → ¬ϕ2 by 2, 4 and propositional tautologies
7. ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → EX⋀ si+1 for all i < l, by axiom A3a
8. ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → θ for all i ≤ l, by propositional tautologies
9. ⊢BMCL EX⋀ si → EXθ for all i ≤ l, by 8 and CTL
10. ⊢BMCL ⋀ si → EXθ for all i < l, by 7, 9 and propositional tautologies
11. ⊢BMCL ⋀ ti → EX⋀ ti+1 for all i < k, by axiom A3a
12. ⊢BMCL ⋀ ti → θ for all i ≤ k, by propositional tautologies
13. ⊢BMCL EX⋀ ti → EXθ for all i ≤ k, by 12 and CTL
14. ⊢BMCL ⋀ ti → EXθ for all i < k, by 13 and propositional tautologies
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15. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tk → EX⋀ t0 by axiom A3a
16. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tk → θ by propositional tautologies
17. ⊢BMCL EX⋀ tk → EXθ by 16 and CTL
18. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tk → EXθ by 17 and propositional tautologies
19. ⊢BMCL ⋀ θ → EXθ by 10, 14, 18 and propositional tautologies
20. ⊢BMCL ⋀ θ → (ϕ1 → EXθ) by 19, 5 and propositional tautologies
21. ⊢BMCL ⋀ θ → ¬ϕ2 ∧ (ϕ1 → EXθ) by 20, 6 and propositional tautologies
22. ⊢BMCL ⋀ θ → ¬A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 21 and CTL
If there is a state tc in RAc∗(sc) which is not potential for A(ϕ1Uϕ2), there must be a path
s0, . . . , sk, where s0 = sc and sk = tc, in Ac(RAc∗(sc)) such that for all i < k, ⋀ si → ¬ϕ2 is a
theorem (otherwise, tc cannot be in RAc∗(sc)). We have the following proof:
1. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk → ¬ϕ1 since tc = sk is not potential for A(ϕ1Uϕ2)
2. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk → ¬ϕ2 since tc = sk is not potential for A(ϕ1Uϕ2)
3. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk → ¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 1 and propositional tautologies
4. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk → ¬ϕ2 ∧ (¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2)) by 2, 3 and propositional tautologies
5. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk → ¬A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 4 and CTL
6. ⊢BMCL ⋀EXsk → EX¬A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 5 and CTL
7. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → EX⋀ sk by axiom A3a
8. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → EX¬A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 6, 7 and propositional tautologies
9. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → ¬AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 8 and CTL
10. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → ¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 10 and propositional tautologies
11. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → ¬ϕ2
12. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → ¬ϕ2 ∧ (¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2)) by 10, 11 and propositional tautologies
13. ⊢BMCL ⋀ sk−1 → ¬A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 12 and CTL
⋮
14. ⊢BMCL ⋀ s0 → ¬A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by repeating 5,. . . ,13 until s0, notice that s0 = sc
Hence, sc → ¬A(ϕ1Uϕ2) is a theorem.
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Let us now assume that there is no ϕ1-cycle and no state which is not potential for A(ϕ1Uϕ2)
in RAc∗(sc). We first show that there must be a state s ∈ RAc∗(sc) such that ⋀ s → ϕ2 is a
theorem. Assume to the contrary that there is no such state in RAc∗(sc). This means for all
states s ∈ RAc∗(sc) we have that ⋀ s → ϕ1 and ⋀ s → ¬ϕ2 are theorems. Let us consider an
arbitrary state tc ∈ RAc∗(sc), according to the construction of RAc∗(sc), there must be a path
(s0, . . . , sk) from sc to tc in RAc∗(sc) where s0 = sc and sk = tc. Since there is no ϕ1-cycle in
RAc∗(sc), no state occurs twice in the path (s0, . . . , sk). Since sk has at least one successor,
according to the construction of RAc∗(sc), the successor must be in RAc∗(sc). However, this
successor must not occur in the path (s0, . . . , sk) (otherwise, we have a ϕ1-cycle). Let us call
this successor as sk+1 and extend (s0, . . . , sk) to (s0, . . . , sk+1). Then we repeat considering
sk+1 as we did with sk. Finally, we end up with a path (s0, . . . , sk, . . . , sl) which traverses
every state in RAc∗(sc) at most once. Again, we consider sl which must have a successor.
This successor must be in RAc∗(sc), which implies that it is one of the states in the path
(s0, . . . , sk, . . . , sl). Hence, we encounter a ϕ1-cycle in RAc∗(sc), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, if there is no ϕ1-cycle and no state which is not potential for A(ϕ1Uϕ2) in
RAc∗(sc), there must be a state s ∈ RAc∗(sc) such that ⋀ s → ϕ2 is a theorem. Given a
state sc ∈ RAc∗(sc) where ⋀ s → ϕ2 is a theorem, we define the distance from a state sc to
ϕ2 is 0. Given a state s
c ∈ RAc∗(sc) where ⋀ s → ¬ϕ2 is a theorem, we define the distance
from a state sc to ϕ2 is the length of the longest path from s
c to some first state tc ∈ RAc∗(sc)
where ⋀ tc → ϕ2 is a theorem. Such a path must exist, otherwise, we can point out a ϕ1-
cycle in RAc∗(sc). Furthermore, the length of the path is finite because there is no ϕ1-cycle in
RAc∗(sc). In the following, we prove that, for every state tc ∈ RAc∗(sc), ⋀ tc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2) is
a theorem by the induction on the distance from tc to ϕ2.
– In the base case, the distance from tc to ϕ2 is 0, we have the following proof:
1. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ϕ2
2. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ϕ2 ∨ (ϕ1 ∧AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2)) by 1 and propositional tautologies
3. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 2 and CTL
– In the induction step, the distance from tc to ϕ2 is greater than 0, we must have that
⊢BMCL⋀ tc → ϕ1 (3.1)
⊢BMCL⋀ tc → ¬ϕ2 (3.2)
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According to the definition of RAc∗(sc), for every uc ∈ Rc(tc), we have uc ∈ RAc∗(sc).
Of course, the distance from tc to ϕ2 is greater than that from any u
c ∈ Rc(tc). By the
induction hypothesis, we have that for all uc ∈ Rc(tc), ⋀uc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2) is a theorem.
We have the following proof:
1. ⊢BMCL ⋀uc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2) for all uc ∈ Rc(tc)
2. ⊢BMCL ⋁
uc∈Rc(tc)
⋀uc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 1 and propositional tautologies
3. ⊢BMCL AX( ⋁
uc∈Rc(tc)
⋀uc) → AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 2 and CTL
4. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → AX( ⋁
uc∈Rc(tc)
⋀uc) by axiom A3b
5. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 3, 4 and propositional tautologies
6. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ϕ1 from (3.1)
7. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → (ϕ1 ∧AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2)) by 5, 6 propositional tautologies
8. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → ϕ2 ∨ (ϕ1 ∧AXA(ϕ1Uϕ2)) by 7 and propositional tautologies
9. ⊢BMCL ⋀ tc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2) by 8 and CTL
Since sc ∈ RAc∗(sc), we have that ⋀ sc → A(ϕ1Uϕ2) is a theorem.
The above lemma makes the proof of completeness for BMCL(K,nmem, , nmem) straight-
forward. Assume that ϕ is a consistent formula. This means there must be a maximally consistent
set Γ which contains ϕ. Since Γ is maximally consistent, for each i ∈ N , there must be Γi ∈ Li such
that Biα ∈ Γ for all α ∈ Γi and ¬Biα ∈ Γ for all α ∈ L ∖ Γi. Moreover, for each i ∈ N , there must
be also ni ∈ {0, . . . , ncom(i)} such that cnii ∈ Γ and ¬cki ∈ Γ for all k ∈ {0, . . . , ncom(i)} and k /= ni.
Let sc = (Γi, ni)i∈N , we have that ⋀ sc ∈ Γ.
We show that ⋀ sc → ϕ is a theorem. Assume to the contrary that ⋀ sc → ϕ is not a
theorem, this implies by Lemma 5 that ⋀ sc → ¬ϕ is a theorem. Since ⋀ sc ∈ Γ and Γ is maximally
consistent, we have that ¬ϕ ∈ Γ which contradicts the fact that Γ is consistent. Hence, ⋀ sc → ϕ
is a theorem. Since BMCL(K,nmem, , nmem) is sound, ⋀ sc → ϕ is valid. Therefore, we have that
CM, sc ⊧ ⋀ sc and CM, sc ⊧ ⋀ sc → ϕ. This implies CM, sc ⊧ ϕ which means the consistent
formula ϕ is satisfied in CM at sc.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced logics BMCL for each system of multiple reasoning agents.
Agents in such systems perform reasoning under bounds on memory and communication. Each
agent is equipped with a number of inference rules which allow them to derive new information
from what they have in the memory. For each system, we define a corresponding logic based on
CTL for reasoning about properties of the system under bounds on memory and communication.
The logic is specific for the characteristics of the system such as the number of agents in the system,
the knowledge bases of agents in the system and the bounds on memory and communication for
each agent in the system. The semantics is also defined by Kripke structures as in the case of
CTL, however, we are only interested in the class of models which describes systems of multiple
reasoning agents. In particular, the valuation at each state of such a model must comply with the
condition of bounds on memory and communication and a transition in a model must correspond to
a correct behaviour of the system.
We have investigated the satisfiability problem of BMCL where it was proved that the
logic is decidable. Rather than follow the approach for CTL, we utilise the characteristic of models
in the class describing systems of multiple reasoning agents so that an ordinary model-checking
algorithm for CTL can be used for solving the satisfiability problem. We also researched the sound-
ness and completeness of the deductive system for the logic. Once again, the characteristic of
models in the class describing systems of multiple reasoning agents is used to provide the proof of
the soundness and completeness.
Comparing to the result in [Alechina et al., 2006a], the extension from BML to BMCL
in this chapter not only introduces a logic for reasoning about the abilities of systems where mem-
ory and communication are bounded but also provides what has been missing in [Alechina et al.,
2006a] such as the proof for the soundness and the completeness of BML and the study of its sat-
isfiability problem. Nonetheless, BMCL has certain drawbacks. Although BMCL is for reasoning
about systems of multiple reasoning agents, it is not clear how to use it to describe arbitrary multi-
agent systems where resources available to agents in order to operate are bounded. Furthermore,
BMCL can only express properties of systems as a whole. For example, it is possible to formulate
a property where all agents in a system can cooperate to obtain a goal. However, it is impossible
to express another property where some agent or a sub-group of agents in the system has the power
to produce a certain result regardless of other agents. In a logic of BMCL, the bounds on memory
and communication are fixed. Changing the setting of such bounds will produce a different logic.
3. BOUNDED MEMORY-COMMUNICATION LOGIC 59
Moreover, the logic gets much complicated if we want to reason about multi-agent systems where
more types of resources except from memory, communication and time are involved. In order to
overcome such drawbacks, in the next two chapters, we investigate two logical languages which





In previous chapter, we have introduced the logics BMCL which are for reasoning about the abilities
of systems of multiple reasoning agents under a certain amount of resources. BMCL extends the
branching-time temporal logic CTL where bounds of memory and communication are hard-coded
into each of these logics. In other words, each of the logics BMCL allows us to reason about the
ability of a system of multiple reasoning agents under immutable bounds of memory and commu-
nication. This implies that BMCL cannot express nested abilities under bounded resources such
as agents in a system can cooperate to achieve a goal under some bound of resources, and then
continue cooperating to achieve another goal under another bound of resources. Moreover, we also
face the following drawbacks when working with BMCL:
● BMCL is designed for systems of multiple reasoning agents although it is possible to adapt
the logical language for other multi-agent systems. Nevertheless, how to adapt is not straight-
forward and requires changes in the axiomatisation system of the logics.
● BMCL is based on CTL, which only allows specifying and reasoning about properties of
systems as a whole. For instance, it is possible to formalise in BMCL the property that all
agents in the system can cooperate to achieve some goal. However, it is not possible to
use BMCL for formalising the properties about the abilities of individuals or a coalition of
individuals in a multi-agent system.
● Because bounds of resources are hard-coded into a logic of BMCL, it is not possible to reason
about the ability of a system of reasoning agents under different bounds of resource in the
same logic.
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Recently, there have been several studies on Coalition Logic (CL) such as [Pauly, 2001,
Pauly, 2002,Wooldridge et al., 2007, A˚gotnes et al., 2008a, A˚gotnes et al., 2008b, A˚gotnes et al.,
2009a, A˚gotnes et al., 2009b] which enables us to express many interesting properties about the
abilities of coalitions. For instance, CL allows us to express a property where a coalition of agents
in a system can cooperate to force a certain result regardless of the intervention from any agent
outside the coalition. Because the semantics of CL is based on Game Frames, the logic CL allows
expressing and reasoning about properties about coalitional abilities of multi-agent systems. Each
game frame describes a multi-agent system including possible states that the system may have,
actions available to agents in the system at each state as well as the outcome of a joint action by all
the agents in the system at each state. Because there is no cost associated with actions available to
agents, there is no natural way of expressing resource requirements in CL. For example, there is no
easy way to verify properties of the form ‘can a set of agents C cooperate to force a result without
spending no more than a given resource bound b’. Essentially, this is the successful coalition under
resource bound problem investigated by Wooldridge and Dunne in [Wooldridge & Dunne, 2006].
In this chapter, we extend CL with resource bounds in order to overcome problems with
BMCL where the extended logic allows expressing and reasoning about individual and coalitional
abilities under resource bounds. In particular, we expand the concept of Game Frames with sets of
resources which are required by actions as well as costs to actions. Then, we also extend the syntax
of CL with resource bounds for coalitions to express the ability of a coalition under a certain bound
of resources. Furthermore, unlike Wooldridge and Dunne, the extended logic also accounts for
multi-shot games where the agents need to perform a sequence of actions to achieve the goal. As a
running example, let us reconsider the system of two reasoning agents described on page 28. There
are two explicit resources required by agents in the system for operating which are memory and
communication. Each action requires a different amount of resources to perform. The action Read,
which loads some formula from the knowledge base into the internal memory, requires at least one
cell of memory where the resulting formula could be loaded into. The action Infer, which performs
the inference rule modus ponens, requires at least two cells of memory where the antecedents of
the inference rule are stored. Notice that both actions, Read and Infer, do not require any mount
of the resource communication. However, the action Copy does where in order to perform a copy
action, an agent needs to have at least one memory cell to store the resulting formula and one unit
of the resource communication to obtain the formula from the internal memory of other agents.
Apart from the two explicit resources, actions in this system also require another type of resource,
which is time. In other words, all those actions take one step of time to complete. Even though the
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action Idle, which means to do nothing, requires no memory and communication, one step of time
is essential for Idle to perform. In this example, it is assumed that the bound of memory for each
agent is two cells and the bound of communication is two messages, two reasoning agents in the
system need at least seven steps of time to derive the goal formula C. Particularly, under the bounds
of two cells of memory, two messages of communication and seven steps of time, the two reasoning
agents of the system are able to derive C. Moreover, when we alter the bounds of resources where
limitation of memory is increased to three cells, communication is forbidden and allowed time is
extended to ten steps of times, agent 1 has the power to derive C on its own.
In this chapter, we present in detail the extension of CL, namely Resource-Bounded Coali-
tion Logic (RBCL). In particular, we first discuss the notion of resources together with related ones
which are costs of action and resource bounds. After that, we describe the extension of Game
Frames with resources and costs of actions. Then, we give the definition of the syntax and seman-
tics of RBCL. In the remainder of the chapter, we introduce a sound and complete axiomatisation
of RBCL and study the satisfiability problem of RBCL.
4.2 Resources
In a multi-agent system, agents perform actions by spending certain amount of resources. For
instance, actions available to our reasoning agents in the example on page 28 require two explicit
resources which are memory and communication together with an implicit resource, namely time.
Each action costs a different amount of resources such as the cost of the action Read is 1 cells of
memory, 0 message of communication and 1 step of time. For convenience, we will write this cost
as as a tuple (1,0,1) where the first element of the tuple refers to the memory cost, the second to
the communication cost and the third to the time cost. Likewise, the costs of the actions Infer by
modus ponens and Copy are (2,0,1) and (1,1,1), respectively.
In the general case, we assume that each multi-agent system is associated with a set of
resources which are the fuel for actions of agents in the system to be able to perform. For the sake
of simplicity, we also make a further assumption where amounts of resources are expressed in terms
of units. Let us first define the set of resource bounds.
Definition 6. Given a finite set R of resources where R = {1, . . . , r}, the set of resource bounds is
defined as B = Nr.
There are two places where resource bounds are used. One the one hand, they can be used
as the available amount of resources for a coalition of agents in properties about the ability of the
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coalition; in other words, they are the resource bounds of the coalition. On the other hand, we also
use resource bounds to describe the cost of actions. We define the comparison over resource bounds
as usual. Given a resource bound b = (b1, . . . , br) ∈ B, we write bi to denote the ith component of b.
Then, given two resource bounds b, d ∈ B, we say that b ≤ d iff bi ≤ di for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
In this thesis, we generalise the way in which the resource requirements of complex ac-
tions are calculated. We argue that not all resource costs should be combined using the addition
operator. For example, if one of the resources is time and the agents execute their actions con-
currently, then, if each individual action costs one unit of time, the parallel combination of those
actions also costs one unit of time. If one of the resources is memory, one can argue that if action
a1 requires k units of memory and action a2 requires m units of memory, then executing actions
a1 and a2 sequentially requiresmax(k,m) units of memory. For generality, we introduce two cost
operators ⊕j and ⊗j for each resource j ∈ R to express how resource requirements are combined
in parallel and in sequence, respectively. These operators ⊕j and ⊗j are defined as mappings from
N×N to N. For both of them, we only require that for any k andm ∈ N, k ≤ k⊕jm and k ≤ k⊗jm,
for any j ∈ R. This requirement is natural since it makes sense to say that the combination of two
amounts of resource must be greater than or at least equal to each of them. Given two resource
bounds b = (b1, . . . , br) ∈ B and d = (d1, . . . , dr) ∈ B, we define that
b⊕ d = (b1 ⊕1 d1, . . . , br ⊕r dr)
b⊗ d = (b1 ⊗1 d1, . . . , br ⊗r dr)
Then, if two actions a1 and a2 cost Res(a1) and Res(a2), respectively, the cost of executing them
in parallel is Res(a1) ⊕Res(a2), and in sequence Res(a1) ⊗Res(a2).
4.3 Formalising single step strategies
We assume a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} and a set of resources R = {1, . . . , r}. Agents can
perform actions from a set Σ = ∪i∈NΣi, where Σi is the set of actions that can be performed by the
agent i. Each action a ∈ Σ has an associated cost Res(a), which is a resource bound. A joint action
executed by a coalition C ⊆ N is a tuple of actions aC = (a1, . . . , ak) (we assume for simplicity
unless otherwise stated that C = {1, . . . , k} for some k ≤ n).
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4.3.1 Syntax
The language of RBCL1 is defined relative to the sets N and R and a set of propositional variables
Prop. A formula is defined as follows:
p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∧ ψ ∣ [Cb]ϕ
where p ∈ Prop, C ⊆ N , and b ∈ Nr. The intuitive meaning of [Cb]ϕ for C /= ∅ is that coalition
C can force the outcome ϕ under the resource bound b, or, in other words, the agents in C have
a strategy costing at most b which enables them to achieve a ϕ-state no matter what the agents in
C¯ = N ∖ C do. For the empty coalition, [∅b]ϕ means that if the grand coalition N executes any
joint action which together costs at most b, then the system will end up in a ϕ state; that is, ϕ is
unavoidable if N acts within the resource bound b.
4.3.2 Semantics
We define models of RBCL1 as transition systems, where in each state agents execute actions in
parallel to determine the next state. These are essentially the same as the models for coalition logic
with the addition of costs of actions. First we define resource-bounded action frameswhich underlie
the models:
Definition 7. A resource-bounded action (RBA) frameF is a tuple (N,R,Σ = ∪i∈NΣi, S, T, o,Res)
where:
● N is a non-empty set of agents,
● R is a non-empty set of resources,
● Σ is the set of actions agents can perform,
● S is a non-empty set of states,
● T ∶ S ×N → ℘(Σi) assigns to each state the set of actions available to the agent i in this
state; there must be an action which requires the smallest cost (0, . . . ,0).
● o is the outcome function which takes a state s and a joint action aN and returns the state
resulting from the execution of aN by the agents in s.
● Res ∶ Σ→ Nr is the resource requirement function.
4. RESOURCE-BOUNDED COALITION LOGIC 65
In the case of joint actions, we generalise the function T as follows: a joint action aC ∈
T (s,C) iff ai ∈ T (s, i) for all i ∈ C. By Res(aC) we denote the combined cost of Res(ai) for
every i ∈ C, that is Res(aC) = ⊕i∈CRes(ai).
Definition 8. A single-step resource-bounded action (RBA) model M is a pair (F,V ) where F is
an RBA frame and V ∶ S → ℘(Prop) is an assignment function.
The truth definition for single-step RBA models is as follows:
● M,s ⊧ p iff p ∈ V (s)
● M,s ⊧ ¬ϕ iffM,s /⊧ ϕ
● M,s ⊧ ϕ ∧ ψ iffM,s ⊧ ϕ andM,s ⊧ ψ
● M,s ⊧ [Cb]ϕ for C /= ∅ iff there is aC ∈ T (s,C) with Res(aC) ≤ b such that for every
joint action aC¯ ∈ T (s, C¯) by the agents not in C, the outcome of the resulting tuple of actions
executed in s satisfies ϕ: M,o(s, (aC , aC¯)) ⊧ ϕ
● M,s ⊧ [∅b]ϕ iff the outcome of any joint action aN ∈ T (s,N) with Res(aN) ≤ b executed
in s satisfies ϕ: M,o(s, aN) ⊧ ϕ.
The notions of satisfiability and validity are standard. Let us call the set of all formulas
valid in single-step RBA models RBCL1 (where 1 refers to considering only one-step strategies, as
in Coalition Logic).
Theorem 2. RBCL1 is completely axiomatised by the following set of axiom schemas and inference
rules:
A0 All propositional tautologies
A1 [Cb]⊺
A2 ¬[Cb]
A3 ¬[∅b]ϕ↔ [N b]¬ϕ
A4 [Cb](ϕ ∧ ψ)→ [Cb]ϕ
A5 [Cb]ϕ→ [Cd]ϕ where d ≥ b if C /= ∅ or d ≤ b if C = ∅
A6a [Cb]ϕ ∧ [Dd]ψ → [(C ∪D)b⊕d](ϕ ∧ ψ) where C and D are both disjoint and non-empty
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A6b [∅b]ϕ ∧ [Cb]ψ → [Cb](ϕ ∧ ψ) where C is either ∅ or N
MP ⊢ ϕ, ⊢ ϕ→ ψ⇒ ⊢ ψ
Equivalence ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ⇒ ⊢ [Cb]ϕ↔ [Cb]ψ
The notions of derivability and consistency are standard. Note that if we erase the resource
superscript in the axiomatisation above, we get the complete axiomatisation of Coalition Logic as
given in [Pauly, 2002], and a trivial formula resulting from A5. The rule of monotonicity (RM) is
derivable as in Coalition Logic, that is, if ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, then ⊢ [Cb]ϕ→ [Cb]ψ.
We omit the completeness proof here as it is a special case of completeness proof of
RBCL given in the next sections.
4.3.3 Example
As an illustration, we show how to express some properties of coalitional resource games from
[Wooldridge & Dunne, 2006] in RBCL1.
A coalitional resource game (CRG) Γ is defined as a tuple (N , G, R, G1, . . ., Gn, en,
req) where
● N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents,
● G = {g1, . . . , gm} is a set of goals,
● R = {r1, . . . , rt} is a set of resources,
● Gi ⊆ G is the set of goals for the agent i,
● en ∶ N ×R → N is the resource endowment function (how many units of a given resource is
allocated to an agent),
● req ∶ G×R → N is the resource requirement function (how many units of a particular resource
is required to achieve a goal). It is assumed that each goal requires a non-zero amount for at
least one resource.
In CRGs, the endowment of a coalition is equal to the sum of the endowments of its members:
en(C, r) = Σi∈Cen(i, r). Furthermore, the cost of performing actions in parallel is defined by
means of the sum operator.
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As an example, we give a simple CRG from [Wooldridge & Dunne, 2006], where N =
{1,2,3}; G = {g1, g2}; R = {r1, r2}; G1 = {g1}, G2 = {g2}, G3 = {g1, g2}; en(1, r1) = 2,
en(1, r2) = 0, en(2, r1) = 0, en(2, r2) = 1, en(3, r1) = 1, en(3, r2) = 2; req(g1, r1) = 3,
req(g1, r2) = 2, req(g2, r1) = 2, and req(g2, r2) = 1. In RBCL1, we can state properties such
as the coalition of agents 1 and 3 can achieve g1 under the resource bound corresponding to the sum
of their endowments: [1,3⟨3,2⟩]g1. More generally, a decision problem which is called coalition C







4.4 Formalising multi-step strategies and arbitrary resource combinators
In this section, we generalise the logic described in the previous section. In particular, we consider
multi-step strategies, as in Extended Coalition Logic with the [C∗] operator [Pauly, 2001], or as
in ATL. The reason for this is that we are interested in the resource requirements of strategies
which involve multiple steps. For example, suppose a coalition C can enforce ϕ in three steps:
[Cb1][Cb2][Cb3]ϕ. We can deduce from this that the agents have a strategy to achieve ϕ which
costs at most b1 ⊗ b2 ⊗ b3. However expressing the fact in this way is rather clumsy. Even worse,
to say that ‘C has some strategy which achieves ϕ in three steps which costs at most b’ in RBCL1,
we have to use a disjunction over all possible vectors of natural numbers b1, b2, b3 which sum up to
b: ∨b1⊗b2⊗b3=b[Cb1][Cb2][Cb3]ϕ. Hence we extend the set of actions, or strategies, with sequential
compositions of actions.
In the rest of the chapter, we assume the following:
● The last resource r in the set of resources R is always time.
● ⊕r is the max function.
● ⊗r is the + operator.
● Every action costs exactly one unit of time.
As every action requires at least one step of time to perform, the smallest cost is redefined as
(0, . . . ,0,1). We denote by t(b) the time component of cost vector b. In particular, t(Res(a)) = 1
for any a ∈ Σ. In the language, only operators [Cb] with t(b) ≥ 1 are allowed.
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4.4.1 Strategies and multi-step RBA models
Given an RBA frame F = (N,R,Σ, S, T, o,Res), a strategy for an agent i ∈ N is a function
fi ∶ S+ → Σi from finite non-empty sequences of states to actions, such that fi(λs) = a ∈ T (s, i),
where λs is a sequence of states ending in state s. Intuitively, fi says what action the agent i should
perform in state s given the previous history of the system. A strategy for a coalition C is a set
FC = {f1, . . . , fk} of strategies for each agent.
For a sequence λ = s0s1 . . . ∈ Sω, we denote λ[i] = si and λ[i, j] = si . . . sj . The set of
possible computations generated by a strategy FC from a state s0, out(s0, FC), is
{λ ∣ λ[0] = s0 ∧ ∀j ≥ 0 ∶ λ[j + 1] ∈ o∗(λ[j], (fi(λ[0, j]))i∈C)}
where o∗(s, aC) = {o(s, (aC , aC¯)) ∣ aC¯ ∈ T (s, C¯)}. Now we define the cost of a multi-step
strategy. Let λ ∈ out(s0, FC). The cost of FC over a prefix λ[0,m] where m > 0 is defined
inductively as follows:
cost(λ[0,1], FC) = ⊕i∈CRes(fi(λ[0])), where Res(fi(λ[0])) is the cost of action of the agent
i in λ[0], and ⊕i∈C is the operator for combining the costs of actions executed in parallel by
the agents in C;
cost(λ[0,m], FC) = cost(λ[0,m − 1], FC)⊗ (⊕i∈CRes (fi(λ[0,m − 1]))) form > 1; this is the
cost of the previousm−1 steps in the strategy combined sequentially with the cost of themth
step.
In the following, we define the semantics of RBCL for the case of multi-step strategies.
Notice that we only provide the definition of formulas of the form [Cb]ϕ since the other cases are
still the same as before.
Definition 9. A multi-step resource-bounded action modelM is a pair (F,V ) where F is an RBA
frame, and V ∶ S → ℘(Prop) is an assignment function, and the truth definition for the [Cb]
modality is
● M,s ⊧ [Cb]ϕ for C /= ∅ iff there is a strategy FC such that for all λ ∈ out(s,FC), there
existsm > 0 such that cost(λ[0,m], FC) ≤ b andM,λ[m] ⊧ ϕ,
● M,s ⊧ [∅b]ϕ iff for all strategies FN , computations λ ∈ out(s,FN), and m > 0 such that
cost(λ[0,m], FN) ≤ b,M,λ[m] ⊧ ϕ.
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Note that under this definition, the meaning of [Cb]ϕ (for non-empty C) becomes as
follows: C has a multi-step strategy to bring about ϕ, and the cost of this strategy is less than b. The
meaning of [∅b]ϕ is that the outcome of any strategy of the grand coalitionN which costs less than
b, satisfies ϕ.
The set of all formulas valid in multi-step RBA models will be denoted by RBCL.
4.4.2 Example
As an illustration, we show how properties of coalitions of resource-bounded reasoners can be
expressed by, once again, considering the example presented in page 28. As depicted in Figure 3.1,
the system in this example has the ability to derive c under the resource bound 4 for memory, 1
for communication and 7 for time. In the logic BMCL, the resource bound (except time) is hard-
coded into the logic and we did not have a way of expressing coalitional abilities of agents. We can
however express in RBCL that, for example, reasoners 1 and 2 can derive c under such resource
bound by the formula [{1,2}(4,1,7)] B1c.
4.4.3 Effectivity structures
For proving completeness of RBCL, it is easier to work with an alternative semantics, given not in
terms of multi-step RBA models, but in terms of effectivity structures. These are closely related to
RBA models, and we will show that effectivity structures satisfying some natural properties give
rise to an alternative semantics for RBCL.
Let ℘(N)B = {Cb ∣ C ⊆ N, b ∈ Nr, t(b) ≥ 1}. Intuitively, this is the set of all possible
coalitions with all possible resource allocations. An effectivity structure is a function E ∶ S →
(℘(N)B → ℘(℘(S))) which describes, for each state in S, which subsets of S a coalition C can
force under resource bound b.
Given an RBA frame F, the effectivity structure corresponding to F is defined as follows:
● for C /= ∅,X ∈ E(s)(Cb) iff there exists a strategy FC such that for all λ ∈ out(s,FC), there
existsm > 0 such that cost(λ[0,m], FC) ≤ b and λ[m] ∈X;
● X ∈ E(s)(∅b) iff for all strategies FN , sequences of states λ ∈ out(s,FN), and m > 0 such
that cost(λ[0,m], FN) ≤ b, we have λ[m] ∈X .
In other words,X ∈ E(s)(Cb), where C is not the empty coalition, means that the coalition C has a
strategy to bring about X within the bound b. X ∈ E(s)(∅b) means that all strategies for the grand
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coalition which cost less b always result in a state in X , i.e., X is inevitable.
4.4.4 Characterising effectivity in RBA frames
Every RBA frame gives rise to an effectivity structure, but the reverse does not hold. In this section,
we characterise properties which an effectivity structure should satisfy to be an effectivity struc-
ture corresponding to an RBA frame. Following Pauly in [Pauly, 2002], we call such effectivity
structures playable (RB-playable, where RB stands for resource-bounded).
Below we state some useful properties of RB-playable effectivity structures. These are
very similar (apart from the resource bound) to the properties of playable effectivity structures listed
in [Pauly, 2002] and are given the same names:
● An effectivity structure E is outcome monotonic iff
X ∈ E(s)(Cb) ⇒X ′ ∈ E(s)(Cb) for all X ′ ⊇X
● An effectivity structure E is coalition monotonic iff
X ∈ E(s)(Cb) ⇒X ∈ E(s)(Db)
where C /= ∅ and D ⊇ C; and
X ∈ E(s)(∅b) ⇒X ∈ E(s)(N b)
● An effectivity structure E is N-maximal iff
X ∉ E(s)(∅b) ⇒X ∈ E(s)(N b)
● An effectivity structure E is N-minimal iff
X ∈ E(s)(N b) ∧ Y ∉ E(s)(N b) ⇒X ∖ Y ∈ E(s)(N b)
Note that N-minimality is not listed in [Pauly, 2002], but its analogue is derivable.
● An effectivity structure E is N -determinant1 iff
X ∈ E(s)(N b) ⇒ ∃t ∈X such that {t} ∈ E(s)(N b)
1Notice N -determinacy is also not listed in [Pauly, 2002], however, we need this property to prove Theorem 3 below
and also its analogue in [Pauly, 2002]. The problem with Pauly’s proof was pointed out to the author by Wojtek Jamroja,
Valentin Goranko and Paolo Turrini, but the fix was developed independently.
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We can also write this property in another way, that is E is N -determinant iff for anyX ⊆ S,
if ∀t ∈X , {t} ∉ E(s)(N b) then we have X ∉ E(s)(N b).
● An effectivity structure E is regular iff for all coalitions C which are neither empty nor equal
to N
X ∈ E(s)(Cb) ⇒X ∉ E(s)(Cb′) for all t(b) = t(b′) = 1
In the case where the time component is greater than one, we also have a similar property to
regularity but for only the whole system (or the empty coalition). An effectivity structure E
is N-regular iff X ∈ E(s)(N b) ⇒X ∉ E(s)(∅b).
● An effectivity structure E is super-additive iff the following holds, for all b and d with t(b) =
t(d) = 1, and C ∩D = ∅:
– If C /= ∅ and D /= ∅, X1 ∈ E(s)(Cb) and X2 ∈ E(s)(Dd) ⇒
X1 ∩X2 ∈ E(s)((C ∪D)b⊕d)
– If C = ∅ and D = ∅ or N , X1 ∈ E(s)(∅d) and X2 ∈ E(s)(Dd) then X1 ∩ X2 ∈
E(s)(Dd)
We have two different cases in the definition of super-additivity because in the notation ∅b,
b is not the resource bound for the coalition it annotates but for its complement. Therefore,
it is not possible to combine the bounds as in the case when both coalition C and D are non
empty. Notice that super-additivity requires the time component of both resource bounds to
be equal to 1. When one of them is greater than one, such a property might not be true. We
also have a more general property that if one of the coalitions in the property is empty as
follows.
● An effectivity structureE is general super-additive iff it is super-additive andX1 ∈ E(s)(∅b)
andX2 ∈ E(s)(Cb) ⇒X1 ∩X2 ∈ E(s)(Cb) where C is either empty or the grand coalition.
We also have properties corresponding to sequential composition of strategies:
● An effectivity structure E is super-transitive iff the following holds for all C /= ∅: {s′ ∈
S ∣ X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1) ⇒ X ∈ E(s)(Cb1⊗b2) (if a set of states where X
is obtainable under b2 can be enforced under b1, then X can be enforced by the combined
strategy under b1 ⊗ b2).
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● An effectivity structureE is transitive iff for any bwith t(b) > 1 andC /= ∅: X ∈ E(s)(Cb) ⇒
∃b′ < b ∶ X ∈ E(s)(Cb′) (X can be achieved under a tighter bound b′) or ∃b1 ⊗ b2 = b ∶ {s′ ∈
S ∣ X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1) (X can be achieved by combining two strategies costing
b1 and b2 such that b1 ⊗ b2 = b).
Finally, the following property is specific to resource bounds:
● An effectivity structure E is bound-monotonic iff
X ∈ E(s)(Cb) ⇒X ∈ E(s)(Cd) for all d ≥ b if C /= ∅ or d ≤ b if C = ∅.
Bound-monotonicity is a very natural property: if a non-empty coalition can achieve something
under the bound b, then it can achieve it with a more generous resource allowance. For C = ∅,
this property means that if an outcome cannot be avoided when the grand coalition is restricted to
strategies which cost at most b, then it cannot be avoided ifN uses fewer resources (hence has fewer
strategies available).
It is easy to prove that the properties above are true for any effectivity structure obtained
from a RBA frame. Conversely, RB-playable effectivity structures defined below are effectivity
structures of an RBA frame.
Definition 10. An effectivity structure E ∶ S → (℘(N)B → ℘(℘(S))) is RB-playable iff, for every
s ∈ S, E has the following properties:
1. For all Cb ∈ ℘(N)B, S ∈ E(s)(Cb)
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10. Bound-monotonicity
It can be shown that RB-playability implies the other properties listed above.





In the following, we provide the proof of the above lemma. First general super-additivity
is proved by induction on resource bounds using super-additivity. The proofs of the other properties
are based on general super-additivity.
Proof. By super-transitivity, we have that, for any b and b1 ⊗ b2 = b
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(N b2)} ∈ E(s)(N b1) ⇒X ∈ E(s)(N b1⊗b2)
Hence,
X ∉ E(s)(N b1⊗b2) ⇒ {s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(N b2)} ∉ E(s)(N b1)
By N -regularity and N -maximality, we have X ∈ E(s)(∅b1⊗b2) ⇒ X ∉ E(s)(N b1⊗b2) and
{s′ ∣ X ∈ E(s′)(N b2)} ∉ E(s)(N b1) ⇒ {s′ ∣ X ∈ E(s′)(∅b2)} ∈ E(s)(∅b1), respectively.
Therefore,
X ∈ E(s)(∅b1⊗b2) ⇒ {s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(∅b2)} ∈ E(s)(∅b1) (4.1)
We now prove general super-additivity by induction on the time component of b. The
base case follows directly from super-additivity. Let X ∈ E(s)(∅b) where the time component of
b is greater than 1. Assume that Y ∈ E(s)(Cb) where C is either ∅ or N . If Y ∈ E(s)(Cb′) for
some b′ < b, then bound-monotonicity for the empty coalition and induction hypothesis show that
X ∩ Y ∈ E(s)(Cb′). Hence, bound-monotonicity implies X ∩ Y ∈ E(s)(Cb). If Y ∉ E(s)(Cb′)
for all such b′, we have there exists b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that
{s′ ∣ Y ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1)
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which follows from transitivity when C = N or from (4.1) with arbitrary b1 ⊕ b2 = b when C = ∅.
Note that we also have {s′ ∣ X ∈ E(s′)(∅b2)} ∈ E(s)(∅b1). Applying the induction hypothesis
twice together with outcome-monotonicity, we have the following result:
{s′ ∣X ∩ Y ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1)
Therefore, super-transitivity implies that X ∩ Y ∈ E(s)(Cb).
1. Assume that X ∈ E(s)(∅b). By RB-playability, we have S ∈ E(s)(N b). Apply general
super-additivity, we obtain X ∈ E(s)(N b).
Let ∅ /= C ⊂ N , we prove by induction on the time component of b that X ∈ E(s)(Cb) ⇒
X ∈ E(s)(Db) for any D ⊃ C.
In the base case, when time component of b is equal to 1, let C ′ = D ∖ C. We have S ∈
E(s)(C ′(0,...,0,1)), thus super-additivity implies that X =X ∩ S ∈ E(s)(Db).
Let us assume that time component of b is greater than 1. If X ∈ E(s)(Cb′) for some
b′ < b, then it is obvious by the induction hypothesis that X ∈ E(s)(Db′). Hence, bound-
monotonicity shows that X ∈ E(s)(Db). If X ∉ E(s)(Cb′) for any such b′, then we have by
transitivity that there exists b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1)
By the induction hypothesis, we have
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Db1)
and
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ⊆ {s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Db2)}
Thus, outcome-monotonicity implies that
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Db2)} ∈ E(s)(Db1)
Therefore, we have by super-transitivity that X ∈ E(s)(Db).
2. Assume thatX ∈ E(s)(N b) and Y ∉ E(s)(N b). ByN -maximality, we have Y ∈ E(s)(∅b).
Therefore, general super-additivity implies that X ∩ Y ∈ E(s)(N b).
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3. Assume that ∅ /= C ⊂ N and X ∈ E(s)(Cb) where the time component of b is equal to 1.
Furthermore, assume to the contrary that X ∈ E(s)(Cb′) where time component of b′ is also
equal to 1. Applying super-additivity, we have X ∩X ∈ E(s)(N b⊕b′) which contradicts the
fact that E is RB-playable. Therefore, in general, E is regular.
Furthermore, notice that N -determinacy is derivable from other properties of a RB-
playable effectivity structure E over a finite set S of states. From the proof of Lemma 6, we know
that any RB-playable effectivity structure has N -minimality. Given any finite subset X of states
where X ∈ E(s)(N b), we remove any state s ∈ X such that {s} ∉ E(s)(N b) and N -minimality
shows thatX ∖{s} ∈ E(s)(N b). We repeat the removal forX ∖{s} until no states can be removed.
Obviously, it must not happen that all s ∈X were removed as we would end up with ∅ ∈ E(s)(N b)
which violates the second requirement for a RB-playable effectivity structure. As X is finite, the
removal must terminate and for any state s remained, we have that {s} ∈ E(s)(N b); hence N -
determinacy is proved. In other words, this means that when proving an effectivity structure over a
finite set of states to be RB-playable, we shall omit proving N -determinacy.
Theorem 3. An effectivity structure is RB-playable iff it is the effectivity structure of some RBA
frame.
Proof. It is easy to check that effectivity structures obtained from RBA frames satisfy all properties
of RB-playability. As a running example, let us prove that the corresponding effectivity structure
EF of a given RBA frame F (over a set S of states) satisfies N -determinacy. Assume that X ∈
EF (s)(N b) where X ⊆ S, s ∈ S and b ∈ B. This means there is a strategy FN for the coalition N
such that for all λ ∈ out(s,FN), there existsm > 0 such that cost(λ[0,m], FN) ≤ b and λ[m] ∈X .
Obviously, we also implies that {λ[m]} ∈ EF (s)(N b) according to the definition of EF . Hence,
EF satisfies N -determinacy.
In order to prove the other direction for a given RB-playable effectivity structure E, we
need to construct a RBA frame such that its effectivity structure is identical to E.
Let E be an RB-playable effectivity structure. The construction of the RBA frame is
similar to that in Coalition Logic extended with costs for actions. First, we define the set of possible
actions for each agent at each state s ∈ S with their associated costs Res. Then the construction is
completed by defining the outcome function o.
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In order to make the following proof easy to follow, let us provide an informal sketch of
the argument. The main task of defining the RBA frame is to define actions available for each agent
at a particular state. We define these actions so that it facilitates the definitions of costs of actions
and the outcome function. Each action for an agent is a triple (g, t, h) where:
● g is a function which defines the preferred set of outcomes for each coalition where the agent
participates and is willing to contribute a certain amount of resources (then, the cost of this
action is this amount of resources). Given the actions of all agents, the component g of those
actions will define the coalitions where the agents participate, hence also the preferred set of
outcomes for each agent.
● t is a natural number which is used to determine which agent has the power to decide outcome.
● When we know which agent has the power to decide the outcome and its preferred set of
outcomes, h is a function which determines the only outcome among those in the preferred
set.
In the following, we present in detail how actions and outcomes of actions are defined.
For every i ∈ N , let b be a bound such that t(b) = 1, we define Cbi = {Cd ∣ i ∈ C ∧ t(d) =
1 ∧ d ≥ b} which is the set of all coalitions where i may participate and contribute b amount of
resources. Note that for all actions t(b) is always 1.
For every s ∈ S, we define
Γ(s, i) = {gb(s,i) ∶ Cbi → ℘(S) ∣ gb(s,i)(Cd) ∈ E(s)(Cd)}
Γ(s, i) is the set of option functions for an agent i at state s. Each option function in Γ(s, i) is a
mapping gb(s,i) where b is a resource bound such that t(b) = 1; gb(s,i) determines the outcome when
the agent i agrees to participate in a coalition. How an agent agrees to participate in a coalition will
be specified later when we define the outcome function.
Let H = {h ∶ ℘(S) → S ∣ h(X) ∈ X} be the set of choice functions, that is, if an agent
has the power to decide the outcome, it will use some h function to do so. We then define the set of
available actions for an agent i at a state s as follows:
T (s, i) = Γ(s, i) ×N ×H
Each action is a triple (gb(s,i), t, h) consisting of an option function gb(s,i), an index t (a
natural number) and a choice function h. Informally, option functions determine how the agents
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group together to form coalitions and then which outcome options they will choose. The index
determines which agent has the power to decide the outcome based on its associated h function. We
assign that Res((gb(s,i), t, h)) = b. Note that for any action, we have t(Res((gb(s,i), t, h))) = 1.
Let Σi = ⋃s∈S T (s, i). We now define the outcome of a joint action σ ∈ ΣN at a state
s. Assume that σ = {(gbi
(s,i)
, ti, hi) ∣ i = 1, . . . , n} where t(bi) = 1 for all i ∈ N . For any coalition
C ⊆ Σ, let bC = ⊕i∈Cbi and g = (gbi(s,i))i∈N . We denote P (g,C) the coarsest partition ⟨C1, . . . , Cm⟩
of C such that:
∀l ≤m ∀i, j ∈ Cl ∶ gbi(s,i)(CbC) = gbj(s,j)(CbC)
We define how coalitions are formed based on g as follows:
P0(g) = ⟨N⟩
P1(g) = ⟨P (g,N)⟩ = ⟨C1,1, . . . , C1,k1⟩
P2(g) = ⟨P (g,C1,1), . . . , P (g,C1,k1)⟩
= ⟨C2,1, . . . , C2,k2⟩
⋮
Pη(g) = ⟨Cη,1, . . . , Cη,kη⟩
As N is finite, the above computation reaches some η such that Pη(g) = Pη+1(g). Let
P (g) = Pη(g) which shows how agents are grouped into coalitions.
Now, we define the core of the set E(s)(N b) containing all states which are the possible
outcomes from s where all agents in the system spends less than b amount of resources. The core
of E(s)(N b) is denoted as Eo(s)(N b) and we define that a state t ∈ S is in Eo(s)(N b) iff {t} ∈
E(s)(N b). Obviously, Eo(s)(N b) /= ∅ as otherwise, S ∉ E(s)(N b) according to the fact that E is
N -determinant. Moreover, as ∀t ∈ S∖Eo(s)(N b), {t} ∉ E(s)(N b), we have that S∖Eo(s)(N b) ∉
E(s)(N b). Thus, by N -maximality, we have that Eo(s)(N b) ∈ E(s)(∅b).
Assume that P (g) = ⟨C1, . . . , Cm⟩. For convenience, let g(Cl) = g
bi
(s,i)
(ClbCl ) for some
i ∈ Cl where l ≤m.
We define G(g) = ⋂
l≤m
g(Cl) ∩ (Eo(s)(N bN )). Let us show that G(g) /= ∅. By super-
additivity, we have that ⋂
l≤m
g(Cl) ∈ E(s)(N bN ). Moreover, we already have that Eo(s)(N bN ) ∈
E(s)(∅bN ). Apply super-additivity again, we obtainG(g) = ⋂
l≤m
g(Cl)∩(Eo(s)(N bN )) ∈ E(s)(N bN ).
As E is RB-playable, it is straightforward that G(g) /= ∅.
Let t0 = (∑i∈N ti mod n) + 1. The outcome function is defined as follows: o(s, σ) =
ht0(G(g)).
4. RESOURCE-BOUNDED COALITION LOGIC 78
Before continuing the proof, let us consider an example in order to illustrate how outcome
is determined for a given joint action as described above. For the sake of simplicity, we describe
a RB-playable effectivity structure by considering the following resource bounded game frame at
a state s0. Assume that we have three agents 1, 2 and 3 in a system which is associated with two
resources utility and time At s0, each agent can either perform a cooperate or a defect action. We
use C and D to denote these actions, respectively. While the cost of D for all the agents is (0,1),
that is 0 for utility and 1 for time, the cost of C varies depending on who performs C. In particular,
the cost of C for agent 1 is (1,1), for agent 2 is (2,1) and for agent 3 is (3,1). For convenience,
we shall write C(1,1) to denote that action C costs (1,1). Moreover, as all actions cost 1 unit of
time, we temporarily ignore the time component in the cost, hence C(1,1) is simply rewritten as
C1 which means that the action C costs 1 unit of utility. There are eight output states s1, . . . , s8
each is associated with a number which is the total of the utility contributed by every agent as
they pay for the actions in order to get the corresponding outcome. In Figure 4.1, we illustrate the
FIGURE 4.1: Outcomes from s0 and their associated numbers.
outcomes of each joint action. The first column contains actions performed by agent 1 together with
corresponding costs. Actions performed by agent 2 are depicted in the second row while the first
row is for describing actions of agent 3. In other cells, we define the outcomes of each joint action.
For example, the cell on the third row, second column which contains a state s1 and a number 6 says
that the outcome of the joint action (C1, C2, C3) is s1 and this state is associated with the number
6. For convenience, for each number k ∈ {0, . . . ,6}, we define a proposition (≥ k) which is true in
a state si where i ∈ {1, . . . ,8} iff n is smaller or equal to the number with which si is associated.
For instance, (≥ 4) is true at s2 and s3 but not in s5 and s6. Furthermore, by abusing the notation,
we also denote (≥ k) is the subset of {s1, . . . , s8} which contains only states where (≥ k) is true
at. Let us consider the effectivity structure E admitted by this example, at least at the state s0. We
consider the joint action a = ((g21,5, h1), (g
2
2,6, h2), (g
1,8, h1)) in T (s0,1) × T (s0,2) × T (s0,3)
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3 are partially defined as follows:
g21({1}
2) =(≥ 1) g22({2}
2) =(≥ 2) g13({3}
1) =S
g21({1,2}
4) =(≥ 3) g22({1,2}
4) =(≥ 3) g13({1,3}
3) =S
g21({1,3}
3) =(≥ 3) g22({2,3}
3) =(≥ 2) g13({2,3}
3) =S
g21({1,2,3}
5) =(≥ 5) g22({1,2,3}
5) =(≥ 5) g13({1,2,3}
5) =S
Moreover, the function h1 (h2) is defined so that it returns a state si from a subsetX ⊆ {s1, . . . , s8}
where i the smallest (greatest) index inX . For example, h1({s2, s3, s5}) = s2 while h2({s2, s3, s5}) =
s5. To determine the outcome of a at s0, we first compute P (g) as follows:
P0(g) = ⟨N⟩ where N = {1,2,3}
P1(g) = ⟨P (g,N)⟩ = ⟨{1,2},{3}⟩
P2(g) = ⟨P (g,{1,2}), P (g,{3})⟩ = ⟨{1,2},{3}⟩
Hence, we obtain P (g) = ⟨{1,2},{3}⟩ where g({1,2}) = (≥ 3) and g({3}) = S. Notice that
we have Eo(s0)(N5) = {s2, . . . , s8}. Then, we have that G(g) = (≥ 3) ∩ S ∩ Eo(s0)(N5) = (≥
3)∖{s1} = {s2, s3, s4, s5}. Furthermore, we have that t0 = (5+6+8) mod 3+1 = 2, which means
the function h2 is used to decide the outcome. Thus, the outcome of a is h2(G(g)) = s5.
Let us now turn back to the proof. Assume EF be the effectivity structure of the frame
constructed above. We claim that E = EF .
Firstly, we show the left-to-right inclusion by induction on bounds. In the base case,
assume X ∈ E(s)(Cb) where t(b) = 1. Choose the actions for agents in C = {1, . . . , k} as follows,
a1 = (gb1, t1, h1)
a2 = (g02, t2, h2)
⋮
ak = (g0k, tk, hk)
where gb1(D
d) = g0i (D
d) =X for all i = 2, . . . , k,D ⊇ C, d ≥ b. Notice that the choices of gb1, g
0
2 , . . .,
g0k must exist because of bound-monotonicity and coalition-monotonicity. Moreover, the choices of
ti and hi, where i = 1, . . . , k, are arbitrary. Let σC = {(gb1, t1, h1), (g
0
2, t2, h2), . . . , (g
0
k, tk, hk)}.
Let σC be an arbitrary joint action for C. Let σ = (σC , σC) and let g be the set of the
option functions from σ. By the choice of σC , C must be a subset of a partition Cl in P (g). Then,
we have
o(s, σ) = ht0(G(g)) ∈ G(g) ⊆ g(Cl) =X
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Hence, X ∈ EF (s)(Cb).
For the induction step, let X ∈ E(s)(Cb) where t(b) > 1. If X ∈ E(s)(Cb
′
) for some
b′ < b, by the induction hypothesis, we have X ∈ EF (s)(Cb
′
). Therefore, bound-monotonicity
implies that X ∈ EF (s)(Cb).
If X ∉ E(s)(Cb
′
) for any b′ < b, by transitivity there are b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1)
By the induction hypothesis, we have
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ EF (s)(Cb1)
and
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)}
⊆ {s′ ∣X ∈ EF (s′)(Cb2)}
By outcome-monotonicity, we have
{s′ ∣X ∈ EF (s′)(Cb2)} ∈ EF (s)(Cb1)
Hence, by super-transitivity X ∈ EF (s)(Cb).
For the other direction, we consider two cases where C = N and C ⊂ N . Assume that
X ∉ E(s)(N b). By N -maximality, we obtainX ∈ E(s)(∅b). However, the previous proof implies
that X ∈ EF (s)(∅b). As EF is RB-playable, by regularity we have X ∉ EF (s)(N b).
For the case of C ⊂ N , the proof is done by induction on bounds. Assume that X ∉
E(s)(Cb) where t(b) = 1 and C ⊂ N , i.e. there is i0 ∈ N ∖C. Let σC = {(g
bi
(s,i)
, ti, hi) ∣ i ∈ C} be
an joint action for C such that Res(σC) ≤ b. We choose a strategy σC = {(g
bi
(s,i)
, ti, hi) ∣ i ∈ C} for
C such that:
● bi = 0 for all i > k
● gbi
(s,i)
(Dd) = S for all i ∈ C, D ⊇ C, d ≥ bi
● (∑i∈N ti mod n) + 1 = i0
● hi for i /= i0 is arbitrary, we will select hi0 shortly
As before, let σ = (σC , σC) and g the collection of option functions in σ. We use notation bD =
⊕i∈Dbi for any D ⊆ N .
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By the choice of option functions in σC , it follows that C is the subset of some partition
Cl of P (g). For other partitions, super-additivity shows that G(g) ∈ E(s)(Cl
b
Cl ). By coalition-
monotonicity and bound-monotonicity, we have that G(g) ∈ E(s)(Cb). As X ∉ E(s)(Cb), it
follows that G(g) /⊆X by outcome-monotonicity, i.e. there is some s0 ∈ G(g) ∖X . Select hi0 such
that hi0(G(g)) = s0, then
o(s, σ) = hi0(G(g)) = s0 ∉X
Hence, X ∉ EF (s)(Cb).
In the induction step, assume that X ∉ E(s)(Cb) where t(b) > 1. Bound-monotonicity
shows that for all b′ ≤ b, X ∉ E(s)(Cb
′
) and super-transitivity implies that for all b1 ⊗ b2 = b,
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∉ E(s)(Cb1)
By the induction hypothesis, we have that for all b′ < b, X ∉ EF (s)(Cb
′
) and for all b1 ⊗ b2 = b,
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∉ EF (s)(Cb1)}
and {s′ ∣ X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} = {s′ ∣ X ∈ EF (s′)(Cb2). Then, {s′ ∣ X ∈ EF (s′)(Cb2)} ∉
EF (s)(Cb1). Therefore, transitivity implies that X ∉ EF (s)(Cb).
4.5 Axiomatisation of RBCL
In this section we define models based on playable effectivity structures, and give a complete ax-
iomatisation for the set of validities in those models.
Definition 11. A resource-bounded effectivity modelM = (S,E,V ) is a triple consisting of a non-
empty set of states, a RB-playable effectivity structure and a valuation function V ∶ Prop → ℘(S).
The truth definition for [Cb] modalities is as follows:
● M,s ⊧ [Cb]ϕ iff ϕM ∈ E(s)(Cb) where ϕM = {s′ ∣M,s′ ⊧ ϕ}
Notice that in the above definition, we do not define the truth for [Cb] modalities in
two separate cases, one for non-empty coalitions C and one for empty coalitions. This is because
the two cases have been covered by the RB-playable effectivity structure E, one may refer to the
correspondence of effectivity structures to RBA frames in Section 4.4.3 for more details.
For convenience, we also extend the definition of the function V for a given model M =
(S,E,V ) as follows, V (ϕ) = {s ∈ S ∣M,s ⊧ ϕ}.
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Theorem 4. The sets of formulas valid in multi-step RBAmodels and in resource-bounded effectivity
models are equal.
This follows from the correspondence between RBA frames and RB-playable effectivity
structures, and the correspondence between the two truth definitions. Therefore the next result also
provides an axiomatisation for RBCL.
Theorem 5. The following set of axiom schemas and inference rules provides a sound and complete
axiomatisation of the set of validities over all resource-bounded effectivity models:
A0-A5, MP and Equivalence given above
A6a [Cb]ϕ∧ [Dd]ψ → [(C ∪D)b⊕d](ϕ∧ψ) where C andD are both non-empty and disjoint, and
t(b) = t(d) = 1
A6b [∅b]ϕ ∧ [Cb]ψ → [Cb](ϕ ∧ ψ) where C is either ∅ or N
A7 [Cb1][Cb2]ϕ→ [Cb1⊗b2]ϕ for C /= ∅
A8 [Cb]ϕ→ ⋁b′<b[Cb′]ϕ ∨⋁b1⊗b2=b[Cb1][Cb2]ϕ for all C /= ∅ and t(b) > 1
Proof. The proof of soundness is straightforward. We prove completeness by first constructing a
canonical model. Let us denote by ⊢Λ derivability in the axiom system above. Let SΛ be the set
of all Λ-maximally consistent sets. For any formula ϕ, we denote ϕ˜ = {s ∈ SΛ ∣ ϕ ∈ s}. Then, we
define the canonical valuation function V Λ(p) = p˜.
We define the canonical effectivity structure EΛ by induction on b as follows:
● For all b such that t(b) = 1 and C /= N , X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) iff ∃ϕ˜ ⊆X ∶ [Cb]ϕ ∈ s.
● For all b such that t(b) = 1, X ∈ EΛ(s)(N b) iff X ∈ EΛ(s)(∅b).
● For all b such that t(b) > 1 and C /= ∅, X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) iff X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb
′
) for some b′ < b
or there are b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that {s′ ∣X ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb1).
● For all b such that t(b) > 1, X ∈ EΛ(s)(∅b) iff X ∉ EΛ(s)(N b).
The following property (∗) is crucial for the proof:
(∗) ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) iff [Cb]ϕ ∈ s
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We prove it by induction on the bounds. In the base case, assume that ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) for some
t(b) = 1. For C /= N , ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) iff ∃ψ˜ ⊆ ϕ˜ ∶ [Cb]ψ ∈ s. Then we have ψ → ϕ ∈ s; together
with RM, it is implied that [Cb]ϕ ∈ s. In the inverse direction, [Cb]ϕ ∈ s implies directly that
ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) by definition of EΛ.
If C = N , we have ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(N b) iff ¬˜ϕ ∉ EΛ(s)(∅b) iff ¬[∅b]¬ϕ ∈ s (as just proved)
iff [N b]ϕ ∈ s (by axiom A3).
For the induction step, assume that ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) where t(b) > 1. For C /= ∅, there are
two cases to consider. (1) ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb
′
) for some b′ < b. By the induction hypothesis, we have
[Cb
′
]ϕ ∈ s. Then, axiom A5 implies that [Cb]ϕ ∈ s. (2) There are b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that
{s′ ∣ ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb1).
Let ψ = [Cb2]ϕ, by the induction hypothesis, we have ψ˜ = {s′ ∣ ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)}, thus, ψ˜ ∈
EΛ(s)(Cb1). Again, induction hypothesis gives us [Cb1][Cb2]ϕ ∈ s. Therefore, by axiom A7, we
have [Cb]ϕ ∈ s.
For the inverse direction, assume that [Cb]ϕ ∈ s for some t(b) > 1. By axiom A8, there
are two cases to consider. If [Cb
′
]ϕ ∈ s for some b′ < b, then the induction hypothesis implies that
ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb
′
). Hence, by the definition of EΛ, we have ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb). In the second case,
there are b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that [Cb1][Cb2]ϕ ∈ s. Similar to the proof above, let ψ = [Cb2]ϕ, the
induction hypothesis implies that ψ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb1). As we have that ψ˜ = {s′ ∣ ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)},
this shows
{s′ ∣ ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb1).
By the definition of EΛ, we obtain ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb).
If C = ∅, we have ϕ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(∅b) iff ¬˜ϕ ∉ EΛ(s)(N b) iff ¬[N b]¬ϕ ∈ s (as just proved)
iff [∅b]ϕ ∈ s (by axiom A3).
Let us prove that EΛ satisfies properties of RB-playability except N -determinacy by ex-
ploiting the property (∗), the definition of EΛ and the axioms of Λ.
1. As [Cb]⊺ ∈ s for all s ∈ SΛ, it means by (*) that SΛ = ⊺˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb).
2. Similarly, [Cb] ∉ s for all s ∈ SΛ, it implies by (*) that that ∅ = ˜ ∉ EΛ(s)(Cb).
3. We prove outcome-monotonicity by induction on bounds. Assume that X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb).
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● If t(b) = 1 andC /= N ,X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) iff there existsϕ such that ϕ˜ ⊆X and [Cb]ϕ ∈ s.
Hence, for all X ′ ⊇ X , we have that ϕ˜ ⊆ X ′. This implies by the definition of EΛ that
X ′ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb)
● If t(b) = 1, X ∈ EΛ(s)(N b) iff X ∉ EΛ(s)(∅b). Let X ′ ⊇ X , it implies that X ′ ⊆ X .
Assume to the contrary that X ′ ∉ EΛ(s)(N b). Then, X ′ ∈ EΛ(s)(∅b). As X ′ ⊆ X ,
this implies that X ∈ EΛ(s)(∅b) which is a contradiction.
● If t(b) > 1 and C /= ∅. If X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb
′
) for some b′ < b, the induction hypothesis
shows that X ′ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb
′
) for all X ′ ⊇ X . Then, by the definition of EΛ we have
X ′ ∈ EΛ(Cb)(s). If X ∉ EΛ(s)(Cb
′
) for all b′ < b. By the definition of EΛ, there are
b1 ⊗ b2 = b and
{s′ ∣X ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb1)
Let X ′ ⊇X , by the induction hypothesis we have
{s′ ∣X ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)} ⊆ {s′ ∣X ′ ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)}
⇒ {s′ ∣X ′ ∈ EΛ(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb1)
By the definition of EΛ, we have X ′ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb).
● If t(b) > 1, X ∈ EΛ(s)(∅b) iff X ∉ EΛ(s)(N b). Let X ′ ⊇ X , assume to the contrary
that X ′ ∉ EΛ(s)(∅b). This implies that X ′ ∈ EΛ(s)(N b). By the previous proof, we
have X ∈ EΛ(s)(N b) as X ′ ⊆X , which is a contradiction.
4. N -maximality follows directly from the definition of EΛ for N when t(b) = 1 and ∅ when
t(b) > 1.
5. Similarly, N -regularity also follows directly from the definition of EΛ for N when t(b) = 1
and ∅ when t(b) > 1.
6. In order to show super-additivity, we consider the following three different cases. Let t(b) =
t(d) = 1, C ∩D = ∅ with X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) and Y ∈ EΛ(s)(Dd).
● If both C and D are not empty by the definition of EΛ, we have that there are ϕ and
ψ such that ϕ˜ ⊆ X , ψ˜ ⊆ Y , [Cb]ϕ and [Dd]ψ ∈ s. According to axiom A6a, we have
[(C∪D)b⊕d](ϕ∧ψ) ∈ s. Obviously, ϕ˜∩ψ˜ ⊆X∩Y , henceX∩Y ∈ EΛ(s)((C∪D)b⊕d).
● If C = ∅, b = d and D = ∅, the proof is similar to the one above except that axiom A6b
gives us [Dd](ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ s. Hence, X ∩ Y ∈ EΛ(s)(Dd).
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● If C = ∅, b = d and D = N , we need to show that X ∩ Y ∈ EΛ(N b)(s). As-
sume to the contrary that X ∩ Y ∉ EΛ(N b)(s), then N -maximality, which has been
proved above, implies that X ∩ Y ∈ EΛ(∅b)(s). Then, by the previous case of super-
additivity, we haveX ∩Y ∈ EΛ(∅b)(s). As we already showed outcome-monotonicity,
Y ∈ EΛ(∅b)(s). However, by N -regularity, we have Y ∉ EΛ(N b)(s) which is a con-
tradiction.
7. Super-transitivity follows directly from the definition of EΛ when t(b) > 1.
8. Similarly, transitivity follows directly from the definition of EΛ when t(b) > 1.
9. Finally, we show that EΛ is indeed bound-monotonic. Let us assume that X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb).
● If t(b) = 1 and C /= N , X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) iff there exists ϕ such that ϕ˜ ⊆ X and
[Cb]ϕ ∈ s. By axiom A5, we have for any d ≥ b or d ≤ b if C /= ∅ or otherwise,
respectively, [Cd]ϕ ∈ s. Then, by the definition of EΛ, X ∈ EΛ(s)(Cd).
● If t(b) = 1 and C = N , X ∈ EΛ(s)(N b) iff X ∉ EΛ(s)(∅b). Then, axiom A5 implies
that X ∉ EΛ(s)(∅d) for any d ≥ b. Once again, by the definition of EΛ, we have
X ∈ EΛ(s)(Nd).
● If t(b) > 1 and C /= ∅, it is straightforward from the definition of EΛ that X ∈
EΛ(s)(Cd) for any d ≥ b.
● If t(b) > 1 and C = ∅, X ∈ EΛ(s)(∅b) iff X ∉ EΛ(s)(N b). By the proof of the
previous case, we have X ∉ EΛ(s)(Nd) for any d ≤ b. Hence, X ∈ EΛ(s)(∅d).
Since we have already shown (*), the following truth lemma is straightforward:
(∗∗) MΛ, s ⊧ ϕ iff ϕ ∈ s
As usual, we show (**) by induction on the structure of ϕ. The cases for proposition
variables and usual Boolean connectives are trivial, so we omit them here.
● If ϕ = [Cb], then,
MΛ, s ⊧ [Cb]ψ ⇔ ψMΛ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb)
⇔ ψ˜ ∈ EΛ(s)(Cb) by the induction hypothesis
⇔ [Cb]ψ ∈ s by (*)
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By showing (**), it is obvious that for any consistent formula ϕ, there is a state s0 ∈ SΛ
such that ϕ ∈ s, hence MΛ, s0 ⊧ ϕ. In other words, ϕ is satisfiable in the canonical model MΛ;
however, notice that EΛ is not proved to be RB-playable. Therefore, in order to provide a model
which has an RB-playable effectivity structure and satisfies ϕ, we present the notion of filtration as
for the case of CL [Hansen & Pauly, 2002].
Let M = (S,E,V ) be a resource-bounded effectivity model and Γ be a set of formulas,
we define the equivalent relation ≡Γ over Γ on S as follows: for any s, t ∈ S, s ≡Γ t iff ∀ϕ ∈ Γ,
M,s ⊧ ϕ iffM, t ⊧ ϕ.
For convenience, we shall denote ∣s∣ = {t ∈ S ∣ s ≡Γ t}, then ∣X ∣ = {∣s∣ ∣ s ∈ X} where
X ⊆ S.
We define the notion of filtration for resource-bounded effectivity models, where the ef-
fectivity structure has all properties of RB-playability except N -determinacy, as follows.
Definition 12. Given a resource-bounded effectivity model M = (S,E,V ) and a sub-formula
closed set Γ of formulas, a model M
f
Γ
= (Sf ,Ef , V f) is a filtration of M over Γ iff the follow-
ing conditions hold:
1. Sf = ∣S∣,
2. For any C ⊆ N and b ∈ B where t(b) = 1, ∀ϕ ∈ Γ: ϕM ∈ E(s)(Cb) implies ∣ϕM ∣ ∈
Ef(∣s∣)(Cb),
3. For anyC ⊆ N and b ∈ B where t(b) = 1, ifX ∈ Ef(∣s∣)(Cb) then ∀ϕ ∈ Γ: {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈X} ⊆ ϕM
implies ϕM ∈ E(s)(Cb),
4. For any C /= ∅ and b ∈ B where t(b) > 1, X ∈ Ef(∣s∣)(Cb) iff X ∈ Ef(∣s∣)(Cb
′
) for some
b′ < b or there are b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that {∣s′∣ ∣X ∈ Ef(∣s′∣)(Cb2)} ∈ Ef(∣s∣)(Cb1),
5. For any b ∈ B where t(b) > 1, X ∈ Ef(∣s∣)(∅b) iff X¯ ∉ Ef(∣s∣)(∅b),
6. V f(p) = ∣V (p)∣ for all p ∈ Prop.




= (Sf ,Ef , V f) to be a filtration ofM = (S,E,V ), for all ϕ ∈ Γ and s ∈ S,
we have that:
M,s ⊧ ϕ iffMf
Γ
, ∣s∣ ⊧ ϕ
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Proof. The proof is done by induction on the structure of ϕ:
● If ϕ = p where p ∈ Prop,M,s ⊧ p iff s ∈ V (p) iff ∣s∣ ∈ ∣V (p)∣ iffMf
Γ
, ∣s∣ ⊧ p.
● If ϕ = ¬ψ,M,s ⊧ ¬ψ iffM,s /⊧ ψ iffMf
Γ




● If ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2, M,s ⊧ ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff M,s ⊧ ψ1 or M,s ⊧ ψ2. Without loss of generality, we
assume thatM,s ⊧ ψ1 iffM
f
Γ
, ∣s∣ ⊧ ψ1 (by the induction hypothesis) iffM
f
Γ
, ∣s∣ ⊧ ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
● If ϕ = [Cb]ψ, where t(b) = 1,M,s ⊧ [Cb]ψ iff ψM ∈ E(s)(Cb) iff ∣ψM ∣ ∈ Ef(∣s∣)(Cb) (by
the definition of Ef ) iffM
f
Γ
, ∣s∣ ⊧ [Cb]ψ.
● The last case when ϕ = [Cb]ψ, where t(b) > 1, can be done similarly by using the definition
of Ef and the induction hypothesis.
Given a formula ϕ, we define sub(ϕ) to be set of all sub-formulas of ϕ including itself,
and esub(ϕ) to be the boolean closure (closed under negations and disjunctions) of sub(ϕ) upto
tautology equivalence. Firstly, esub(ϕ) is finite since ∣sub(ϕ)∣ ≤ ∣ϕ∣; hence the cardinality of
esub(ϕ) is no more than 22
∣ϕ∣
. We define the filtration of a resource-bounded effectivity model for
a formula ϕ as follows:
Definition 13. Given a resource-bounded effectivity model M = (S,E,V ) and a formula ϕ, the
filtration modelMϕ = (Sϕ,Eϕ, V ϕ) ofM for ϕ is defined as follows:
1. Γ = esub(ϕ),




3. For any C /= N and b such that t(b) = 1,X ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(Cb) iff ∃ϕ ∈ Γ such that ϕM ⊆ {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈
X} and ϕM ∈ E(s)(Cb),
4. For any b such that t(b) = 1, X ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(N b) iff X¯ ∉ Eϕ(∣s∣)(∅b),
5. For any C /= ∅ and b ∈ B where t(b) > 1, X ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(Cb) iff X ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(Cb
′
) for some
b′ < b or there are b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that {∣s′∣ ∣X ∈ Eϕ(∣s′∣)(Cb2)} ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(Cb1),
6. For any b ∈ B where t(b) > 1, X ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(∅b) iff X¯ ∉ Eϕ(∣s∣)(∅b),
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7. V ϕ(p) = ∣V (p)∣ for all p ∈ Prop.
Let us show the following result.
Lemma 8. Mϕ = (Sϕ,Eϕ, V ϕ) is a filtration.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. According to the definition of a filtration and Mϕ, we only
need to show thatMϕ satisfies the second and third requirements in Definition 12.
● Let C /= N , assume that ψ ∈ esub(ϕ) and ψM ∈ E(s)(Cb), it follows directly from the
definition ofMϕ that ∣ψM ∣ ∈ E(∣s∣)(Cb).
● Assume that ψ ∈ esub(ϕ) and ψM ∈ E(s)(N b), we need to prove that ∣ψM ∣ ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(N b).
Assume to the contrary that ∣ψM ∣ ∉ Eϕ(∣s∣)(N b), this implies ∣¬ψM ∣ ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(∅b); thus,
∃ψ′ ∈ esub(ϕ) such that ψ′M ⊆ {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈ ∣¬ψM ∣} and ψ′M ∈ E(s)(∅b). Then, ψ′M ⊆ ¬ψM ,
hence, ¬ψM ∈ E(s)(∅b) as E is outcome-monotonicity. By N -regularity, we obtain ψM ∉
E(s)(N b) which is a contradiction.
● Let C /= N , assume that X ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(Cb) and ψ ∈ esub(ϕ) such that {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈X} ⊆ ψM . We
have by the definition ofMϕ that ∃ψ′ ∈ esub(ϕ): ψ′M ⊆ {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈ X} and ψ′M ∈ E(s)(Cb).
Thus, ψ′M ⊆ ψM ; and by outcome monotonic, we obtain ψM ∈ E(s)(Cb).
● Assume that X ∈ Eϕ(∣s∣)(N b) and ψ ∈ esub(ϕ) such that {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈ X} ⊆ ψM . We have by
the definition of Mϕ that X¯ ∉ Eϕ(∣s∣)(N b) iff for all ψ′ ∈ esub(ϕ), if ψ′M ⊆ {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈ X¯}
then ψ′M ∉ E(s)(∅b). As {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈ X} ⊆ ψM , we have that {t ∣ ∣t∣ ∈ X¯} ⊇ ¬ψM ; hence
¬ψM ∉ E(s)(∅b). By N -regularity, we obtain ψM ∈ E(s)(N b).
Finally, we have the following result.
Lemma 9. The effectivity structure Eϕ of the filtrationMϕ is RB-playability.
The proof of the above lemma proceeds by first showing that Eϕ has all properties of RB-
playability except N -determinacy. We omit the proof as it is similar to that of showing EΛ has all
properties of RB-playability exceptN -determinacy. Since Sϕ is finite,N -determinacy follows from
the others properties of RB-playability. Therefore, Eϕ is RB-playable. This result also implies the
finite model property of RBCL where we have that any satisfiable formula in RBCL is also satisfied
in a finite model.
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We complete the proof of completeness for RBCL as follows. LetMΛ,ϕ be the filtration
model of MΛ, we have by Lemma 7 that MΛ,ϕ, ∣s0∣ ⊧ ϕ. Let /⊢Λ ϕ, i.e. ¬ϕ is consistent. Hence,
¬ϕ is satisfiable. Therefore, ϕ is not valid.
4.6 Satisfiability problem
The last result about the finite model property of RBCL in the previous section suggests an ex-
hausted way to search for a finite model to satisfy a given formula. In this section we give an
alternative proof of decidability for RBCL, which is more efficient than the exhausted search, by
providing an algorithm which determines the satisfiability of a given formula ϕ. Similar to Coali-
tion Logic, our algorithm is developed by adopting the approach presented in [Vardi et al., 1989]. In
principle, the algorithm will try to guess a suitable valuation for the set of more-or-less sub-formulas
generated by ϕ which satisfies a number of conditions. Such existing valuation will help construct
a model for ϕ, or in other words, assure the satisfiability of ϕ.
Given a formula ϕ, we define a set sub(ϕ) inductively as follows.
● sub(p) = {p} for any propositional variable p
● sub(¬ψ) = {¬ψ} ∪ sub(ψ)
● sub(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) = {ψ1 ∨ ψ2} ∪ sub(ψ1) ∪ sub(ψ2)
● sub([Cb]ψ) = {[Cb]ψ} ∪ sub(ψ) for t(b) = 1 and C /= N
● sub([N b]ψ) = {[N b]ψ} ∪ sub(¬[∅b]¬ψ) for t(b) = 1




for t(b) > 1 and C /= ∅
● sub([∅b]ψ) = {[∅b]ψ} ∪ sub(¬[N b]¬ψ) for t(b) > 1
It is easy to show that sub(ϕ) is finite. Then, we define the closure cl(ϕ) of a given
formula ϕ as follows.
cl(ϕ) = {ψ,¬ψ ∣ ψ ∈ sub(ϕ)}∪
{[∅b]¬ψ,¬[∅b]¬ψ ∣ [N b]ψ ∈ sub(ϕ)}∪
{[N b]¬ψ,¬[N b]¬ψ ∣ [∅b]ψ ∈ sub(ϕ)}
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Notice that we identify ¬¬ψ as ψ. We have the following definition of valuations. Moreover, we
denote 0¯ as the smallest bound of which all components are 0 except for the time component which
is 1.
Let us consider an example. Assume that N = {1,2} (i.e. there are two agents in the
system) and ∣R∣ = 1 and one of the resources in R is time. We consider the following formula
¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p ∧ [{2}1,2]p. Then, the set cl(¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p ∧ [{2}1,2]p) contains the following





Then, cl(¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p ∧ [{2}1,2]p) contains the above formulas together with their negations.
Definition 14. A valuation for a given formula ϕ is a mapping v ∶ cl(ϕ) → {0,1} which satisfies
the following conditions:
1. v(ϕ) = 1
2. v(⊺) = 1
3. v(¬ψ) = 1 − v(ψ)
4. v(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) =max(v(ψ1), v(ψ2))
5. v([∅b]ψ) = v(¬[N b]¬ψ)
6. v([Cb]ψ) ≤ v([Cd]ψ) where b ≤ d if C /= ∅ or b ≥ d otherwise
7. v([Cb]ψ) = max{⋃b′<b{v([Cb
′
]ψ)} ∪ ⋃b1⊗b2=b{v([C
b1][Cb2]ψ)}} where t(b) > 1 and
C /= ∅
For instance, Figure 4.2 depicts a valuation for the formulas in the set cl(¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p∧
[{2}1,2]p). Notice that we only provide the valuation for the positive formulas in cl(¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p∧
[{2}1,2]p) since the negation ones can be determined by the definition v(¬ψ) = 1 − v(ψ).
In the following lemma, we determine when such a valuation is qualified as a starting
point to help building up a model for ϕ.
4. RESOURCE-BOUNDED COALITION LOGIC 91
ϕ v(ϕ) ϕ v(ϕ) ϕ v(ϕ)
[{1,2}(2,1)]p 0 [∅(2,1)]¬ p 1 [{2}0,1][{2}0,1]p 0
[{2}(0,1)]p 0 [{2}1,1]p 0 [{2}1,1][{2}0,1]p 0
[{2}0,2]p 0 [{2}1,2]p 1 [{2}0,1][{2}1,1]p 1
p 0
FIGURE 4.2: A valuation for cl(¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p ∧ [{2}1,2]p).
Lemma 10. A formula ϕ is satisfiable if and only if there exists a valuation v for ϕ such that
1. If there are [Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bk
k
]ψk ∈ cl(ϕ) for some k > 0 such that:
● t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
● C1, . . . , Ck are pairwise disjoint
● for any [Cbjj ]ψj such that Cj = ∅, bj ≥ ⊕Cj′ /=∅bj′
● v([Cbjj ]ψj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
then ∧j≤kψj is satisfiable.
2. If there are [Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bk
k
]ψk ∈ cl(ϕ) for some k > 0 such that:
● t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
● C1, . . . , Ck−1 are pairwise disjoint and all non-empty
● ⋃j<kCj ⊆ Ck
● ⊕j<kbj = bk




then ∧j<kψj ∧ ¬ψk is satisfiable.
Proof. Firstly, we prove the left-to-right direction by defining a valuation based on the model satis-
fying the formula ϕ. In particular, let us assume that ϕ is satisfiable by a model M = (S,E,V ) at





1 ifM,s ⊧ ψ
0 otherwise
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Based on the definition of the semantics for RBCL, it is straightforward to show that the defined
valuation v satisfies all conditions listed in Definition 14. What remains is to prove that it also has
the two properties listed in the lemma.
1. Assume that there are [Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bk
k
]ψk ∈ cl(ϕ) for some k > 0 such that:
● t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
● C1, . . . , Ck are pairwise disjoint
● for any [Cbjj ]ψj such that Cj = ∅, bj ≥ ⊕Cj′ /=∅bj′
● v([Cbjj ]ψj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
That isM,s ⊧ [Cbjj ]ψj for all j ≤ k.
If there is some non-emptyCj then, by super-additivity, we have thatM,s ⊧ [Cb](∧j≤k,Cj /=∅ψj)
where C = ⋃j≤kCj and b = ⊕j≤k,Cj /=∅bj . By coalition monotonicity, we have that M,s ⊧
[N b](∧j≤k,Cj /=∅ψj). Furthermore, super-additivity implies that, for all Cj = ∅, M,s ⊧
[N b](∧j≤kψj). Because of playability, ∅ ∉ E(s)(N b), thus V (∧j≤kψj) /= ∅. Therefore,
there exists s′ ∈ V (∧j≤kψj) and it is straightforward thatM,s′ ⊧ ∧j≤kψj .
If there is no non-empty Cj then super-additivity gives us directly thatM,s ⊧ [∅b](∧j≤kψj)
where b =min{bj ∣ j ≤ k}. Apply the same argument for playability, we have that there exists
s′ ∈ V (∧j≤kψj) and it is straightforward thatM,s′ ⊧ ∧j≤kψj .
2. Assume that there are [Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bk
k
]ψk ∈ cl(ϕ) for some k > 1 such that:
● t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
● C1, . . . , Ck−1 are pairwise disjoint and all non-empty
● ⋃j<kCj ⊆ Ck
● ⊕j<kbj ≤ bk




That is M,s ⊧ [Cbjj ]ψj for all j < k and M,s /⊧ [C
bk
k
]ψk. By super-additivity, we have that
M,s ⊧ [Cb](∧j<kψj) where C = ⋃j<kCj and b = ⊕j<kbj . That is V (∧j<kψj) ∈ E(s)(Cb).
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over, we already have M,s /⊧ [Cbk
k
]ψk, thus, V (ψk) ∉ E(s)(C
bk
k
). Then, outcome mono-
tonicity implies that V (ψk) /⊇ V (∧j<kψj). Since V (∧j<kψj) /= ∅, there must exist s′ ∈
V (∧j<kψj) ∖ V (ψk) and it is straightforward thatM,s′ ⊧ ∧j<kψj ∧ ¬ψk.
In the case when k = 1, the proof is slightly different from above as we do not have the set
V (∧j<kψj). However, we make the use of the first requirement of playability which states
that S ∈ E(s)(Cbk
k
), therefore, V (ψk) /= S. Hence, there also exists s′ ∈ S ∖ V (ψk) and it is
obvious thatM,s′ ⊧ ¬ψk.
Let us now prove the right-to-left direction of the lemma. The idea is that we construct a
model satisfying the formula ϕ by collecting models which witness the satisfaction of the formulas
in the two conditions of the lemma. That is for any tuple ([C
bj
j ]ψj)j≤k of cl(ϕ) which corresponds
to one of the two conditions of the lemma, as ∧i≤kψj (or ∧i<kψj ∧ ¬ψk) is satisfiable, there is a
model M ′ which satisfies ∧i≤kψj (or ∧i<kψj ∧ ¬ψk) at some state s′ of M ′. The model M we
construct to satisfy ϕ will be the union of all such witnessing modelsM ′ together with a new state
s0 at which ϕ will be satisfied. We define the assignment function and the effectivity structure at
a state of M by using the valuation function if the state is s0 or the assignment function and the
effectivity structures of the witness models if otherwise. After constructing the model M , we also
have to show that the effectivity structure ofM is RB-playable so thatM then is a qualified model
for ϕ. In the following, we detail the construction ofM .
For each tuple of formulas ([C
bj
j ]ψj)j≤k of cl(ϕ) which corresponds to one of two cases
in the lemma, there is a finite model which satisfies its corresponding formula in form of either
∧i≤kψj or ∧i<kψj ∧ ¬ψk. Let M1, . . . ,Mn be the enumeration of the above witnessing models
where Mi = (Si,Ei, Vi) such that, without loss of generality, all Si’s are assumed to be pairwise
disjoint.
We construct a finite model M = (S,E,V ) as follows. The set of states S is the set
⋃i≤n Si ∪ {s0} where s0 is a new state; hence S is finite. In order to define V , we firstly introduce





{s0} if v(ψ) = 1
∅ otherwise
Then, we define an assignment U ∶ cl(ϕ) → ℘(S) by U(ψ) = ⋃i=0,...,n Vi(ψ). Note that by the
construction, we have U(¬ψ) = S ∖ U(ψ), U(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) = U(ψ1) ∪ U(ψ2). Now, we define the
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mapping V forM by the projection of U on the set of propositional variables p, that is V (p) = U(p)
(without loss of generality, we can assume that all propositional variables are contained in cl(ϕ)).
Finally, we define the effectivity structure E in a way which is similar to that of the
completeness proof.
For C /= N and b such that t(b) = 1, we put X ⊆ S in E(s)(Cb) if and only if X = S or
there are [Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bk
k
]ψk ∈ cl(ϕ) for some k > 0 such that:
● t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
● C1, . . . , Ck are pairwise disjoint, and all non-empty if C is not empty
● ⋃j≤kCj ⊆ C
● ⊕j≤kbj ≤ b if C /= ∅ or b ≤ bj for all j ≤ k otherwise
● ⋂j≤k U(ψj) ⊆X for all j ≤ k
● v([Cbjj ]ψj) = 1 for all j ≤ k if s = s0
● Mi, s ⊧ [Cbjj ]ψj for all j ≤ k if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n
For t(b) = 1, X ∈ E(s)(N b) if and only if X ∉ E(s)(∅b). For the case when t(b) > 1
and C /= ∅, we define E(s)(Cb) inductively as follows: X ∈ E(s)(Cb) iff one of the following
conditions holds,
1. There is b′ < b such that X ∈ E(s)(Cb)
2. There are b1 ⊕ b2 = b such that {s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1)
Then, we define for t(b) > 1, X ∈ E(s)(∅b) iff X ∉ E(s)(N b).
Before proving that the model M which we just construct is indeed a model for ϕ, it is
required to show that E is an RB-playable effectivity structure.
Claim 1. The effectivity structure E is RB-playable.
Proof. ● We show the first two properties of RB-playability by induction on bounds.
Let t(b) = 1 and C /= N . The definition of E implies directly that S ∈ E(s)(Cb).
Moreover, S ∈ E(s)(∅b) implies that ∅ ∉ E(s)(N b) also by the definition of E.
Let t(b) = 1 and C /= N . Assume to the contrary that ∅ ∈ E(s0)(Cb). Hence, there are
[Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bk
k
]ψk ∈ cl(ϕ) for some k > 0 such that:
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– t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
– C1, . . . , Ck are pairwise disjoint, and all non-empty if C is not empty
– ⋃j≤kCj ⊆ C
– ⊕j≤kbj ≤ b if C /= ∅ or b ≤ bj for all j ≤ k otherwise
– ⋂j≤k U(ψj) ⊆X for all j ≤ k
– v([C
bj
j ]ψj) = 1 for all j ≤ k if s = s0
– Mi, s ⊧ [C
bj
j ]ψj for all j ≤ k if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n
Then, ∧j≤kψj ≡  which contradicts the first condition of the lemma where  is required to
be satisfiable.
Similarly to the case when s /= s0, we can show that ∅ ∉ E(s)(Cb) for C /= N .
Then, ∅ ∉ E(s)(∅b) implies that S ∈ E(s)(N b), by the definition of E, again.
In the induction step, let t(b) > 1 and C /= ∅, we directly have that S ∈ E(s)(Cb) as
S ∈ E(s)(Cb
′
) for any b′ < b and t(b′) = 1. S ∈ E(s)(N b) also implies that ∅ ∉ E(s)(∅b).
Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, we have that ∅ ∉ E(s)(Cb′) for any b′ < b. Further-
more, for any b1 ⊗ b2 = b, we have that {s′ ∣ ∅ ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} = ∅ and ∅ ∉ E(s)(Cb1) also
because of the induction hypothesis. By the definition of E, it follows that ∅ ∉ E(s)(Cb).
Once agent, ∅ ∉ E(s)(N b) implies that S ∈ E(s)(∅b).
● Let us now show outcome monotonicity.
Let t(b) = 1 and C /= N . Assume that X ∈ E(s)(Cb) where X ⊂ S. By the definition of E,
there are [Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bk
k
]ψk ∈ cl(ϕ) for some k > 0 such that:
– t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
– C1, . . . , Ck are pairwise disjoint, and all non-empty if C is not empty
– ⋃j≤kCj ⊆ C
– ⊕j≤kbj ≤ b if C /= ∅ or b ≤ bj for all j ≤ k otherwise
– ⋂j≤k U(ψj) ⊆X for all j ≤ k
– v([C
bj
j ]ψj) = 1 for all j ≤ k if s = s0
– Mi, s ⊧ [C
bj
j ]ψj for all j ≤ k if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n
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It is straightforward that for any X ′ ⊇ X , we have ⋂j≤k U(ψj) ⊆ X ⊆ X ′. Hence, X ′ ∈
E(s)(Cb).
In the case of the grand coalition, assume that X ∈ E(s)(N b). By the definition of E, we
have X¯ ∉ E(s)(∅b). Assume to the contrary that X ′ ∉ E(s)(N b) for some X ′ ⊇ X . It
follows that X¯ ′ ⊆ X¯ . X ′ ∉ E(s)(N b) implies that X¯ ′ ∈ E(s)(∅b), hence, X¯ ∈ E(s)(∅b)
which is a contradiction.
Now, we provide a proof of outcome monotonicity for the case when t(b) > 1. It is easy to
notice that it is similar to the proof of completeness of RBCL.
Let t(b) > 1 and C /= ∅. . If X ∈ E(s)(Cb
′
) for some b′ < b, induction hypothesis shows that
X ′ ∈ E(s)(Cb
′
) for all X ′ ⊇ X . Then, by the definition of E, we have X ′ ∈ E(Cb)(s). If
X ∉ E(s)(Cb
′
) for all b′ < b. By the definition of E, there are b1 ⊗ b2 = b and
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1)
Let X ′ ⊇X , by the induction hypothesis we have
{s′ ∣X ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ⊆ {s′ ∣X ′ ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)}
⇒ {s′ ∣X ′ ∈ E(s′)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1)
By the definition of E, we have X ′ ∈ E(s)(Cb).
If t(b) > 1, X ∈ E(s)(∅b) iff X ∉ E(s)(N b). Let X ′ ⊇ X , assume to the contrary that
X ′ ∉ E(s)(∅b). This implies that X ′ ∈ E(s)(N b). By the previous proof, we have X ∈
E(s)(N b) as X ′ ⊆X , which is a contradiction.
● N -maximality and regularity follow directly from the definition of E for ∅ when t(b) = 1
and also t(b) > 1. Therefore, we omit the proof here.
● Since S is finite, we ignore proving N -determinacy as it is derivable by other properties of
RB-playability.
● Let us now prove super-additivity. Let t(b) = t(d) = 1, C ∩D = ∅ with X ∈ E(s)(Cb) and
Y ∈ E(s)(Dd).
– If bothC andD are not empty. Assume that bothX and Y are not equal to S. By defini-
tion ofE, we have there are [Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bkC
kC
]ψkC ∈ cl(ϕ) and [D
d1
1




cl(ϕ) for some kC > 0 and kD > 0 such that:
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∗ t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ kC
∗ t(dj) = 1 for all j ≤ kD
∗ C1, . . . , CkC are pairwise disjoint, and all non-empty
∗ D1, . . . ,DkD are pairwise disjoint, and all non-empty
∗ ⋃j≤kC Cj ⊆ C
∗ ⋃j≤kD Dj ⊆D
∗ ⊕j≤kC bj ≤ b
∗ ⊕j≤kDdj ≤ d
∗ ⋂j≤kC U(ψj) ⊆X for all j ≤ kC
∗ ⋂j≤kD U(ψ′j) ⊆ Y for all j ≤ kD
∗ v([Cbjj ]ψj) = 1 for all j ≤ kC if s = s0
∗ v([Ddjj ]ψ′j) = 1 for all j ≤ kD if s = s0
∗ Mi, s ⊧ [Cbjj ]ψj for all j ≤ kC if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n
∗ Mi, s ⊧ [Ddjj ]ψ′j for all j ≤ kD if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n
Then, it is straightforward that X ∩ Y ⊇ ⋂j≤kC U(ψj) ∩⋂j≤kD U(ψ′j). It follows that
X ∩ Y ∈ E((C ∪D)b⊕d).
In the case when Y is S, the proof is similar to above with the notice that C ⊆ C ∪D
and b ≤ b⊕ d.
– If C =D = ∅ and b = d, we apply the same argument as the case above.
– If C = ∅, b = d and D = N , we need to show that X ∩ Y ∈ E(N b)(s). Assume to the
contrary that X ∩ Y ∉ E(N b)(s), then N -maximality, which has been proved above,
implies thatX ∩ Y ∈ E(∅b)(s). Then, by the previous case of super-additivity, we have
X ∩ Y ∈ E(∅b)(s). As we already showed outcome-monotonicity, Y ∈ E(∅b)(s).
However, by N -regularity, we have Y ∉ E(N b)(s) which is a contradiction.
● Super-transitivity follows directly from the definition of E when t(b) > 1.
● Similarly, transitivity follows directly from the definition of E when t(b) > 1.
Therefore, E is RB-playable. In order to show thatM satisfies ϕ, we prove the following
two claims.
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Claim 2. For any [Cb]ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb) iff v([Cb]ψ) = 1 if s = s0 orMi, s ⊧ [Cb]ψ if
s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n.
Proof. The direction from right to left is straightforward according to the definition of E. Hence,
we provide here only a proof for the other direction.
A trivial case is when U(ψ) = S, therefore we ignore it here. We prove the claim also by
induction on the resource bounds.
Let t(b) = 1 and C /= N . As U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb), there are [Cb1
1




for some k > 0 such that:
● t(bj) = 1 for all j ≤ k
● C1, . . . , Ck are pairwise disjoint, and all non-empty if C is not empty
● ⋃j≤kCj ⊆ C
● ⊕j≤kbj ≤ b if C /= ∅ or b ≤ bj for all j ≤ k otherwise
● ⋂j≤k U(ψj) ⊆ U(ψ) for all j ≤ k
● v([Cbjj ]ψj) = 1 for all j ≤ k if s = s0
● Mi, s ⊧ [Cbjj ]ψj for all j ≤ k if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n
Suppose s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n. As Mi, s ⊧ [C
bj
j ]ψj for all j ≤ k, super-additivity implies that
Mi, s ⊧ [⋃j≤kC
⊕j≤kbj
j ](∧j≤kψj) if C /= ∅ or directly, Mi, s ⊧ [Cb](∧j≤kψj) otherwise. In the
former case, coalition monotonicity gives us Mi, s ⊧ [Cb](∧j≤kψj). Then, in both cases, we can
conclude by outcome-monotonicity thatMi, s ⊧ [Cb](ψ).
When s = s0, assume by contradiction that v([Cb]ψ) = 0. Then there is a witnessing
modelMi and s
′ ∈ Si such thatMi, s′ ⊧ ∧j≤kψi ∧ ¬ψ which contradicts the fact that ⋂j≤k U(ψj) ⊆
U(ψ).
Let t(b) = 1 and C = N . By the definition of E, U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(N b) iff U(¬ψ) ∉
E(s)(∅b). By the proof above, U(¬ψ) ∉ E(s)(∅b) iff v([∅b]¬ψ) = 0 if s = s0 orMi, s /⊧ [∅b]¬ψ
if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n. By the definition of v, we have that v([∅b]¬ψ) = 0 implies v([N b]ψ) = 1.
Moreover, by N-maximality, we also haveMi, s /⊧ [∅b]¬ψ implies thatMi, s ⊧ [N b]ψ.
Let t(b) > 1 and C /= ∅. We have that U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb) iff U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb′) for
some b′ < b or there are b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that {s′ ∣ U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1). If U(ψ) ∈
E(s)(Cb
′
), by the induction hypothesis, v([Cb
′
]ψ) = 1 if s = s0 or Mi, s ⊧ [Cb
′
]ψ if s ∈ Si for
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some i ≤ n. By the definition of v, v([Cb
′
]ψ) = 1 implies that v([Cb]ψ) = 1. By RB-playability,
Mi, s ⊧ [Cb
′
]ψ impliesMi, s ⊧ [Cb]ψ.
If there are b1⊗b2 = b such that U([Cb2]ψ) = {s′ ∣ U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb2)} ∈ E(s)(Cb1), by
the induction hypothesis, v([Cb1][Cb2]ψ) = 1 if s = s0 orMi, s ⊧ [Cb1][Cb2]ψ if s ∈ Si for some
i ≤ n. By the definition of v, v([Cb1][Cb2]ψ) = 1 implies that v([Cb]ψ) = 1. By RB-playability,
Mi, s ⊧ [Cb1][Cb2]ψ impliesMi, s ⊧ [Cb]ψ.
Let t(b) > 1 and C = ∅. By the definition of E, U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(∅b) iff U(¬ψ) ∉
E(s)(N b). By the proof above, U(¬ψ) ∉ E(s)(N b) iff v([N b]¬ψ) = 0 if s = s0 or Mi, s /⊧
[N b]¬ψ if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n. By the definition of v, we have that v([N b]¬ψ) = 0 im-
plies v([∅b]ψ) = 1. Moreover, by N-maximality, we also have Mi, s /⊧ [N b]¬ψ implies that
Mi, s ⊧ [∅b]ψ.
Claim 3. V and U agree on cl(ϕ).
Proof. In the base case, the proof is trivial as according to the definition of V , they already agree
on the set of propositions in cl(ϕ). The proof for propositional connectives is also straightforward
as we know that U(¬ψ) = S ∖ U(ψ) and U(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) = U(ψ1) ∪ U(ψ2), and similarly for V . For
the case of [Cb]ψ, the proof is done by induction on the resource bounds.
Assume that s ∈ U([Cb]ψ), then by the definition of U , v([Cb]ψ) = 1 if s = s0 or
Mi, s ⊧ [Cb]ψ if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n.
If t(b) = 1 and C /= N , then in both above cases, by the definition of E, we have that
U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb). By the induction hypothesis, U(ψ) = V (ψ), hence V (ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb), there-
foreM,s ⊧ [Cb]ψ.
If t(b) = 1 and C = N , then we have v([∅b]¬ψ) = 0 if s = s0 orMi, s /⊧ [∅b]¬ψ if s ∈ Si
for some i ≤ n. In both cases, by the definition of E, we have that U(¬ψ) ∉ E(s)(∅b), otherwise,
U(¬ψ) ∈ E(s)(∅b) will contradict Claim 2. Hence, U(ψ) = V (ψ) ∈ E(s)(N b) because E is
RB-playable. Then,M,s ⊧ [N b]ψ. Therefore s ∈ V ([N b]ψ).
Assume t(b) > 1 and C /= ∅. If s = s0 and v([Cb]ψ) = 1, then either v([Cb
′
]ψ) = 1 for
some b′ < b or there are b1 ⊗ b2 = b such that v([Cb1][Cb2]ψ) = 1. In both cases, by the induction
hypothesis together with the definition of E, we imply that s ∈ V ([Cb]ψ). Similarly, if s ∈ Si
and Mi, s ⊧ [Cb]ψ, either Mi, s ⊧ [Cb
′
]ψ or Mi, s ⊧ [Cb1][Cb2]ψ. Again, in both cases, by the
induction hypothesis together with the definition of E, we imply that s ∈ V ([Cb]ψ).
If t(b) > 1 and C = ∅, then we have v([N b]¬ψ) = 0 if s = s0 or Mi, s /⊧ [N b]¬ψ if
s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n. In both cases, by the definition of E, we have that U(¬ψ) ∉ E(s)(N b),
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otherwise, U(¬ψ) ∈ E(s)(N b) will contradict Claim 2. Hence U(ψ) = V (ψ) ∈ E(s)(∅b) because
E is RB-playable. Then,M,s ⊧ [∅b]ψ. Therefore s ∈ V ([∅b]ψ).
Assume that s ∈ V ([Cb]ψ), that isM,s ⊧ [Cb]ψ. Therefore, V (ψ) = U(ψ) ∈ E(s)(Cb).
By the above claim, we have v([Cb]ψ) = 1 if s = s0 orMi, s ⊧ [Cb]ψ if s ∈ Si for some i ≤ n. In
both cases, the definition of U gives us s ∈ U([Cb]ψ).
Finally, we complete the proof for Lemma 10. Since v(ϕ) = 1, s0 ∈ U(ϕ). Therefore, by
Claim 3, we have s0 ∈ V (ϕ), hence,M,s0 ⊧ ϕ. In other words, ϕ is satisfiable.
We now return to the example. We have already computed the set cl(¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p ∧
[{2}1,2]p) as well as a valuation v as depicted in Figure 4.2. Let us consider any subset of formulas
from cl(¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p ∧ [{2}1,2]p) which satisfy either the first or the second case of Lemma 10.
For example, the set Γ = {[{2}(0,1)][{2}(1,1)]p, [∅(2,1)]¬p, [{1,2}(2,1)]p,} which fits into the
second case of Lemma 10, then is the formula [{2}(1,1)]p ∧ ¬p satisfiable? In order to answer
this question, one possible way is to routinely compute the set cl([{2}(1,1)]p ∧ ¬p) and guess a
valuation for it. However, the formula is simple enough for us to guess a model, which is illustrated





FIGURE 4.3: A model satisfies [{2}(1,1)]p ∧ ¬p.
action at both states which is idle(0,1) which costs only one unit of time. Each transition drawn in
Figure 4.3 defines the outcome of each joint action for both agents. A joint action in our example
is a pair of idle(0,1) (performed by agent 1) and an action attached to the transition (performed by
agent 2).
Beside the set Γ which we already considered above, there are also others sub-sets of
formulas from cl(¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p ∧ [{2}1,2]p) which can be used in the first or the second case of
Lemma 10. Let us list them as follows:
● Γ = {[{2}(0,1)][{2}(1,1)]p, [{2}(1,1)]p,}
● Γ = {[{2}(0,1)][{2}(1,1)]p, [{2}(0,1)]p,}
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● Γ = {[{2}(0,1)][{2}(1,1)]p, [{2}(1,1)][{2}(0,1)]p,}
● Γ = {[{2}(0,1)][{2}(1,1)]p, [{2}(0,1)][{2}(0,1)]p,}
We can also routinely consider each case by computing the closure of their conjunction formulas and
guessing the corresponding valuation. However, it is not difficult to see that they are also satisfied by
the model depicted in Figure 4.3. In other words, Lemma 10 implies that ¬[{1,2}(2,1)]p∧[{2}1,2]p
is satisfiable.
As a consequence of the lemma, we finish this section by providing an algorithm for de-
ciding the satisfiability problem of RBCL. Let us introduce some notation. As defined above, given
a closure cl(ϕ), let CON(ϕ) be the set of all finite nonempty subsets {[Cb1
1




cl(ϕ) which appear in either the first or the second condition of Lemma 10. Moreover, each set
Γ = {[Cb1
1
]ψ1, . . . , [C
bk
k
]ψk} ∈ CON(ϕ) is associated with a formula, denoted ϕΓ, which is in
the form of either ∧i≤kψi or ∧i<kψi ∧ ¬ψk, depending on whether Γ is for the first or the second
condition of Lemma 10, respectively. Then, the algorithm for the satisfiability problem, given a
formula ϕ, is as follows.
1. Non-deterministically select a valuation v for cl(ϕ).
2. For every set Γ ∈ CON(ϕ), recursively check that ϕΓ is satisfiable.
Note that if we measure the size of the input to the algorithm (the formula ϕ) assuming that the
resource bounds are written in unary, then the algorithm is PSPACE (since in this case the size of
cl(ϕ) is polynomial in ∣ϕ∣). However, if the resource bounds are written in binary, then ∣cl(ϕ)∣ is
exponential in ∣ϕ∣ and hence the algorithm requires exponential space to record the valuation.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the logic RBCL (and its simplified version, RBCL1) which
allows us to reason about the ability of coalitions of agents under resource bounds in systems of
multiple agents where every action is associated with a certain cost of resources. RBCL1 is for
reasoning about single step strategies of resource-bounded multi-agent system, which helps us to
determine whether a coalition of agents could cooperate in one step of time in order to obtain a
certain goal under a resource bound. We generalise the logic to RBCL for reasoning about multi-step
strategies of coalitions of agnets under resource bounds. Rather than look at single step cooperation,
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we consider the case when agents in a coalition cooperate in a sequence of consecutive steps in order
to force a desired result without spending more than a certain amount of resources.
Similar to the case of Coalition Logic, we study the soundness and completeness of RBCL
by considering the notions of effectivity structures of resource-bounded concurrent game frames and
resource-bounded playability. Apart from that, the chapter also discusses the satisfiability problem
of RBCL where we have shown that RBCL is decidable.
Finally, let us remark on the relationship between RBCL and CL. Comparing to CL,
RBCL is an extension where modalities of CL are attached with resource bounds in order to express
abilities of a coalition of agents under such resource bounds. Although RBCL allows reasoning
about multi-step strategies of coalitions, the approaches used in this chapter for results of RBCL are
not proved to be applicable for the case of ECL [Pauly, 2002]. Moreover, the fact that every resource
bound in a formula of RBCL contains only concrete numbers shows that RBCL is intuitively not
expressive enough to define the modalities [C∗] and [C×] of ECL where the formula [C∗]ϕ in ECL
sets no time limitation on the strategy of the coalition C to force ϕ and the formula [C×]ϕ in ECL






When we use RBCL to reason about coalitional ability under resource bounds in a multi-agent
system, the formula of the form [Cb]ϕ expresses the case that the coalition C has the ability to
bring about ϕ under the resource bound b. In other words, RBCL is a logic which allows us to
reason about coalitional ability to obtain certain goals under an explicit resource bound. Naturally,
the logic is not expressive enough to specify other coalitional abilities of resource-bounded multi-
agent systems. For instance, it is not possible the express the following properties in RBCL:
● A coalition C has the ability to maintain a condition under a resource bound b.
● A coalition C has the ability to maintain a condition until it obtains another goal under a
resource bound b.
Without speaking about resource bounds, we also face a similar problem with Coalition Logic where
the more expressive logic ATL is taken into account in order to express such properties with the
help of temporal operators such as global (◻) and until U . Therefore, we present in this chapter a
logic, namely resource-bounded alternating-time temporal logic (RB-ATL) which is an extension of
ATL with resource bounds. The purpose of having RB-ATL is to have a more expressive logic for
specifying and reasoning about properties of resource-bounded multi-agent systems. Furthermore,
for a more flexible logic, we extend the notion of resource bounds in order to express properties
where bounds do not need to cover for all resources used in a multi-agent system. Therefore, we
could flexibly express properties such as a coalition C has the ability to maintain a condition ϕ
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without spending more than an explicit amount of a resource r in the set of resources used by the
multi-agent system. It is worth noticing that in this property, the usage of the resource r by the
coalition C is explicitly limited while there are no bounds for all other resources of the multi-agent
system. Therefore, the bound on the coalition C only covers the resource r and the coalition can
spend an unlimited amount of other resources in order to maintain the condition ϕ.
The chapter is organised as follows. First, we introduce the extensions of notions of
resource bounds and concurrent game structures. After that, the syntax and the semantics of the
logic are presented. Then, we study the soundness and completeness of the logic. Finally, we
investigate the satisfiability problem of the logic.
5.2 Extended resource bounds
In the previous chapter, we have defined the set of resource bounds B over a given finite set R of
resources as B = Nr where r is the cardinality of R. This definition means that a resource bound
b = (b1, . . . , br) determines the bounds on every resource in R.
Therefore, we could only express properties in RBCL such as [Cb]ϕ where the bound
b covers all resources used by a multi-agent system. For instance, let us return to the example on
page 28. In this example, the system of two reasoning agents uses explicitly two resources: memory
and communication and an implicit resource time. As we already knew, it is possible to express in
RBCL the property that Agents 1 and 2 can enforce C to become true without using more than
4 units of memory and 2 units of network bandwidth in maximally 7 steps of time by the formula
[{1,2}(4,2,7)]C. However, if we would like to express the same property but we do not want to
set a bound on how many messages can be exchanged between two agents (i.e. there is no limit
on communication between them), it is not possible to do so in RBCL unless the language allows
infinite disjunction. This is because the property can only be written as ⋁n≥0[{1,2}(4,n,7)]C. In
order to allow expressing such properties, we extend the notion of resource bounds by allowing the
inclusion of an extra symbol ∞. The idea is that whenever no limit is required over a resource,
we set the bound for this resource as ∞. Then, the previous property can be expressed by the
formula [{1,2}(4,∞,7)]c where ∞ means that there is no bound on communication while we still
set limitations on the resources memory and time.
Let us formally define the set of extended resource bounds in the following.
Definition 15. Given a finite set R of resources where R = {1, . . . , r}, the set of extended resource
bounds is defined as B∞ = (N ∪ {∞})r.
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In the previous chapter, we have mentioned that there are two places where resource
bounds can be used. First, resource bounds b are used as the bounds in the formulas of the form
[Cb]ϕ. Then, resource bounds are used to specify the cost of actions. However, it is not the case for
extended resource bounds where the cost of actions must be concrete numbers rather than a symbol
∞. Therefore, we only use extended resource bounds as the limitation of resources in formalising
properties of resource-bounded multi-agent systems. In other words, the set of resource bounds are
still used to specify the cost of actions in models that are used to define the semantics of the logic
RB-ATL.
The comparison operator between extended resource bounds are defined as usual. Given
two extended resource bounds b and d, we say that b ≤ d iff bi ≤ di for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r where the
comparison involving∞ is defined as follows.
n ≤∞ for all n ∈ N
∞ ≤∞
This means∞ is greater than any natural number in N. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume
that both resource bound sequence and parallel operators ⊗ and ⊕, which are presented in the
previous chapter, are defined by means of the addition operator. The addition operator where∞ is
involved is defined as follows:
n +∞ = ∞+ n =∞ for all n ∈ N
∞+∞ =∞
Then, when we add∞ with any natural number, we also obtain∞.
In this chapter, we denote the smallest (extended) resource bound by the symbol 0¯ where
0¯ = (0, . . . ,0), i.e. all components of 0¯ are 0.
5.3 Resource-bounded concurrent game structure
In this section, we present the extension of concurrent game structures [Alur et al., 2002] which
will be used to define the semantics of the logic RB-ATL. Similar to the case of resource-bounded
action frame defined in Section 4.3.2, we extend the concept of concurrent game structures by ac-
companying each of them a finite set of resources. Moreover, actions in concurrent game structures
are also associated with costs each of which is a resource bound from B.
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In particular, we define the notion of resource-bounded concurrent game structures (RB-
CGS) as follows.
Definition 16. A Resource-bounded Concurrent Game Structure (RB-CGS) is a tuple
S = (n,R,Q,Prop, π, d, c, δ)
where:
● n ≥ 1 is the number of players (agents) in a resource-bounded multi-agent system, we denote
the set of players {1, . . . , n} by N
● R is a finite set of resources where ∣R∣ = r.
● Q is a non-empty set of states
● Prop is a set of propositional variables
● π ∶ Q → ℘(Prop) is a mapping which assigns each state in Q a subset of propositional
variables
● d ∶ Q ×N → N is a mapping to indicate the number of available moves (actions) for each
player a ∈ N at a state q ∈ Q such that d(q, a) ≥ 1. At each state q ∈ Q, we denote the set of
joint moves available for all players in N by D(q) as follows:
D(q) = {1, . . . , d(q,1)} × . . . × {1, . . . , d(q, n)}
● c ∶ Q×N ×N→ B is a mapping to indicate the cost of resources required by each move avail-
able to each agent at a state. Furthermore, we require that among actions {1, . . . , d(q, a)}
available to an agent a ∈ N at a state q ∈ Q, there is at least one action j ∈ {1, . . . , d(q, a)}
where the cost of j is the minimal value 0¯.
● δ ∶ Q × Nn → Q is a mapping where δ(q,m) is the next state from q if all players opt the
corresponding move inm ∈D(q).
In the above definition, it is worth noticing that the extra requirement for the cost function
c is to make the structure S to be total. That is there are always possible actions for agents so that
the system can move forward without spending any amount of resources.
In the following, let us consider an example of an RB-CGS as depicted in Figure 5.1. We
describe in this example possible ways for an agent to go from Nott (which stands for Nottingham)
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to Ams (Amsterdam) by train and by air. On the ways, the agent may have to get to intermediate
destinations which are Lond (London) and Paris. There are two agents in this example, one is the
agent that wants to go from Nott to Ams, and the other is an agent which tries to disrupt the trip
of the first agent. If a trip is disrupted by the second agent, it causes the first agent to arrive the
destination of the trip late as long as the first agent travels by air. We could think of the second
agent as external factors which can delay trips by air such as bad weather or the strong activity of
volcano. We assume that it is not likely to be disrupted when travelling by train, and hence, train















































FIGURE 5.1: Possible ways to go from Nott to Ams.
of hours the first agent spends on a trip from one place to another by air and by train, respectively.
From every state, each agent can perform a “null” action which costs no hour by air and by train,
i.e. the cost of null is 0¯. Also from any state, the second agent can perform the disrupt action of
which cost is also 0¯. From q1, the first agent can perform the action trainLd which stands for going
to London by train, hence, costs no hour by air but two hours by train. Similarly, from the state q2,
the first agent can go to Paris either by air or by train and only to Ams by air. The action flyA which
means to go to Ams by air costs two hours on the flight but no hour by train. The action flyP is for
going to Paris by air which costs one hour on the flight and no hour by train. The action trainP is for
going to Paris by train; therefore, it costs no hour on the flight but three hours by train. Then, from
Paris, the first agent can only go to Ams by train by performing the action trainA which costs no
hour by air and three hours by train. In Figure 5.1, each transition from one state to another is the
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result of a joint action of both agents which is drawn next to the transition. An action in the figure
is written in the form of act(x,y) to indicate that the action act costs x hours by air and y hours by
train. We write −(0,0) to denote either the actions null(0,0) or disrupt(0,0). Notice that when the
first agent performs an action flyX to go to the destination X by air and the second agent performs
the action disrupt, we arrive at a state where the proposition Late is true to indicate that the action
disrupt has caused delay to the trip of the first agent.
Then, we list in the following several properties of the system depicted in Figure 5.1:
● At q1, the first agent cannot get to Ams on time (i.e. not late) without spending more than
three hours by train and five hours by air.
● At q1, the first agent can get to Ams on time without spending more than ten hours only by
train.
● At q1, the first agent cannot get to Ams on time without spending more than ten hours only
by air.
● At q1, the first agent can get to Ams on time, i.e. allowing spending any number of hours by
air or by train.
● At q1, the first agent can get to Ams on time only by train, i.e. there is no limitation on the
number of hours spent on the train.
● At q1, the first agent cannot get to Ams on time only by air, i.e. there is no limitation on the
number of hours spent on the flight.
● At q1, the first agent cannot get to Ams on time by spending no more than three hours by train
and any number of hours by air.
In order to formalise and reason about the above properties, we present the logical lan-
guage RB-ATL in the next section.
5.4 The language RB-ATL
In this section, we define the syntax and the semantics of RB-ATL. Moreover, we also present the
normal form of RB-ATL which will be useful for us to investigate RB-ATL including the soundness
and completeness problem of RB-ATL, and then the decidability of RB-ATL.
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5.4.1 Syntax of RB-ATL
Assume we have a finite set N of agents where N = {1, . . . , n}, a finite set R of resources where
∣R∣ = r, the set B∞ of extended resource bounds, and a set of propositional variables Prop. We shall
write A to denote a non-empty coalition of agents, that is A ⊆ N and A /= ∅. Then, we define the
syntax of RB-ATL as follows.
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ψ ∣ ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ ∣ ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∣ ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ
where p ∈ Prop, A is a coalition and b ∈ B∞.
Let us discuss the informal meaning of temporal formulas of RB-ATL which are quite
similar to those of ATL. The formula ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ means that agents in the coalition A have a strategy
to force ϕ to become true in the next step without spending more than b amount of resources. Then,
the formula ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ means that the coalition A has a strategy to make ϕ true forever without
spending more than b amount of resources. Finally, the formula ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ is to say that the coalition
A has a strategy to keep ϕ true until ψ is eventually true without spending more than b amount of
resources. For the case of the empty coalition, we shall write ⟪∅b⟫◯ϕ to say that for any strategy
of the grand coalition N which spends at most b amount of resources, ϕ is true in the next step. In
other words, ϕ is unavoidable for the system if it is not allowed to spend more than b amount of
resources. Similarly, the formula ⟪∅b⟫◻ϕ describes that if the system can only spend no more than
b amount of resources, ϕ is true forever. Then, ⟪∅b⟫ϕUψ means that if the system can only spend
no more than b amount of resources, ϕ keeps being true until ψ is true. We define these temporal
operators for the case of the empty coalition in terms of equivalences as follows:
⟪∅b⟫◯ϕ ≡ ¬⟪N b⟫◯(¬ϕ)
⟪∅b⟫◻ϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ ¬⟪N b⟫⊺U¬ϕ
⟪∅b⟫ϕUψ ≡ ¬(⟪N b⟫¬ψU¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ⟪N b⟫◻¬ψ)
Before defining the semantics of RB-ATL, let us give some examples of formulas of RB-
ATL. We turn back to the example in the previous section where the listed properties of the system
depicted in Figure 5.1 can be written by the following formulas: ¬⟪{1}(5,3)⟫⊺U(Ams ∧ ¬Late),
⟪{1}(0,10)⟫⊺U(Ams∧¬Late), ¬⟪{1}(10,0)⟫⊺U(Ams∧¬Late), ⟪{1}(∞,∞)⟫⊺U(Ams∧¬Late),
⟪{1}(0,∞)⟫⊺U(Ams ∧ ¬Late), ¬⟪{1}(∞,0)⟫⊺U(Ams ∧ ¬Late), and ¬⟪{1}(∞,3)⟫⊺U(Ams ∧
¬Late), respectively.
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5.4.2 Semantics of RB-ATL
As we have already mentioned, the semantics of RB-ATL is defined by means of resource-bounded
concurrent game structures. Given a RB-CGS S = (n,R,Q,Prop, π, d, c, δ), let us define the notion
of moves, strategies and b-strategies where b ∈ B∞.
Firstly, given a RB-CGS S, we denote the set of infinite sequences of states by Qω as
usual. Let λ = q0q1 . . . ∈ Qω, we denote λ[i] = qi and λ[i, j] = qi . . . qj for any i, j ∈ N such that
0 ≤ i ≤ j.
Then, we define the notion of moves as follows.
Definition 17. Given a RB-CGS S and a state q ∈ Q, a move for a coalition A ⊆ N is a tuple
σA = (σa)a∈A such that 1 ≤ σa ≤ d(q, a).
For convenience, we denote DA(q) to be the set of all moves for A at q. Furthermore,
given m ∈ D(q), we denote mA = (ma)a∈A. Then, we define the set of all possible outcomes by a
move σA ∈DA(q) at a state q as follows
out(q, σA) = {q′ ∈ Q ∣ ∃m ∈D(q) ∶mA = σA ∧ q′ = δ(q,m)}
The cost of a move σA ∈DA(q) then is defined as cost(q, σA) = Σa∈Ac(q, a, σa).
Let us come back to the example in Figure 5.1. At state q2, flyP is a move of the coalition
{1} which contains only the first agent. The cost of this move is simply the cost of the action flyP ,
i.e. (1,0). The set of possible outcomes of this move is out(q2, (flyP )) = {q3, q5}. Let us consider
another move (flyA,null) of the coalition {1,2} which consists of both agents where fltyA is the
action of the first agent and null of the second one. The cost of this action is (2,0)+ (0,0) = (2,0).
Then, the set of possible outcomes of this move is out(q2, (flyA,null)) = {q4}.
From the notion of moves, let us now define strategies.
Definition 18. Given a RB-CGS S, a strategy for a coalition A ⊆ N is a mapping FA which
associates each sequence λq ∈ Q+ to a move in DA(q).
A computation λ ∈ Qω is consistent with FA iff for all i ≥ 0 we have that
λ[i + 1] ∈ out(λ[i], FA(λ[0, i]))
We denote out(q,FA) the set of all sequences λ consistent with FA which start from q, i.e. q =
λ[0]. Given a bound b ∈ B∞, a computation λ ∈ out(q,FA) is b-consistent with FA iff, for every
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i ≥ 0, ∑ij=0 cost(λ[i], FA(λ[0, i])) ≤ b. We denote out(q0, FA, b) the set of all such b-consistent
sequences with FA. A strategy FA is a b-strategy iff out(q,FA) = out(q,FA, b) for any q ∈ Q.
For example, let us consider some strategies of the system in Figure 5.1. Below is a
strategy F{1} for the first agent to get to Ams on time:
● F{1}(q1) = trainLd
● F{1}(q1q2) = trainP
● F{1}(q1a2q3) = trainA
● F{1}(q1a2q3q4q∗4) = null
Then, it is easy to see that this strategy has only a single consistent computation, we have that
out(q1, F{1}) = {q1q2q3q4q4 . . .}. Moreover, we also have that F{1} is a (0,8)-strategy.
Let us consider another strategy F ′{1}(λ) also for the first agent to get to Ams as follows:
● F ′{1}(q1) = trainLd







Then, we have that out(q1, F
′
{1}) = {q1q2q3q4q4 . . . , q1q2q3q6q6 . . .} and F
′
{1} is a (2,2)-strategy.
Using the notions of moves and strategies, let us define the semantics of RB-ATL. Given
a RB-CGS S = (n,R,Q,Prop, π, d, c, δ), the truth of a RB-ATL formula is defined inductively as
follows:
● S, q ⊧ p iff p ∈ π(q)
● S, q ⊧ ¬ϕ iff S, q /⊧ ϕ
● S, q ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iff S, q ⊧ ϕ or S, q ⊧ ψ
● S, q ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ iff there exists a b-strategy FA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA), S,λ[1] ⊧ ϕ
iff there is a move σA ∈DA(q) such that for all q′ ∈ out(q, σA), S, q′ ⊧ ϕ
● S, q ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ iff there exists a b-strategy FA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA), S,λ[i] ⊧ ϕ
for all i ≥ 0
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● S, q ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ iff there exists a b-strategy FA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA), there is a
position i ≥ 0 such that S,λ[i] ⊧ ψ and S,λ[j] ⊧ ψ for all j ∈ {0, . . . , i − 1}
Before the end of this section, let us consider the truth of some properties we have listed
for the example in Figure 5.1. For convenience, let S be the name of the transition system depicted
in Figure 5.1. We have that S, q1 ⊧ ⟪{1}(0,∞)⟫⊺U(Ams ∧ ¬Late) since the first agent can apply
the strategy F{1}, then out(q1, F{1}) = {q1q2q3q4q4 . . .} and we have that S, q4 ⊧ Ams ∧ ¬Late.
As we know that F{1} is a (0,8)-strategy and (0,8) ≤ (0,∞), which means that F{1} is also a
(0,∞)-strategy.
5.5 Normal form RB-ATL
For the sake of simplicity when dealing with the soundness and completeness of RB-ATL, as well
as the satisfiability problem of RB-ATL, we work with normal form formulas rather than arbitrary
ones of RB-ATL. In this section, we present the syntax and semantics of the normal form RB-ATL.
5.5.1 Syntax of normal form RB-ATL
A formula of RB-ATL is said to be in normal form iff the negation symbol can only appear in front of
a propositional variable or a temporal operator. Given a finite setN of agents whereN = {1, . . . , n},
a finite set R of resources where ∣R∣ = r, the set B∞ of extended resource bounds, and a set of
propositional variables Prop, we formally define the syntax of normal form RB-ATL as follows.
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬p ∣ ϕ∨ψ ∣ ϕ∧ψ ∣ ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ ∣ ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ ∣ ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∣ ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∣ ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ ∣ ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ
where p ∈ Prop, A is a non-empty coalition and b ∈ B∞.
It is clear that any formula of RB-ATL can be equivalently converted into normal form by
applying the De Morgan’s law where ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕ) ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ and ¬(ϕ ∨ ϕ) ≡ ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ. For a normal
form formula ϕ, we denote ∼ϕ as the equivalent normal form formula of ¬ϕ.
Before defining the semantics of normal form RB-ATL, we need more definitions about
the counterpart of moves and strategies from RB-ATL in order to define the semantics for formulas
of the forms ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ, ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ and ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ where the negation symbol appears in front of
a temporal operator. In the following, we define the notion of co-moves.
Definition 19. Given a RB-CGS S and a state q ∈ Q, a co-move for a coalition A ⊆ N is a mapping
σcA ∶DA(q)→ Q such that σcA(σA) ∈ out(q, σA) for any σA ∈DA(q).
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Let DcA(q) denote the set of all co-moves for A at a state q ∈ Q. A state q
′ is consistent
with a co-move σc iff there is some move σA such that σ
c(σA) = q′. We define the set of consistent
outcomes for a co-move σc by
out(q, σc) = {q′ ∈ Q ∣ q′ is consistent with σc}
Given a bound b ∈ B∞, a state q′ is b-consistent with a co-move σc at q iff there is some
move σA ∈ DA(q) with cost(q, σA) ≤ b such that σc(σA) = q′. We denote the set of b-consistent
outcomes for a co-move σc by
out(q, σc, b) = {q′ ∈ Q ∣ q′ is b-consistent with σc at q}
Then, we define the notion of co-strategy as follows.
Definition 20. Given a RB-CGS S, a co-strategy for a subset of players A ⊆ N is a mapping F cA
which assigns each sequence λq ∈ Q+ to a co-move in DcA(q).
We say a computation λ ∈ Qω is consistent with F cA iff, for all i ≥ 0, λ[i + 1] ∈
out(λ[i], F cA(λ[0, i])). Let us define out(q,F
c
A) to be the set of all such consistent computations
where λ[0] = q.
Given a bound b ∈ B∞, we say a computation λ ∈ out(q,F cA) is b-consistent with F
c
A
iff there is an infinite sequence of moves (σiA)i≥0 for the coalition A where σ
i
A ∈ DA(λ[i]) and
λi+1 = F cA(λ[0, i])(σ
i
A) for all i ≥ 0, such that ∑j cost(λ[j], σ
j
A) ≤ b for all j ≥ 0. Let us denote
out(q,F cA, b) be the set of all such b-consistent computations where λ[0] = q.
5.5.2 Fixed-point characterisations of temporal operators
In this section, we study fixed-point characterisations of temporal operators in RB-ATL, which
will reveal how useful the notions of co-moves and co-strategies are for defining the semantics of
normal form RB-ATL. Furthermore, fixed-point characterisations also suggest key axioms for the
axiomatisation of RB-ATL.
Given a RB-CGS S, we define ∥ϕ∥ = {q ∈ Q ∣ S, q ⊧ ϕ}, i.e. the set of states where ϕ is
true. Let us first have the following definition.
Definition 21. The function [⟪Ab⟫◯] ∶ ℘(Q)→ ℘(Q) is defined as
[⟪Ab⟫◯](X) = {q ∣ ∃σ ∈DA(q) ∶ cost(σ) ≤ b ∧ out(q, σ) ⊆X}
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Informally, [⟪Ab⟫◯](X) where X ⊆ Q is the set of all states q where agents in the
coalitionA have a move costing at most b so that the outcome is withinX; in this situation, we shall
say that the coalition A is b-effective for X at q. Obviously, we have that:
[⟪Ab⟫◯](∥ϕ∥) = ∥⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ∥
Similarly, we also define the following function.
Definition 22. The function [¬⟪Ab⟫◯] ∶ ℘(Q)→ ℘(Q) is defined as
[¬⟪Ab⟫◯](X) = {q ∣ ∃σc ∈DcA(q) ∶ out(q, σ
c, b) ⊆ Q ∖X}
In contrast to [⟪Ab⟫◯], the function [¬⟪Ab⟫◯](X) defines the set of states q where A
is not b-effective for X . It is straightforward that:
[¬⟪Ab⟫◯](∥ϕ∥) = Q ∖ [⟪Ab⟫◯](∥ϕ∥) = ∥¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ∥
Before discussing fixed-point characterisations in more details, let us define some notions.
Given three bounds b, d, e ∈ B∞, we say that b +∞ d = e iff for every i = 1, . . . , r,
bi + di = ei if ei /= ∞
bi = di = ∞ if ei = ∞
Then, +∞ only allows performing addition over natural numbers rather than the infinity symbol∞.
Then, given a bound e ∈ B∞, the set {(b, d) ∈ B∞×B∞ ∣ b+∞d = e}must be finite. For example, let
us consider the bound (1,2,∞), the set of (b, d) ∈ B∞ ×B∞ where b +∞ d = (1,2,∞) contains the
following pairs: (1,2,∞) and (0,0,∞), (0,2,∞) and (1,0,∞), (1,1,∞) and (0,1,∞), (1,0,∞)
and (0,2,∞), and the last one (0,0,∞) and (1,2,∞).
Furthermore, we define a projection db of bound d ∈ B∞ with respect to a bound b in B∞





di if bi /= ∞
∞ otherwise
For example, we have that 0¯(1,2,∞) = (0,0,∞), (3,3,1)(1,2,∞) = (3,3,∞) and (∞,3,1)(1,2,∞) =
(∞,3,∞).
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We have the following result.
Lemma 11. For all q ∈ Q, the following fixed-point characterisations hold:
1. q ∈ ∥⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ∥ iff q ∈ νX.∥ϕ∥∩ (∥⟪Ab⟫◯◻ϕ∥∪ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](X)) iff there is a b-strategy FA
for A such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA), λ[i] ∈ ∥ϕ∥ for all i ≥ 0
2. q ∈ ∥⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ∥ iff q ∈ µX.∥ψ∥ ∪ (∥ϕ∥ ∩ (∥⟪Ab⟫◯ϕUψ∥ ∪ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](X))) iff there is a
b-strategy FA for A such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA), there exists i ≥ 0 such that λ[i] ∈ ∥ψ∥
and λ[j] ∈ ∥ϕ∥ for all j ≤ i
Proof. We will only provide the proof for the first case as the second can be done in a similar
way. For convenience, let us denote f(X) = ∥ϕ∥ ∩ (∥⟪Ab⟫◯◻ ϕ∥ ∪ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](X)). We firstly
show that f(X) is monotone. Let X1 ⊆ X2 ⊆ Q. Let q ∈ f(X1), then q ∈ ∥ϕ∥ and either q ∈
∥⟪Ab⟫◯◻ϕ∥ or q ∈ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](X1). According to definition of [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](), it is easy to see that
q ∈ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](X2) if q ∈ [⟪A0⟫◯](X1), hence q ∈ f(X2).
Therefore, f(X) is monotone and there is the greatest fixed point νX.f(X). We now
show that Y = ∥⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ∥ is a post-fixed point of f(X), i.e. f(Y ) ⊆ Y . Let q ∈ Y , by the semantics
definition, we have that there is a b-strategy FA such that for any λ ∈ out(q,FA), λ[i] ∈ ∥ϕ∥
for all i ≥ 0. Then, q = λ[0] ∈ ∥ϕ∥. Assume that b′ = cost(q,FA(q)), let b′′ be an extended
resource bound such that b′b +
∞ b′′ = b. For every q′ ∈ out(q,FA(q)), we define a b-strategy F ′A
which is the remainder of FA from q
′ as follows, F ′A(κ) = FA(qκ) for all κ ∈ Q
+ starting at
q′. Then, for all κ ∈ out(q′, F ′A), we have that qκ ∈ out(q,FA). It is straightforward that any
computation in out(q′, F ′A) costs at most b
′′. Then, for all i ≥ 0, we have that κ[i] ∈ ∥ϕ∥, hence
q′ ∈ ∥⟪Ab
′′




⟫◻ϕ∥). If b′ /= 0¯, we have that q ∈ ∥⟪Ab⟫◯◻ ϕ∥,
otherwise q ∈ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](∥⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ∥). This means that q ∈ f(∥⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ∥).
In order to show that Y = ∥⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ∥ is, in fact, the greatest fixed point of f(X), we
show that for every post-fixed point Z, Z ⊆ Y . Considering that b is the projection of a bound d ∈ B
and b, we show the inclusion by induction on d.
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The base case:
In the base case, d = 0¯, we have f(X) = ∥ϕ∥ ∩ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](X). Assume q ∈ Z, then q ∈ ∥ϕ∥ ∩
[⟪A0⟫◯](Z) as Z is a post-fixed point of f(X). We now define a 0¯b-strategy FA which will
maintain ϕ for any consistent computation. The definition proceeds by induction on the length of
inputs for FA. Moreover, we only define FA for inputs which will be used later for the coalition
to determine which joint action to perform in order to maintain ϕ. Let Λn denote the set of such
inputs of length n. Initially, Λ1 = {q}. We will define FA and Λi+1 inductively on i such that the
last element of any member of Λi+1 is always in Z.
● When i = 1, we have that q ∈ ∥ϕ∥ and there is a move σA ∈ DA(q) with cost(q, σA) = 0¯b
such that out(q, σA) ⊆ Z. Let FA(q) = σA and Λ2 = {qq′ ∣ q′ ∈ out(q,FA(q))}. For all such
states q′, we have q′ ∈ Z ⊆ f(Z).
● When i > 1, for any λ ∈ Λi, we have that λ[i−1] ∈ Z ⊆ f(Z) by the induction hypothesis. We
have that λ[i − 1] ∈ ∥ϕ∥ and there is a move σA ∈DA(λ[i − 1]) with cost(λ[i − 1], σA) = 0¯b
such that out(λ[i − 1], σA) ⊆ Z. Let FA(λ) = σA and Λi+1(λ) = {λq′ ∣ q′ ∈ out(λ[i −
1], FA(λ))}.
Finally, we define Λi+1 = ⋃λ∈Λi Λ
i+1(λ). By the definition of Λi+1(λ), it is easy to see that
for any λ′ ∈ Λi+1, λ′[i] ∈ Z ⊆ f(Z).
After defining FA, we have that for any λ ∈ out(q,FA) and i ≥ 0, λ[0, i] ∈ Λi+1, hence λ[i] ∈ Z ⊆
f(Z). Therefore, λ[i] ∈ ∥ϕ∥. This shows that q ∈ Y .
The induction step:
In the induction step, d > 0¯, we have f(X) = ∥ϕ∥ ∩ (∥⟪Adb⟫◯◻ ϕ∥ ∪ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Z)). Assume
q ∈ Z, then q ∈ ∥ϕ∥ and either q ∈ ∥⟪Adb⟫◯◻ϕ∥ or q ∈ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Z). Similar to the base case, we
also define a db-strategy FA which will maintain ϕ for any consistent computation. The definition
will proceed by induction on the length of inputs for FA. Moreover, we only define FA for inputs
which will be used later for the coalition to determine which joint action to perform in order to
maintain ϕ. Let Λn denote the set of such inputs of length n. Initially, Λ1 = {q}. We will define
FA and Λ
i+1 inductively on i such that the last element of any member of Λi+1 is always either in
∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥ if the accumulated cost along that member is no more than b1 for some b1 +∞ b2 = db
or in Z if the same cost is less than 0¯b.
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● When i = 1, we have that q ∈ ∥ϕ∥ and either q ∈ ∥⟪Adb⟫◯◻ϕ∥ or q ∈ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Z).
If q ∈ ∥⟪Adb⟫◯◻ϕ∥, there is b1 +∞ b2 = db such that q ∈ [⟪Ab1⟫◯](∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥). Then,
there is a move σA ∈ DA(q) with cost(q, σA) ≤ b1 such that out(q, σA) ⊆ ∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥.
By the induction hypothesis, for any q′ ∈ out(q, σA), there is another b2-strategy F ′A from
q′ to maintain ϕ, we define FA(qq
′λ) = F ′A(q
′λ) for all λ ∈ Q∗. Let FA(q) = σA and
Λ
2 = {qq′ ∣ q′ ∈ out(q, σA)}. It is obvious that all such states q′ ∈ ∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥ and the cost
along qq′ is at most b1.
If q ∈ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Z), there is a move σA ∈DA(q)with cost(q, σA) ≤ 0¯b such that out(q, σA) ⊆
Z. Let FA(q) = σA and Λ2 = {qq′ ∣ q′ ∈ out(q, σA)}. It is obvious that all such q′ ∈ Z and
the cost along qq′ is less than 0¯b.
● When i > 1, for any λ ∈ Λi, we have that either λ[i − 1] ∈ ∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥ if
∑
j<i−1
cost(λ[j], FA(λ[0, j])) ≤ b1
for some b1 +∞ b2 = db or λ[i − 1] ∈ Z ⊆ f(Z) if
∑
j<i−1
cost(λ[j], FA(λ[0, j])) = 0¯b
by the induction hypothesis.
– If λ[i−1] ∈ ∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥, then FA has been defined. Let Λi+1(λ) = {λq′ ∣ q′ ∈ out(λ[i−
1], FA(λ[0, i− 1]))}. Assume that b′ = cost(λ[i− 1], FA(λ[0, i− 1])) and let b′′ ∈ B∞
such that b′d + b
′′ = b2. By the induction hypothesis, as b2 < b, we have that all such
q′ ∈ ∥⟪Ab
′′
⟫◻ϕ∥ and ∑j<i cost(λ[j], FA(λ[0, j])) ≤ b1 + b
′
d.
– If λ[i − 1] ∈ Z ⊆ f(Z), then λ[i − 1] ∈ ∥ϕ∥ and either λ[i − 1] ∈ ∥⟪Adb⟫◯◻ϕ∥ or
λ[i − 1] ∈ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Z).
∗ If λ[i − 1] ∈ ∥⟪Adb⟫◯◻ϕ∥, there exists b1 +∞ b2 = db such that
λ[i − 1] ∈ [⟪Ab1⟫◯](∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥)
Then, there is a move σA ∈ DA(λ[i − 1]) with cost(λ[i − 1], σA) ≤ b1 such
that out(λ[i − 1], σA) ⊆ ∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥. By the induction hypothesis, for any q′ ∈
out(λ[i], σA), there is another b2-strategy from q to maintain ϕ, we define
FA(λq
′κ) = F ′A(q
′κ)
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for all κ ∈ Q∗. Let FA(λ) = σA andΛi+1(λ) = {λq′ ∣ q′ ∈ out(λ[i−1], σA)}. Then,
for all such states q′ we have q′ ∈ ∥⟪Ab2⟫◯◻ϕ∥ and∑j<i cost(λ[j], FA(λ[0, j])) ≤
b1.
∗ If λ[i − 1] ∈ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Z)), there is a move σA ∈ DA(λ[i − 1]) with cost(λ[i −
1], σA) ≤ 0¯b such that out(λ[i − 1], σA) ⊆ Z. Let FA(λ) = σA and Λi+1(λ) =
{λq′ ∣ q′ ∈ out(λ[i − 1], σA)}. Then, for all such q′, we have that q′ ∈ Z and
∑j<i cost(λ[j], FA(λ[0, j])) ≤ 0¯b.
Then, Λi+1 = ⋃λ∈Λi Λ
i+1(λ).
After defining FA, we have that for any λ ∈ out(q,FA) and i ≥ 0, λ[0, i] ∈ Λi+1, hence
λ[i] ∈ Z ⊆ f(Z). Therefore, λ[i] ∈ ∥ϕ∥. This shows that q ∈ Y .
Therefore, Y is the greatest post-fixed point of f(X), hence also the greatest fixed point
of f(X).
Similarly, we also have the following result.
Lemma 12. For all q ∈ Q, the following fixed-point characterisations hold:
1. q ∈ ∥¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ∥ iff q ∈ µX.∥ ∼ϕ∥ ∪ (∥¬⟪Ab⟫◯◻ ϕ∥ ∩ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖X)) iff there is a
co-strategy F cA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA, b), λ[i] ∈ ∥¬ϕ∥ for some i ≥ 0
2. q ∈ ∥¬⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ∥ iff q ∈ νX.∥ ∼ψ∥ ∩ (∥ ∼ϕ∥ ∪ (∥¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕUψ∥ ∩ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖X)))
iff there is a co-strategy FA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA, b), if there is i ≥ 0 such that
λ[i] ∈ ∥ψ∥, then there exists j < i such that λ[j] ∈ ∥¬ϕ∥
Proof. Similar to the previous lemma, we only show the first case, others can be also done in a
similar way.
We have that
∥¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ∥ = Q ∖ ∥⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ∥
= Q ∖ νX.∥ϕ∥ ∩ (∥⟪Ab⟫◯◻ϕ∥ ∪ [⟪A0¯b⟫◯](X))
= µX.∥ ∼ϕ∥ ∪ (∥¬⟪Ab⟫◯◻ϕ∥ ∩ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖X))
Let f(X) = ∥ ∼ϕ∥ ∪ (∥¬⟪Ab⟫◯◻ ϕ∥ ∩ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖X)). Let Z ⊆ Q be the set of
states q where there is a co-strategy F cA such that for every λ ∈ out(q,F
c
A, b), λ[i] ∈ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for some
i ≥ 0. Let us now show that Z is a pre-fixed point of f(X), i.e. f(Z) ⊆ Z.
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Assume q ∈ f(Z). If q ∈ ∥ ∼ϕ∥, then for any co-strategy F cA, every computation λ ∈
out(q,F cA) from q has that λ[0] ∈ ∥ ∼ϕ∥. If q ∈ ∥¬⟪A
b⟫◯◻ϕ∥ ∩ [¬⟪A0⟫◯](Q ∖Z), we continue
the proof by induction on components of a bound b which are not ∞. In order to do so, the proof
proceeds by induction on the projection db of a bound b ∈ B and an arbitrary bound d ∈ B
∞.
The base case:
Let d = 0¯, then q ∈ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖ Z). This means there is a co-move σc ∈ DcA(q) such that
outc(q, σc, 0¯b) ⊆ Q ∖ (Q ∖Z) = Z. Then, for each q′ ∈ outc(q, σc, 0¯b), we have a co-strategy F cA,q′
such that for each computation λ ∈ outc(q′, F cA,q′ , 0¯b), λ[i] ∈ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for some i ≥ 0. We just need to
define a strategy F cA(q) = σ
c and F cA(qq
′κ) = F c(q′κ) for all such states q′ and κ ∈ Q∗. It is easy
to see that for any λ ∈ outc(q′, F cA′ , 0¯b), λ[i] ∈ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for some i ≥ 1.
The induction step:
Let d > 0¯, then we have both q ∈ ∥¬⟪Adb⟫◯◻ϕ∥ and q[¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖Z)).
● Since q ∈ ∥¬⟪Ab⟫◯◻ ϕ∥, then for every pair of extended resource bounds b1 and b2 such
that b1 +∞ b2 = b, we have q ∈ [¬⟪Ab1⟫◯](∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥)). This means there is a co-move
σcb1 ∈D
c
A(q) such that out
c(q, σcb1 , b1) ⊆ ∥¬⟪A
b2⟫◻ϕ∥. Let us pick a co-move σc ∈DcA(q) as
follows, for each σ ∈ DA(q) such that cost(q, σ) = b1 ≤ b, σc(σ) = σcb1(σ). Then, we define
F cA(q) = σ
c. For each q′ ∈ outc(q, σc, b) where q′ = σc(σ) for some cost(q, σ) = b1 ≤ b, by
the induction hypothesis, there is a co-strategy F cA,q′ such that for all λ ∈ out(q
′, F cA,q′ , b2),
λ[i] ∈ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for some i ≥ 0. Let F cA(qq
′κ) = F cA,q′(q
′κ) for all such q′ and κ ∈ Q∗. Then, it
is easy to see that for every λ ∈ out(q,F cA, b), λ[i] ∈ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for some i ≥ 1.
● Since q ∈ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖Z)), the proof can proceed similarly to the base case.
In order to prove that Z is in fact the least fixed point of f(X), we show that Z is included
in all pre-fixed points of f(X). Assume that Y is a pre-fixed point of f(X), i.e. Y ⊇ f(Y ), we
now prove for every q ∉ Y that q ∉ Z.
Let us consider b as the projection of a bound d ∈ B and b ∈ B∞. Then, the proof is done
by induction on d. In the following, the base case is included in the second case of the argument.
As q ∉ Y , hence q ∉ f(Y ), then q ∉ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ and q ∉ ∥¬⟪Adb⟫◯◻ ϕ∥ ∩ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖ Y ). Then,
either q ∉ [¬⟪Ab1⟫◯](∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥) for some b1 +∞ b2 = db or q ∉ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖ Y ). Let us
consider an arbitrary co-strategy F cA. Assume that F
c
A(q) = σ
c for some σc ∈DcA(q).
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● If q ∉ [¬⟪Ab1⟫◯](∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥) for some b1 +∞ b2 = db, we have that for any co-move
σc ∈DcA(q)
outc(q, σc, b1) /⊆ ∥¬⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥
Therefore, there exists a state q1 ∈ outc(q, σc, b1) such that q1 ∈ ∥⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ∥. Then, by the
previous lemma, there is a b2-strategy FA such that for every computation λ ∈ out(q1, FA),
λ[i] ∉ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for all i ≥ 0. Consider a computation λ ∈ Qω defined such that λ[0] = q1 and
λ[i + 1] = F cA(λ[0, i])(FA(λ[0, i])) for all i ≥ 0. It is straightforward that λ ∈ out(q1, FA)
and outc(q1, F
c
A, b2). This implies λ[i] ∉ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for all i ≥ 0. Hence, we have a computation
λ′ = qλ ∈ outc(q, σc, db) where λ′[i] ∉ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for all i ≥ 0.
● If q ∉ [¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯](Q ∖ Y ), by a similar argument, we have a state q1 ∈ outc(q, σc, 0¯b)
such that q1 ∉ Y . Hence, q1 ∉ ∥ ∼ϕ∥. By proceeding in the same manner, we can find a
successor q2 ∉ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ of q1. In this way, we construct a computation λ = qq1q2 . . . which is in
outc(q,F cA, db) and satisfies λ[i] ∉ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for all i ≥ 0.
In summary, we have shown that for any co-strategy F cA, there exists a computation λ ∈
outc(q,F cA, db) such that λ[i] ∉ ∥ ∼ϕ∥ for all i ≥ 0. Thus, q ∉ Z as well.
5.5.3 Semantics of normal form RB-ATL
Provided the fixed-point characterisations of temporal operators in RB-ATL which have been shown
in the previous section, we present the semantics for normal form RB-ATL which is also equivalent
to that of RB-ATL.
Given a RB-CGS S = (n,R,Q,Prop, π, d, c, δ), the truth of a normal form RB-ATL
formula is defined inductively as follows:
● S, q ⊧ p iff p ∈ π(q)
● S, q ⊧ ¬p iff p ∉ π(q)
● S, q ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iff S, q ⊧ ϕ or S, q ⊧ ψ
● S, q ⊧ ϕ ∧ ψ iff S, q ⊧ ϕ and S, q ⊧ ψ
● S, q ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ iff there exists a b-strategy FA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA), S,λ[1] ⊧ ϕ
iff there is a move σA ∈DA(q) such that for all q′ ∈ out(σA), S, q′ ⊧ ϕ
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● S, q ⊧ ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ iff there exists a co-strategyF cA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA, b), S,λ[1] ⊧∼
ϕ iff there is a co-move σc ∈ DcA(q) such that for all σA ∈ DA(q) and cost(σA) ≤ b,
S,σc(σA) ⊧∼ϕ
● S, q ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ iff there exists a b-strategy FA for any λ ∈ out(q,FA), S,λ[i] ⊧ ϕ for all
i ≥ 0
● S, q ⊧ ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ iff there exists a co-strategy F cA for any λ ∈ out(q,F
c
A, b), S,λ[i] ⊧ ϕ for
all i ≥ 0
● S, q ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ iff there exists a b-strategy FA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA), there is a
position i ≥ 0 such that S,λ[i] ⊧ ψ and S,λ[j] ⊧ ψ for all j ∈ {0, . . . , i − 1}
● S, q ⊧ ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ iff there exists a co-strategy F cA such that for all λ ∈ out(q,FA, b), either
S,λ[i] ⊧ ψ for all i ≥ 0 or if there is a position i ≥ 0 such that S,λ[i] ⊧ ψ then there exists
0 ≤ j < i such that S,λ[j] ⊧∼ϕ
5.6 Axiomatisation of RB-ATL
In this section, we present an axiomatisation system for RB-ATL. Then, we prove that the logic
generated by the axiomatisation system for RB-ATL is sound and complete.
5.6.1 Axiomatisation of RB-ATL
The axiomatisation system for RB-ATL consists of the following axioms and inference rules. Let A
be a non-empty coalition (A ⊆ N ), and b, d, b1, b2 extended resource bounds, i.e. in B
∞.
Axioms




where b ≤ d





⟫◯ψ → ⟪(A1 ∪A2)b1+b2⟫◯(ϕ ∧ ψ)
where both A1 ⊆ N and A2 ⊆ N are non-empty and A1 ∩A2 = ∅
(S∅) ⟪∅b⟫◯ϕ ∧ ⟪∅b⟫◯ψ → ⟪∅b⟫◯(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(SN ) ⟪N b⟫◯ϕ ∧ ⟪∅b⟫◯ψ → ⟪N b⟫◯(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(FP◻) ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ↔ ϕ ∧ (⟪Ab⟫◯◻ϕ ∨ ⟪A0¯b⟫◯(⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ))
(FPU ) ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ↔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ (⟪Ab⟫◯ϕUψ ∨ ⟪A0¯b⟫◯(⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ)))
(N◯) ⟪∅b⟫◯ϕ↔ ¬⟪N b⟫◯(¬ϕ)
(N◻) ⟪∅b⟫◻ϕ↔ ϕ ∧ ¬⟪N b⟫⊺U¬ϕ












θ → (ϕ ∧ (⟪Ab⟫◯◻ϕ ∨ ⟪A0¯b⟫◯θ))
θ → ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ
(⟪Ab⟫U-Induction)
(ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ (⟪Ab⟫◯ϕUψ) ∨ ⟪A0¯b⟫◯θ)))→ θ
⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ → θ
As usual, we define that a formula ϕ is a theorem of RB-ATL iff it is derivable from the
above axiomatisation system, denoted as ⊢RB-ATL ϕ. Then, a formula ϕ is consistent if its negation
¬ϕ is not a theorem, i.e. /⊢RB-ATL ϕ.
In the rest of this section, we prove the soundness and completeness of the above axioma-
tisation system. As usual the soundness is omitted as it is straightforward. In the following, we
present the proof of completeness. We show that by constructing a RB-CGS for each consistent
formula ϕ0 such that ϕ0 is satisfied in the RB-CGS. Each RB-CGS structure is in the form of tree
models. We formally define them in the following. The approach of the proof is based on the idea
from [Goranko & van Drimmelen, 2006], but extends it for resource bounds.
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5.6.2 Labelled tree models
Given a finite alphabet Θ, we denote the sets of finite words and infinite words of Θ by Θ∗ and Θω,
respectively.
Definition 23. A tree T is a subset of N∗ where for any x ⋅ c ∈ T , where x ∈ N∗ and c ∈ N:
● x ∈ T
● x ⋅ c′ ∈ T for all 0 ≤ c′ ≤ c
Given a tree T , ǫ is the root of T . Nodes of T are elements of T . We define succ ∶ T → 2T
as a function to return the successors of a node x ∈ T . Formally, succ(x) = {x ⋅ c ∈ T ∣ c ∈ N}. The
degree d(x) of a node x is defined as the cardinality of succ(x), i.e. d(x) = ∣succ(x)∣. A node x is
a leaf iff d(x) = 0. A node x is an interior node iff d(x) > 0.
Definition 24. Given a set Θ, a Θ-labelled tree is a pair (T,V ) where T is a tree and V ∶ T → Θ
is a mapping which labels each node of T with an element of Θ.
Given a finite set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, for the purpose of constructing models for
consistent formulas of RB-ATL, we are interested in a special form ofΘ-labelled trees (T,V )where
Θ is the set 2Prop of subsets of propositions and the degree of every node of T is fixed by some given
number k ∈ N, i.e. deg(x) = kn for all x ∈ T . Then, a 2Prop-labelled tree (T,V ) with a fixed degree
kn can be considered as the skeleton of a model for RB-ATL formulas. We call a tree with a fixed
degree kn as a kn-tree. Informally, each node of T is considered as a state. From each state x ∈ T ,
there are kn transitions to its successors, namely from x ⋅0 to x ⋅kn−1. We can name each transition
from x to x ⋅ c by a tuple (a1, . . . , an) where
1. 1 ≤ ai ≤ k
2. encode((a1, . . . , an)) = c
Where encode ∶ {1, . . . , k}n → {0, . . . , kn − 1} is a bijective function which is defined as
encode((x1, . . . , xn)) = (x1 − 1)kn−1 + (x2 − 1)kn−2 + . . . + (xn − 1)
For convenience, we call the inverse function of encode as decode. Then, each transition from x
to x ⋅ c can be considered as the effect of the joint action of n agents in N where agent i performs
the action ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and (a1, . . . , an) = decode(c). Moreover, to become a model
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for RB-ATL formulas, we need to supply for each 2Prop-labelled kn-tree (T,V ) a costing function
which defines the cost of each action of an agent at a node on the tree. We have the following
definition.
Definition 25. A 2Prop-labelled kn-costed-tree is a tuple (T,V,C) where (T,V ) is a 2Prop-labelled
kn-tree and C ∶ T ×N × {1, . . . , k}→ B is a costing function.
Given a 2Prop-labelled kn-costed-tree (T,V,C), we define the corresponding RB-CGS
S(T,V,C) = (n,T,Prop, V, d,C, δ)
where d(x, i) = k for all x ∈ T and i ∈ N and δ(x, (a1, . . . , an)) = x ⋅ encode((a1, . . . , an)). It is
straightforward that S(T,V,C) is well-defined. We shall write (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ for S(T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ
and (T,V,C) ⊧ ϕ for (T,V,C), ǫ ⊧ ϕ. Furthermore, we also have that in S(T,V,C), the available
joint actions for any coalition A at any state are the same, i.e. DA(x) = DA(x′) for any x,x′ ∈ T ,
hence we shall write ∆A for DA(x). For convenience, the cost of a joint action σ ∈ ∆A at a state
t ∈ T is defined as C(t, σ) = ∑i∈A σi. Similarly, we also have that out(x,σ) = out(x
′, σ) for all
σ ∈∆A and x,x′ ∈ T (i.e. the outcomes of the same action are the same at any state), we shall write
out(σ) instead of out(x,σ) for simplicity.
Notice that when constructing the tree model for a consistent formula, we build kn-costed-
trees which are labelled by subsets of formulas rather than only a subset of propositional variables.
However, we can consider them as models for RB-ATL formulas by restricting the labeling function
V over the set of propositions, i.e. V (t) ∩ Prop. Finally, we define a simple tree as a tree which
consists of only a root and its children.
5.6.3 Completeness of RB-ATL
In this section, we present the proof for the completeness of the logic RB-ATL.
Firstly, we define the closure cl(ϕ0) of a given consistent formula ϕ0 which provides the
ingredients for labelling nodes of the tree model during the construction.
Definition 26. The closure cl(ϕ0) is the smallest set of formulas that satisfies the following condi-
tions:
● All sub-formulas of ϕ0 including itself are in cl(ϕ0)
● If ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ is in cl(ϕ0), then so are ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ for all b1 +∞ b2 = b and also
⟪A0b⟫◯⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ
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● If ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ is in cl(ϕ0), then so are ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ for all b1 +∞ b2 = b and also
⟪A0b⟫◯⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ
● If ϕ is in cl(ϕ0), then so is ∼ϕ
● cl(ϕ0) is also closed under finite positive boolean operators (∨ and ∧) up to tautology equiv-
alence.
Obviously, cl(ϕ0) is finite as its cardinality is bounded by 22
mr×∣ϕ∣
wherem is the maximal
bound of any resource appearing in ϕ0 and r is the number of resources. We denote cl(ϕ0)◯ to be
the set of all formulas of form ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ or ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ in cl(ϕ0).
Then, the following three lemmas describe each step of the construction of the tree model.
We only provide the proof of the last lemma.
Lemma 13. Let Φ = {⟪Ab1
1
⟫◯ϕ1, . . . ,⟪A
bk
k
⟫◯ϕk,¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ} be a consistent set of formulas
where:
● All Ai are both non-empty and pair-wise disjoint
● ⋃iAi ⊆ A
● ∑i bi ≤ b
We have Ψ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk,∼ϕ} is also consistent.
Proof. Let A′ = ⋃iAi, b′ = ∑i bi and ϕ
′ = ⋀iϕi.
By axiom (S), we have ⊢ ⋀i⟪A
bi
i ⟫◯ϕi → ⟪A′b
′




⟪Abii ⟫◯ϕi → ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ′ (5.1)
Now, let us assume that Ψ is inconsistent, that is ⊢ ϕ′ → ϕ. Then, applying ⟪Ab⟫◯-
monotonicity, we have that ⊢ ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ′ → ⟪Ab⟫◯(ϕ).
By (5.1), we have that
⊢⋀
i
⟪Abii ⟫◯ϕi → ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ
Hence Φ ∪ {⟪Ab⟫◯ψ} is consistent, which is a contradiction
Similarly, we can prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 14. Let Φ = {⟪Ab1
1
⟫◯ϕ1, . . . ,⟪A
bk
k
⟫◯ϕk,⟪∅e1⟫◯χ1, . . . ,⟪∅em⟫◯χm} be a consistent
set of formulas where:
● All Ai are both non-empty and pair-wise disjoint
● ∑i bi ≤ ej for all j
We have Ψ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, χ1, . . . , χm} is also consistent.
We now use the above lemma to construct a simple tree which is locally consistent for a
consistent set of formulas.
Definition 27. A tree (T,V,C) is locally consistent if and only if for any interior node t ∈ T :
1. If ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ in V (t), then there is a move σA such thatC(t, σA) ≤ b and for any c ∈ out(t, σA)
we have ϕ ∈ V (c)
2. If ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ in V (t), then for any move σA with C(t, σA) ≤ b, there exists c ∈ out(t, σA)
where ∼ϕ ∈ V (c)
Lemma 15. Let Φ be a finite consistent set of formulas, Φ◯ the subset of Φ which contains all
formulas of the forms ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ or their negations from Φ and k some number where ∣Φ◯∣ < k,
there is a simple kn-costed-tree (T,V,C) which is locally consistent such that V (ǫ) = Φ.
Proof. Firstly, we have ¬⟪N b⟫◯ϕ and ¬⟪∅b⟫◯ϕ are equivalent to ⟪∅b⟫◯ ∼ϕ and ⟪N b⟫◯ ∼ϕ,
respectively. Therefore, we only consider the case when Φ◯ does not contain formulas of the form





⟫◯ϕ1, . . . ,⟪Abmm ⟫◯ϕm}∪
{¬⟪Bd1
1




{⟪∅e1⟫◯χ1, . . . ,⟪∅eh⟫◯χh}
where all Ai’s are non-empty, all Bi’s are both non-empty and not equal to the grand coalition
N . We define a bound max ∈ B where each component of max is the maximal bound other than
the infinity infinity symbol of the corresponding resource appearing in Φ◯. In the case that there
is no maximal bound, then the component of max is set to 0. For example, assume that ∣r∣ = 2
and Φ◯ = {¬⟪{1,2}(2,2)⟫◯p,⟪{1}(3,∞)⟫◯p}, then max = (3,2); in another case, if Φ◯ =
{⟪{1}(3,∞)⟫◯p} then max = (3,0).
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Then, we define a function deinf ∶ B∞ → B which removes infinity from a bound as





bi if bi /= ∞
maxi +1 otherwise
Let e be a bound of resources such that e > deinf(ei) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , h}.
We construct a tree with a root labelled by Φ and kn children, each is denoted by c =
encode(a1, . . . , an) where ai ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Intuitively, we allow each agent i to perform k different
actions and the special action k for each agent will be considered as the costless idle-action. We
shall denote c(i) = ai for the action performed by agent i with the corresponding outcome c. In the
following, we define the labelling function V (c) for each node c and the cost function C(ǫ, i, a) for
each agent i and action a ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
For each ⟪Abpp ⟫◯ϕp ∈ Φ◯ where Ap /= ∅, ϕp is added to V (c) whenever c(i) = p for
all i ∈ Ap. Let minAp be the smallest number in Ap, we assign the cost of action p performed by
minAp to be bp, i.e. C(ǫ,minAp , p) = deinf(bp). For actions of other agents i in Ap, we assign
C(ǫ, i, p) = 0¯.
After considering all ⟪Abpp ⟫◯ϕp ∈ Φ◯, for all other unassigned-cost actions, i.e. actions
a > m but a < k for all agents, we simply set their costs to be e. The action k performed by all
agents is defined to associate with the cost 0¯. We denote C(c) = ∑i∈N C(ǫ, i, c(i)). Then, for each
⟪∅epp ⟫◯χp ∈ Φ◯, χp is added to V (c) whenever C(c) ≤ ep.
Finally, we will add at most one formula from the negation formulas of Φ◯ to V (c). We
denote C(c,A) = ∑i∈AC(ǫ, i, c(i)). For each c, let Φ
−
◯(c) = {¬⟪B




⟫◯ψi1 , . . . ,¬⟪B
dlc
ilc
⟫◯ψlc} where i1 < i2 < . . . < ilc . Let I = {i ∣ m < c(i) ≤ m + lc} and
j = ∑i∈I(c(i) − 1 −m) mod lc + 1. Consider ¬⟪B
dij
ij
⟫◯ψij : if N ∖Bij ⊆ I , then ∼ψij is added
into V (c).
We now need to show that our simple tree is locally consistent. In the first step, we show
that all labels are consistent. It is obvious that V (ǫ) = Φ is consistent.
Let us firstly consider every child c of the root where ∼ψq ∈ V (c) from some negation
formula in Φ◯. This will imply that there will be no χ ∈ V (c) from the formulas of the form
⟪∅b⟫◯χ inΦ◯. The reason is that because some ∼ψq ∈ V (c), there must be some agent performing
an action a ∈ {m + 1, . . . ,m + lc} as otherwise I = ∅ and the condition N ∖ Bij ⊆ I fails since
Bij /= N . We know that the cost of this action is e, then C(c) ≥ e, therefore, no χ will be added into
V (c).
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When there is no ϕ ∈ V (c) from the formulas of the form ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ in Φ◯, the proof is
trivial as there is only one ∼ψq ∈ V (c). If there are some ϕp ∈ V (c) where ⟪A
bp
p ⟫◯ϕp ∈ Φ◯, then
for each p, c(i) = p < m for all i ∈ Ap. Hence, all Ap are pair-wise disjoint. Moreover, we have
that N ∖Bq ⊆ I where I = {i ∈ N ∣ m < c(i) ≤ m + lc}. Then, Bq ⊇ N ∖ I ⊇ {i ∈ N ∣ c(i) ≤ m},
which implies that ⋃ϕp∈V (c)Ap ⊆ Bq. This simply shows that the set of ⟪A
bp
p ⟫◯ϕp ∈ Φ◯ where
ϕp ∈ V (c) and ∼⟪B
bq
q ⟫◯ψq satisfies the conditions of Lemma 13. Therefore, V (c) is consistent.
Now, we consider every child c of the root where there is no ∼ψ ∈ V (c) from some
negation formula in Φ◯.
When there is no ϕ ∈ V (c) from the formulas of the form ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ in Φ◯, the proof is
trivial as there are only some χq ∈ V (c). If there are some ϕp ∈ V (c) where ⟪A
bp
p ⟫◯ϕp ∈ Φ◯ and
Ap /= ∅, then for each p, c(i) = p < m for all i ∈ Ap. Hence, all Ap are pair-wise disjoint. For any
χq ∈ V (c) by some ⟪∅eq⟫◯χq ∈ Φ◯, we have that eq ≥ C(c) ≥ ∑p bp. This simply shows that the
set of ⟪Abpp ⟫◯ϕp ∈ Φ◯ where ϕp ∈ V (c) and ⟪∅
eq
q ⟫◯χq satisfies the conditions of Lemma 14.
Therefore, V (c) is consistent.
Let us now check the conditions of local consistency on the newly built tree.
For ⟪Abpp ⟫◯ϕp ∈ Φ◯, it is straightforward that the move σAp where all agents in Ap
performs action p ≤m which cost no more than bp and for any c ∈ out(σAp), ϕp ∈ V (c).
For ¬⟪Bdpp ⟫◯ψp ∈ Φ◯ and σ being an arbitrary move of agents in Bp of which cost is
at most equal to dp, we will point out an output c ∈ out(ǫ, σ) where ∼ψ ∈ V (c) and the actions of
agents out of Bp are withinm+1 andm+ l, which always cost e amount of resources. Even though
we do not know the exact actions of agents out of Bp, the costs of those unspecified actions are
known to be e. Hence, we can determine the set Φ−◯(c) = {¬⟪B
di1
i1




as well as lc. It is obvious that ¬⟪B
dp
p ⟫◯ψp ∈ Φ−◯(c), then p = ir for some 1 ≤ r ≤ lc. Let σi
be the action performed by agent i in Bp, we define c(i) = σi for all i ∈ Bp. Let I ′ = {i ∈ Bq ∣
m < c(i) ≤ m + lc} and j′ = ∑i∈I′(c(i) − 1 −m)) mod lc. We select an arbitrary i
′ ∉ Bp and set
c(i′) =m+(r−1−j′) mod lc+1. For all other i ∉ Bp, let c(i) =m+1. Then, we have I = {i ∣m <
c(i) ≤m+ lc} = (N ∖Bp)∪I ′. Therefore,∑i∈I(c(i)−1−m) mod lc+1 = ∑i∈I′∪{i′}(c(i)−1−m)
mod lc + 1 = (j′ + c(i′) − 1 −m) mod lc + 1 = (r − 1) mod lc + 1 = r, and N ∖Bp ⊆ I because
I = (N ∖Bp) ∪ I ′. By choosing such outcome c, according to the construction of the simple tree
model, we must have that ∼ψp ∈ V (c).
Let us consider an example of building such a locally consistent tree. Consider a system
5. RESOURCE-BOUNDED ALTERNATING-TIME TEMPORAL LOGIC 129
of 2 agents, i.e. N = {1,2}, 1 resource, i.e. ∣r∣ = 1, and the following set Φ◯ of RB-ATL formulas.
Φ◯ = {⟪1
1⟫◯p,⟪2∞⟫◯(p→ q),¬⟪12⟫◯q,¬⟪22⟫◯p,⟪∅2⟫◯(¬q)}
It is easy to see thatmax = 2 and we can pick e = 3. We now construct a simple tree which is locally
consistent and the root is labelled by Φ◯. As ∣Φ◯∣ = 5, let us consider the number of actions for
each agent k = 6. Then, the set of outcomes is O = {(i, j) ∣ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 6}.
Consider the formula ⟪11⟫◯p ∈ Φ◯, we add to the label of every V ((1, j)) the formula
p, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ 6. The cost of action 1 of agent 1 is 1.
Consider the formula ⟪2∞⟫◯(p → q) ∈ Φ◯, we add to the label of every V ((i,2)) the
formula p→ q, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. The cost of action 2 of agent 2 is max+1 = 3.
As we mean the action 6 for both agents to be the idle action, we simply assign the cost
0 for 6 of both agents. Then we assign the cost e = 3 for all cost-unassigned actions of both agents.
After this step, we add ¬q to every outcome (i, j) of which the total cost of i and j is no more than
2.
We have the assignment of labels V ((i, j)) for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 6 so far as in Figure 5.2
where each column (row) corresponds to an action of agent 1 (2) together with its cost.
AC 11 23 33 43 53 60
1
3 {p} {} {} {} {} {}
2
3 {p, p→ q} {p→ q} {p→ q} {p→ q} {p→ q} {p→ q}
3
3 {p} {} {} {} {} {}
4
3 {p} {} {} {} {} {}
5
3 {p} {} {} {} {} {}
6
0 {p,¬q} {} {} {} {} {¬q}
FIGURE 5.2: The assignment of labels V ((i, j)) for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 6.
Let us consider the negation formulas in Φ◯. We take each outcome into account to
decide whether one of the sub-formulas of the negation formulas in Φ◯ is included in the label of
the outcome.
We consider the outcome c = (11,13), then Φ◯(c) = {¬⟪12⟫◯q}. Then lc = 1, I = {i ∣
2 < c(i) ≤ 2 + 1} = ∅. Therefore, as N ∖ {1} /⊆ I , ¬q is not included in V (c).
We consider the outcome c = (11,33), then Φ◯(c) = {¬⟪12⟫◯q}. Then lc = 1, I = {i ∣
2 < c(i) ≤ 2 + 1} = {2}. Therefore, as N ∖ {1} ⊆ I , ¬q is included in V (c).
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We consider the outcome c = (33,60), then Φ◯(c) = {¬⟪22⟫◯p}. Then lc = 1, I = {i ∣
2 < c(i) ≤ 2 + 1} = {1}. Therefore, as N ∖ {2} ⊆ I , ¬p is included in V (c).
We can apply similar argument, and obtain the final assignment of labels as shown in
Figure 5.3.
AC 11 23 33 43 53 60
1
3 {p} {} {} {} {} {}
2
3 {p, p→ q} {p→ q} {p→ q} {p→ q} {p→ q} {p→ q}
3
3 {p,¬q} {} {} {} {} {¬q}
4
3 {p} {} {} {} {} {}
5
3 {p} {} {} {} {} {}
6
0 {p,¬q} {} {¬p} {} {} {¬q}
FIGURE 5.3: The final assignment of labels V ((i, j)) for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 6.
In the following, Γ is the finite set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas from cl(ϕ0).
As cl(ϕ0) is finite, Γ is also finite. We extend the construction for satisfying eventuality formulas
which are in forms of ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ and ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ by the following lemma. We also omit the proof.
Firstly, we say that a formula ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ (¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ) is realised from a node t of a Γ-
labelled tree (T,V,C) if there exists a strategy (co-strategy) FA such that for all λ ∈ out(t, FA, b)
(λ ∈ out(t, F cA, b)), there is some i such that ψ ∈ V (λ[i]) and ϕ ∈ V (λ[j]) for all j ∈ {0, i − 1}
(∼ϕ ∈ V (λ[i])).
Definition 28. A formula ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ is realised from a node t of a Γ-labelled tree (T,V,C) if there
exists a strategy FA such that for all λ ∈ out(t, FA), there is some i such that cost(λ[0, i], FA) ≤ b,
ψ ∈ V (λ[i]) and ϕ ∈ V (λ[j]) for all j ∈ {0, i − 1}.
Lemma 16. For any subset Y ⊆ Γ, there is a formula χY ∈ cl(ϕ0), called the characterised formula
of Y , such that for every y ∈ Γ, χY ∈ y iff y ∈ Y .
Proof. The proof is a repetition of that of a similar lemma in [Goranko & van Drimmelen, 2006].
For any y ∈ Y , we define χ{y} = ∧y = ⋀{ϕ ∣ ϕ ∈ y}.
Note that χ{y} ∈ cl(ϕ0) as cl(ϕ0) is closed under finite conjunctions. Then, χ{y} is the
characterised formula of {y}. For any other y′ ∈ Y , as both y and y′ are maximal consistent set
of formulas from cl(ϕ0), there is a formula θ ∈ cl(ϕ0) such that θ ∈ y but ¬θ ∈ y′. Then, θ is a
conjunction of χ{y} and then χ{y} ∧ ¬θ is inconsistent. Hence, χ{y} ∉ y′ as y′ is consistent.
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For any Y ∈ Γ, we define χY = ⋁{χ{y} ∣ y ∈ Y }. Then, for any y ∈ Y , we have
⊢ χ{y} → χY , that is χY ∈ y. Conversely, for any y′ ∉ Y , χ{y} ∉ y′ for any y ∈ Y , hence
χY ∉ y′.
Lemma 17. For each formula ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ and x ∈ Γ, there is finite Γ-labelled kn-costed-tree
(T,V,C) where:
● k = ∣Ψ◯∣ + 1
● (T,V,C) is locally consistent
● V (ǫ) = x
● If ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ ∈ x then (T,V,C) realises ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ from ǫ
Proof. Most of the proof is based on that of the similar lemma in [Goranko & van Drimmelen,
2006].
For the sake of readability, we refer to finite Γ-labelled kn-costed-trees by finite trees.
Consider a specific formula ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ. Let Z ⊆ Γ be a set of maximal consistent sets of
formulas where for every x ∈ Z, there is a finite tree obeying the conditions of the lemma. Hence,
we prove the lemma by showing that Z = Γ. If x ∈ Γ does not contain ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ, we just need to
construct a tree (T,V,C) which has only a single root with label V (ǫ) = x. Obviously, x ∈ Z.
Let us now consider the more interesting case, where ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ ∈ x. As we want to show
that x ∈ Z, it suffixes to prove that ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ → χZ is a theorem. This is because ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ ∈ x,
hence χZ ∈ x, i.e. x ∈ Z by Lemma 16. However, to show ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ → χZ is a theorem, we only
need to show
(ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ (⟪Ab⟫◯ϕUψ ∨ (⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ))))→ χZ (5.2)
is also a theorem. If it is the case, then by ⟪Ab⟫U-induction, we have that ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ → χZ is a
theorem as well.
We prove (5.2) being an theorem by showing that it belongs to every maximal consistent
set q (not only formulas from cl(ϕ0)). Note that χZ ∈ q iff q ∩ cl(ϕ0) ∈ Z.
Let us consider the first two easy cases, when either ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ ∉ q or (ψ∨(ϕ∧(⟪Ab⟫◯ϕUψ∨
(⟪A0⟫◯χZ)))) ∉ q.
If ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ ∉ q, it is straightforward for us to construct a tree containing only a single
root. Hence, q∩cl(ϕ0) ∈ Z. Then, χZ ∈ q and we must have (5.2) ∈ q. If (ψ∨(ϕ∧(⟪Ab⟫◯ϕUψ∨
(⟪A0⟫◯χZ)))) ∉ q, it is even easier for us as we directly have (5.2) ∈ q.
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In the last case, consider that b is the projection of a bound d ∈ B with b, the proof
proceeds by induction on the bound d ∈ B. Let us consider the base case where d = 0¯. Assume that
both ⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ and (ψ∨(ϕ∧⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ)) ∈ q. We show (5.2) ∈ q by proving that q∩cl(ϕ0) ∈ Z.
As (ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ)) ∈ q, there are two cases to consider:
(a) ψ ∈ q, then we just need to construct a tree (T,V,C) with only a single root and V (ǫ) =
q ∩ cl(ϕ0). It is straightforward that ⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ is realised at ǫ as ψ ∈ V (ǫ).
(b) ϕ ∧ ⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ ∈ q, we construct a tree with a root with the label q ∩ cl(ϕ0) and kn children
defined as follows.
Let Φ′ be the set containing all formulas of the form ⟪Ab⟫◯φ or ¬⟪Ab⟫◯φ from q ∩ cl(ϕ0)
and also the formula ⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ . Then, ∣Φ′∣ ≤ k + 1, by Lemma 15, we have a locally
consistent tree (T ′, V ′, C ′) of branching degree kn with V ′(ǫ) = Φ′.
For each child c < kn, we assign V (c) be an arbitrary set from Γ such that V (c) ⊇ V ′(c).
This preserves the local consistency at ǫ according to Lemma 15.
For every child c < kn such that χZ ∈ V (c), we have that V (c) ∈ Z. This means there is a
locally consistent tree (Tc, Vc, Cc) satisfying conditions of the lemma. Then, we replace c by
(Tc, Vc, Cc). The result tree (T,V,C) is also locally consistent and of branching degree kn.
We now show that (T,V,C) realises ⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ at ǫ. Let σ be the move generated because
of ⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ ∈ V ′(ǫ) according to Lemma 15. Then, for every c ∈ out(σ), we have that
χZ ∈ V (c), hence V (c) ∈ Z. This is also means that there is a strategy FA,c which realises
⟪A0⟫ϕUψ from c. Let us consider a strategy FA such that FA(ǫ) = σ and FA(cλ) = FA,c(λ).
It is straightforward that FA realises ⟪A0⟫ϕUψ from the root ǫ.
In the induction step, where b > 0¯, the proof proceeds in the similar manner. Assume that
both ⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ and (ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ (⟪Adb⟫◯ϕUψ ∨ (⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ)))) ∈ q. Similar to the base case,
there are also three cases to consider:
(a) ψ ∈ q, the proof is the repetition of that for the base case.
(b) ϕ and ⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ ∈ q, the proof is the repetition of that for the base case.
(c) ϕ and ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ ∈ q for some b1 +∞ b2 = db where b2 < db, we construct a tree with
a root with the label is q ∩ cl(ϕ0) and kn children defined as follows.
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Let Φ′ be the set containing all formulas of the form ⟪Ab⟫◯φ or ¬⟪Ab⟫◯φ from q∩cl(ϕ0).
Notice that one of them is ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ. It is obvious that ∣Φ′∣ < k + 1, by Lemma 15,
we have a locally consistent tree (T ′, V ′, C ′) of branching degree kn with V ′(ǫ) = Φ′.
For each child c < kn, we assign V (c) be an arbitrary set from Γ such that V (c) ⊇ V ′(c).
This preserves the local consistency at ǫ according to Lemma 15.
For every child c < kn such that ⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (c), as b2 < db, by the induction hypothesis,
there is a locally consistent tree (Tc, Vc, Cc) realising ⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ that its root. Then, we
replace c by (Tc, Vc, Cc). The result tree (T,V,C) is also locally consistent and of branching
degree kn.
We now show that (T,V,C) realises ⟪Adb⟫ϕUψ at ǫ. Let σ be the move generated because
of ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ ∈ V ′(ǫ) according to Lemma 15, hence cost(σ) ≤ b1. Then, for
every c ∈ out(σ), we have that ⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (c). By the induction hypothesis, ⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ
is realised at c. This is also means that there is a strategy FA,c which realises ⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ
from c which spends at most b2 amount of resources. Let us consider a strategy FA such that
FA(ǫ) = σ and FA(cλ) = FA,c(λ). It is straightforward that FA realises ⟪A0⟫ϕUψ from the
root ǫ which costs at most b1 + b2 = db.
In the following, we extend the notions of realisation to other types of formulas.
Definition 29. A formula ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ is realised from a node t of a tree (T,V,C) over Γ if there
exists a co-strategy F cA such that for all λ ∈ out(t, F
c
A, b), there is some i such that ¬ϕ ∈ V (λ[i]).
Definition 30. A formula ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ is realised from a node t of a tree (T,V,C) over Γ if there exists
a b-strategy FA such that for all λ ∈ out(t, FA), ϕ ∈ V (λ[i]) for all i.
Definition 31. A formula ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ is realised from a node t of a tree (T,V,C) over Γ if there
exists a co-strategy F cA such that for all λ ∈ out(t, F
c
A, b), if there is some i such that ψ ∈ V (λ[i]),
then there is some j < i such that ¬ϕ ∈ V (λ[j]).
Lemma 18. For each formula ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ and x ∈ Γ, there is finite tree (T,V,C) over Γ such that:
● (T,V,C) is of fixed branching degree kn where k = ∣Ψ◯∣ + 1
● (T,V,C) is locally consistent
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● V (ǫ) = x
● If ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∈ x then (T,V,C) realises ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ from ǫ
Proof. The proof is also done in a similar manner to that of the previous lemma.
Consider a specific formula ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ. Let Z ⊆ Γ be a set of maximal consistent sets of
formulas where for every x ∈ Z, there is a finite tree obeying the conditions of the lemma. Hence,
we prove the lemma by showing that Z = Γ. If x ∈ Γ does not contain ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ, we just need to
construct a tree (T,V,C) which has only a single root with label V (ǫ) = x. Obviously, x ∈ Z.
Let us now consider the more interesting case, where ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∈ x. As we want to show
that x ∈ Z, it suffices to prove that ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ→ χZ is a theorem. This is because if ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∈ x,
then χZ ∈ x, i.e. x ∈ Z. However, to show ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ→ χZ is a theorem, we only need to show
(¬ϕ ∨ (¬⟪Ab⟫◯◻ϕ ∧ ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ))→ χZ (5.3)
is also a theorem. If it is the case, then by ⟪Ab⟫◻-induction, we have that ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ → χZ is a
theorem as well.
By considering b as the projection of a resource bound d ∈ B and b, we prove (5.3) being a
theorem by showing inductively on d that (5.3) belongs to every maximal consistent set q (not only
formulas from cl(ϕ0)). Note that χZ ∈ q iff q ∩ cl(ϕ0) ∈ Z.
The base case:
Assume that d = 0¯, let us consider the first two easy cases, when either ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ ∉ q or ¬ϕ ∨
(¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ) ∉ q. In the first case, we just need to consider a trivial tree containing only a root.
In the later case, it is straightforward that (5.3) ∈ q
Let us now assume that both ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ and ¬ϕ ∨ (¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ) ∈ q.
● If ¬ϕ ∈ q, we construct a tree containing only a root ǫ with the label V (ǫ) = q ∩ cl(ϕ0). As
¬ϕ ∈ q, it is straightforward that ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ is realised at the root ǫ.
● If ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ ∈ q, let us construct a tree (T,V,C) as follows. Let Ψ′ be the set of all for-
mulas of form ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ or ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ from q ∪ cl(ϕ0) and also the formula ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ .
We have that ∣Ψ′∣ ≤ k + 1 where k = ∣Ψ◯∣ + 1. By Lemma 15, there is a locally con-
sistent simple tree (T ′, V ′, C ′) of branching degree kn such that V ′(ǫ) = Ψ′. Moreover,
because ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ ∈ Ψ′, for every σ ∈ ∆A where C(ǫ, σ) ≤ 0¯b, there is at least a child
cσ ∈ out(ǫ, σ) such that ¬¬χZ = χZ ∈ V (cσ). Now, let us define kn children for the root of
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(T,V,C) of which each successor c < kn is labelled such that V (c) is some set in Γ which
contains V ′(c). This still maintains the local consistency of (T,V,C). For every child c, if
χZ ∈ V (c), then V (c) ∈ Z. Hence, there is a tree (Tc, Vc, Cc) satisfying the conditions of the
lemma. Replace the child c in (T,V,C) with the tree (Tc, Vc, Cc).
We also need to show that ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ is realised from the root of (T,V,C). We define a
co-strategy F cA for A with, initially, F
c
A(ǫ) = σ
c where the co-move σc is defined so that for
every σ ∈ ∆A such that c(c, σ) ≤ 0¯b, σc(σ) = cσ. Notice that according to the construction
in Lemma 15, we have that χZ ∈ V (cσ). Then, for every c ∈ outc(ǫ, σc, 0¯b), we have that
χZ ∈ V (c). As (Tc, Vc, Cc) satisfies the conditions of the lemma, there is a co-strategy F ′
c
A
in (Tc, Vc, Cc) realising ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ at c. We define F cA(cλ) = F
′c
A(λ) for all λ ∈ Q
∗. It
follows from this construction of F cA that ¬⟪A
0⟫◻ϕ is realised in (T,V,C) from the root ǫ.
The induction step
Assume that d > 0¯, let us consider the first two easy cases, we repeat the argument as for the base
case, when either ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∉ q or ¬ϕ∨(¬⟪Adb⟫◯◻ϕ∧¬⟪Adb⟫◯¬χZ) ∉ q. In the first case, we
just need to consider a trivial tree containing only a root. In the later case, it is straightforward that
(5.3) ∈ q
Let us now assume that both ¬⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ and ¬ϕ∨(¬⟪Adb⟫◯◻ϕ∧¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ) ∈ q.
● If ¬ϕ ∈ q, we construct a tree containing only a root ǫ with the label V (ǫ) = q ∩ cl(ϕ0). As
¬ϕ ∈ q, it is straightforward that ¬⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ is realised at the root ǫ.
● If (¬⟪Adb⟫◯◻ ϕ ∧ ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ) ∈ q, let us construct a tree (T,V,C) as follows. Let Ψ′
be the set of all formulas of form ⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ or ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ from q ∪ cl(ϕ0) and notice that
it also contains the formula ⟪A0¯b⟫◯χZ . We have that ∣Ψ′∣ ≤ k + 1 where k = ∣Ψ◯∣ + 1.
By Lemma 15, there is a locally consistent simple tree (T ′, V ′, C ′) of branching degree kn
such that V ′(ǫ) = Ψ′. Moreover, because ¬⟪A0¯b⟫◯¬χZ ∈ Ψ′, for every σ ∈ ∆A where
C(ǫ, σ) ≤ 0¯b, there is at least a child cσ ∈ out(ǫ, σ) such that ¬¬χZ = χZ ∈ V (cσ). Similarly,
¬⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ Ψ′ where b1+∞ b2 = db and b2 < db, for every σ ∈∆A where C(ǫ, σ) ≤
b¯1, there is at least a child cσ ∈ out(ǫ, σ) such that ¬⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (cσ). Now, let us define kn
children for the root of (T,V,C) of which each successor c < kn is labelled such that V (c) is
some set in Γ which contains V ′(c). This still maintains the local consistency of (T,V,C).
– For every child c, if χZ ∈ V (c), then V (c) ∈ Z. Hence, there is a tree (Tc, Vc, Cc)
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satisfying the conditions of the lemma. Replace the child c in (T,V,C) with the tree
(Tc, Vc, Cc).
– For every child c, if ¬⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (c) for some b2 < db. By the induction hypothesis,
there is there is a tree (Tc, Vc, Cc) satisfying the conditions of the lemma. Replace the
child c in (T,V,C) with the tree (Tc, Vc, Cc).
We also need to show that ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ is realised from the root of (T,V,C). We define a
co-strategy F cA for A with, initially, F
c
A(ǫ) = σ
c where the co-move σc is defined so that for
every move σ where c(ǫ, σ) ≤ db:
– If c(ǫ, σ) ≤ 0¯b, we assign σc(σ) = cσ where, according to the construction in Lemma 15,
we have that χZ ∈ V (cσ),
– If c(ǫ, σ) ≤ b¯1 for some b1 +∞ b2 = db with b2 < db, we assign σc(σ) = cσ where,
according to the construction in Lemma 15, we have that ¬⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (σ).
Then, for every c ∈ outc(ǫ, σc, db), we have that either χZ or ¬⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (c) for some b2 <
db. Therefore, as (Tc, Vc, Cc) satisfies the conditions of the lemma, there is a co-strategy F ′
c
A
in (Tc, Vc, Cc) realising ¬⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ or ¬⟪A
b
2⟫◻ϕ at c, respectively for each case. We define
F cA(cλ) = F
′c
A(λ) for all λ ∈ Q
∗. It follows from this construction of F cA that ¬⟪A
b⟫◻ϕ is
realised in (T,V,C) from the root ǫ.
The above lemmas give us the ingredients to finally construct the model for the considered
consistent formula ϕ0. In more detail, for each consistent set x in Γ and an eventual formula ϕ of
cl(ϕ0), we have a finite tree (Tx,ϕ, Vx,ϕ, Cx,ϕ) which realises ϕ with the root having label x. Let
the eventual formulas in cl(ϕ0) be listed as ϕe0, . . . , ϕ
e
m. In the following, we have the definition of
the final tree.
Definition 32. The final tree (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0) is constructed inductively as follows.
● Initially, select an arbitrary x ∈ Γ such that ϕ0 ∈ x. As the formula ϕ0 is consistent, such a






) be the initial tree.
● Given the tree constructed so far and the last used eventual formula ϕei . Then, for ev-







) where j = i + 1 if i <m or j = 0 if otherwise.
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Before proving the truth lemma for the final model, we show the following lemmas which
confirm the realisation of eventual formulas.
Lemma 19. If ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ or ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ is in the label of some node t of (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0), it is
realised from t.
Proof. Let us consider the first case whenϕei = ⟪A
b⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (t)where t is a node of (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0).






), then the proof is done as ϕei is
realised within this sub-tree at t, hence also in the final tree.
● If it is not that case, we consider b as the projection of a bound d ∈ B and b and define
inductively on d a db-strategy as follows.
Base case
Assume that d = 0, since ⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (t), as V (t) is a maximally consistent set, we have
that ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ) ∈ V (t).
– If ψ ∈ V (t), the proof is done as ⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ is immediately realised at t.
– Otherwise, we have ϕ∧⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (t). Then ϕ ∈ V (t) and by Lemma 15,
there is a move σ ∈ ∆A which costs no more than 0¯b such that, for all c ∈ out(t, σ),
we have ⟪A0¯b⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (tc). Let FA(t) = σ. Then, we can continue with the same
argument to define the strategy FA until a node t
′ in (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0) is reached. Such a
node must exist because of the construction of the (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0), we add the sub-tree
such that eventual formulas in cl(ϕ0) are used in a circle order.
Induction Step
Assume that d > 0, since ⟪Adb⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (t), and V (t) is a maximally consistent set, we
have that ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ (⟪Adb⟫◯ϕUψ ∨ ⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪Adb⟫ϕUψ)) ∈ V (t).
– If ψ ∈ V (t), the proof is done as ⟪Adb⟫ϕUψ is immediately realised at t.
– If ϕ and ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (t) for some b1 +∞ b2 = db with b2 < db, we have that
ϕ ∈ V (t) and by Lemma 15 and there is a move σ ∈ ∆A which costs no more than b1
such that, for all c ∈ out(t, σ), we have ⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (tc). Let FA(t) = σ. As b2 < db,
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by the induction hypothesis, there is a strategy FA,c which realises ⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ from tc.
Hence, we just need to define FA(tcλ) = FA,c(cλ). This simply gives us a b-strategy
which realises ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ from t.
– Otherwise, we have ϕ and ⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪Adb⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (t). Let us repeat the argument in
the base case where ϕ ∈ V (t) and by Lemma 15 and we have that there is a move σ ∈∆A
which costs no more than 0¯b such that, for all c ∈ out(t, σ), we have ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (tc).
Let FA(t) = σ. Then, we can continue with the same argument to define the strategy
FA until a node t
′ in (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0) is reached. Such a node must exist because of the
construction of the (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0), we add the sub-tree such that eventual formulas in
cl(ϕ0) are used in a circle order.
The proof for the case of ϕei = ¬⟪A
b⟫◻ϕ is also done similarly as that of the previous







), then the co-strategy is the one which realised ϕei within (Tt,ϕei , Vt,ϕei , Ct,ϕei ) at
t. Otherwise, we proceed the construction along the tree by choosing co-moves, which confirms the
condition of local consistency of ¬ϕ ∨ (¬⟪Ab⟫◯◻ ϕ ∧ ¬⟪A0⟫◯⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ) as done in Lemma 15
until we reach the root of a sub-tree which belongs to the eventual formula ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ.
Lemma 20. If ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ or ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ is in the label of some node t of (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0), it is
realised from t.
Proof. Let us firstly consider the case when ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (t). By considering b as the projection
of a bound d ∈ B and b, the proof below is done by induction on d where we construct a db-strategy
FA also by induction on the length of the input.
The base case:
Assume that d = 0¯. As ⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (t) and V (t) is a maximally consistent set, we have that ϕ
and ⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (t). By Lemma 15, there is a move σ ∈ ∆A which costs no more than
0¯b such that for all c ∈ out(t, σ), ⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (tc). We define FA(t) = σ.
Assume that we already construct FA for all inputs λ ∈ Q∗ of length i ≥ 1. We now
need to define FA for all inputs λc where c ∈ out(λ[i − 1], FA(λ)). The resource we spend so
far no more than 0¯b. As ⟪A
0¯b⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λc), repeating the above argument, we have that ϕ and
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⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λc). By Lemma 15, there is a move σ ∈ ∆A which costs no more than 0¯b
such that for all c′ ∈ out(c, σ), ⟪A0¯b⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λcc′). We define FA(λc) = σ.
This construction also shows inductively on the length of input that for any λ ∈ out(t, FA),
ϕ ∈ V (λ[0, i]) for all i ≥ 0.
The induction step:
Assume that d > 0¯. As ⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (t) and V (t) is a maximally consistent set, ϕ and either
⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪A2⟫◻ϕ for some b1 +∞ b2 = db with b2 < db or ⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (t).
● If ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (t), by Lemma 15, there is a move σ ∈ ∆A of cost no more than
b1 such that for all c ∈ out(t, σ), ⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (t). We define FA(t) = σ. Moreover, as
b2 < b, by the induction hypothesis, we have a b2-strategy FA,c which realises ⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ at
tc. Then, we simply define FA(tcλ) = FA,c(cλ) for all λ ∈ Q∗. It is straightforward that for
any λ ∈ out(t, FA), ϕ ∈ V (λ[0, i]) for all i ≥ 0.
● If ⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (t), by Lemma 15, there is a move σ ∈ ∆A which costs no more
than 0¯b such that for all c ∈ out(t, σ), ⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (tc). We define FA(t) = σ.
Assume that we already constructed FA for all inputs λ ∈ Q∗ of length i ≥ 1. We now need
to define FA for all inputs λc where c ∈ out(λ[i − 1], FA(λ)). The resource we spend so far
no more than 0¯b. As ⟪A
b⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λc), repeating the above argument, we have that ϕ and
either ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ for some b1 +∞ b2 = db or ⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λc).
– If ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λc). By Lemma 15, there is a move σ ∈ ∆A of cost no more
than b1 such that for all c
′ ∈ out(λc, σ), ⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λcc′). We define FA(λc) = σ.
Moreover, as b2 < b, by the induction hypothesis, we have a b2-strategy FA,c which
realises ⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ at λcc′. Then, we simply define FA(λcc′κ) = FA,c(c′κ) for all
λ ∈ Q∗. Then, it is straightforward that for any λ ∈ out(t, FA), ϕ ∈ V (λ[0, i]) for all
i ≥ 0.
– If ⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λc). By Lemma 15, there is a move σ ∈ ∆A which costs
no more than 0¯b such that for all c
′ ∈ out(λc, σ), ⟪Adb⟫◻ϕ ∈ V (λcc′). We define
FA(λc) = σ. This construction also shows inductively on the length of input that for
any λ ∈ out(t, FA), ϕ ∈ V (λ[0, i]) for all i ≥ 0.
The proof for the case of ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ is done in the similar way as that of the previous
case. However, we construct a co-strategy F cA instead. As ¬⟪A
b⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (t), we also have that
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¬ψ, ¬⟪A0⟫◯⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ and ¬⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ ∈ V (t) for all b1+∞ b2 = b. Then, the construc-
tion ofF cA is done from the co-moves implied by ¬ψ, ¬⟪A
0⟫◯⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ and ¬⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕUψ ∈
V (t) for all b1 +∞ b2 = b. Moreover, the construction may end for a given computation if we reach
a node t′ where ∼ϕ ∈ V (t′).
Let Sϕ0 be the model which is based on (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0).
Finally, we show the following truth lemma.
Lemma 21. For every node t of (Tϕ0 , Vϕ0 , Cϕ0) and every formula ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ0), if ϕ ∈ Vϕ0(t) then
Sϕ0 , t ⊧ ϕ.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the structure of ϕ.
● For the cases of propositions, negations and disjunctions, the proofs are trivial.
● Assume ϕ = ⟪Ab⟫◯ψ, Lemma 15 makes sure that there is a move σ ∈ ∆A of cost at most b
such that for all c ∈ out(t, σ), we have ψ ∈ V (tc). Then by the induction hypothesis, we have
that Sϕ0 , tc ⊧ ψ. Then, Sϕ0 , t ⊧ ⟪A
b⟫◯ψ
● Assume ϕ = ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ, Lemma 15 makes sure that there is a co-move σ ∈ ∆A such that
for all c ∈ out(t, σ, b), we have ∼ψ ∈ V (tc). Then by the induction hypothesis, we have that
Sϕ0 , tc ⊧∼ψ. Then, Sϕ0 , t ⊧ ¬⟪A
b⟫◯ψ
● For the cases of ⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ, ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ, ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕUψ and ⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ, the proofs are trivial with
the help of the two previous lemmas.
Finally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The axiomatisation system for RB-ATL is sound and complete.
We have the following corollary which is useful for the satisfiability problem of RB-ATL.
Corollary 1. Every satisfiable RB-ATL formula is satisfied by a fixed-branching degree tree model
where the cost of any action in the model is limited by some resource bound which only depends on
the formula.
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Proof. It follows from the soundness of RB-ATL that every satisfiable RB-ATL formula ϕ is a
consistent formula. Therefore, according to the completeness of RB-ATL, there is a tree model
satisfying ϕ. This tree model has a fixed-branching degree which is kn where k = ∣cl(ϕ)◯∣ + 1. Let
b0 be defined as follow, the i-th component of b0 is define to be the maximal i-th component of all
bounds appearing in ϕ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r plus one. According to the assignment of costs for actions
presented in Lemma 15, it is possible to assign e = b0. Thus, it is straightforward that no action has
cost more than b0.
5.7 Satisfiability of RB-ATL
Similar to the satisfiability problem of ATL, we also apply the automaton-based approach as pre-
sented in [Goranko & van Drimmelen, 2006] to determine the satisfiability of a RB-ATL formula
ϕ0. The proof of the correctness of the decision procedure introduced in this section is based on
its counterpart for ATL in [Goranko & van Drimmelen, 2006] with the extension for dealing with
resource bounds. Firstly, we recall the notion of Alternating Bu¨chi Tree Automata. Then, we de-
fine for each RB-ATL formula an alternating Bu¨chi tree automaton which only accepts a class of
fixed-branching degree models satisfying the formula. Therefore, the algorithm for deciding the
emptiness of alternating Bu¨chi tree automata gives us a procedure for the satisfiability of RB-ATL,
given that the number of resources and the number of agents are fixed.
5.7.1 Alternating Bu¨chi tree automata
Firstly, we recall the notion of positive Boolean formulas which will be used later to define transi-
tions of the automata.
Definition 33. Given a set X , B+(X) is the set of positive formulas which are defined inductively
from elements of X in the following way:
● ⊺,  and any element of X are positive formulas,
● If θ1 and θ2 are positive formulas, so are θ1 ∧ θ2 and θ1 ∨ θ2.
A set Y ⊆ X satisfies a formula θ ∈ B+(X) iff assigning true to every element in Y and false to
every element in Y ∖X makes θ true.
Note that if Y1 satisfies θ1 and Y2 satisfies θ2, then Y1∪Y2 satisfies θ1∧θ2. In the following,
we give the definition of alternating Bu¨chi tree automata.
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Definition 34. A (finite) alternating Bu¨chi automaton (ATA) is a tupleA = (Θ, k, S, s∗, ρ, F )where:
● Θ is a finite alphabet,
● k is a finite branching degree,
● S is a finite set of states,
● s∗ ∈ S is an initial state,
● ρ ∶ S ×Θ→ B+({0, . . . , k − 1} × S) is a partial transition function, and
● F ⊆ S is a set of acceptance states.
Inputs of ATA automata are Θ-labelled leafless k-trees (T,V,C). A run of an ATA au-
tomaton over a tree (T,V,C) is also a tree (Tr, r) where nodes are labelled by elements of N∗ ×S.
The label of a node on (Tr, r) and its children have to satisfy the following conditions:
1. r(ǫ) = (ǫ, s∗),
2. If y ∈ Tr, r(y) = (x, s) and ρ(s, V (x)) = θ, there is a set Q = {(c0, s0), . . . , (cp, sp)} ⊆
{0, . . . , k − 1} × S such that:
● Q satisfies θ and
● For any 0 ≤ i ≤ p, we have that y ⋅ i ∈ Tr and r(y ⋅ i) = (x ⋅ ci, si).
Given a path λ in a run (Tr, r), inf(λ) denotes the set of all states which appear infinitely
often on λ. A run is accepting if every infinite path λ of the run satisfies inf(λ)∩F /= ∅, i.e. there is
at least a state in F appearing infinitely often on λ. An input tree (T,V,C) is accepted by an ATA
automaton iff it has an accepting run. We denote the set of all trees which are accepted by an ATA
automaton A by Tω(A).
5.7.2 ATA automata for RB-ATL formulas
Given a RB-ATL formula ϕ0, we have the closure cl(ϕ0) and k = ∣cl(ϕ0)◯∣+1. Let b0 be the limited
bound as defined in the proof of Corollary 1 with respect to ϕ0. For the definition of the transition
function, we introduce a notation ca(∆) which denotes the set of all possible cost assignments for
actions in ∆. Recall that given k, ∆ = {{1, . . . , k}n} is the set of all joint actions for agents in N .
Each assignment a in ca(∆) defines the cost of each action 1 ≤ j ≤ k for every agent i to be some
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value between 0¯ and b0. We denote this assignment as a(j, i). We define an ATA automatonAϕ for
ϕ0 as follows.
Definition 35. Let ϕ0 be a RB-ATL formula over a set of propositions Prop and N be the set of
agents with ∣N ∣ = n, the corresponding ATA automaton Aϕ0 of ϕ0 is defined as Aϕ0 = (℘(Prop) ×
ca(∆), kn, cl(ϕ0), ϕ0, ρ, F ) where:
● The transition function ρ is defined as follows:
– ρ(p, (π, a)) = ⊺ if p ∈ π
– ρ(p, (π, a)) =  if p ∉ π
– ρ(¬p, (π, a)) =  if p ∈ π
– ρ(¬p, (π, a)) = ⊺ if p ∉ π
– ρ(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, (π, a)) = ρ(ϕ1, (π, a)) ∧ ρ(ϕ2, (π, a))
– ρ(ϕ1 ∨ϕ2, (π, a)) = ρ(ϕ1, (π, a)) ∨ ρ(ϕ2, (π, a))
– ρ(⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ, (π, a)) =
⋁σ∈∆A∶∑i∈A a(σi,i)≤b(⋀c∈out(σ)(c,ϕ))
– ρ(¬⟪Ab⟫◯ϕ, (π, a)) =
⋀σ∈∆A∶∑i∈A a(σi,i)≤b(⋁c∈out(σ)(c,∼ϕ))
– ρ(⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ, (π, a)) =
ρ(ϕ, (π, a))∧
⋁b1+∞b2=b(ρ(⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ, (π, a)))
– ρ(¬⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ, (π, a)) =
ρ(∼ϕ, (π, a))∨
⋀b1+∞b2=b(ρ(¬⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫◻ϕ, (π, a)))
– ρ(⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, (π, a)) =
ρ(ϕ2, (π, a)) ∨ (ρ(ϕ1, (π, a))∧
⋁b1+∞b2=b(ρ(⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, (π, a))))
– ρ(¬⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, (π, a)) =
ρ(∼ϕ2, (π, a)) ∧ (ρ(∼ϕ1, (π, a))∨
⋀b1+∞b2=b(ρ(¬⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, (π, a))))
5. RESOURCE-BOUNDED ALTERNATING-TIME TEMPORAL LOGIC 144
● The set F of final state is defined as
F = {⟪Ab⟫◻ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ0)} ∪ {¬⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2 ∈ cl(ϕ0)}
We have the following theorem.
Lemma 22. Given a RB-ATL formula ϕ0, then Tω(Aϕ0) is exactly the set of tree models of ϕ0
where it has a fixed branching degree kn and no action costs more than b0 amount of resources.
Proof. In the following, we show that the automaton Aϕ0 accepts exactly the set Tree(k
n, b0) of
tree models of ϕ0 where each model has a fixed branching degree k
n and no action costs more than
b0 amount of resources. For convenience, we extend the definition of the function V in a model
(T,V,C) ∈ Tree(kn, b0) such that V (x) = (π,C(x)) where π ⊆ Prop is the set of propositions
labeling x (that is exactly V (x) as before) and C(x) is the cost assignment for actions in ∆ at x,
that is C(x)(j, i) = C(x, i, j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This extension allows the labels
on those tree models of Tree(kn, b0) are members of the alphabet of the automaton Aϕ0 so that it
makes sense to run the tree models on Aϕ0 .
In the first part of the proof, we show the direction where if a tree model (T,V,C) ∈
Tree(kn, b0) has a successful run (Tr, r) on Aϕ0 , then it satisfies ϕ0.
Firstly, we introduce the notion of sub-tree models and sub-runs.
Given a node x ∈ T , a sub-tree model of (T,V,C) at x, denoted as (T x, V x, Cx), is
defined as follows:
● T x = T
● V x(x′) = V (x ⋅ x′)
● Cx(x′) = C(x ⋅ x′)
Intuitively, the sub-tree model (T x, V x, Cx) is the sub-tree of (T,V,C) which starts from the node
x in T .
We define the notion of sub-runs of (Tr, r) as follows. For a node y ∈ Tr and a formula




● z ∈ T y,ϕr iff y ⋅ z ∈ Tr and
● ry,ϕ(z) = (x′, s′) iff r(y ⋅ z) = (x ⋅ x′, s′).
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We also define A
ϕ
ϕ0 as Aϕ0 with the initial state replaced by ϕ.
We have the following claim.
Claim 4. Given y ∈ Tr and r(y) = (x,ϕ), (T
y,ϕ
r , r




Proof. The proof is straightforward. Firstly, we have that ry,ϕ(ǫ) = (ǫ,ϕ) as r(y ⋅ ǫ) = (x ⋅ ǫ,ϕ).
Moreover, let us consider any z ∈ T y,ϕr , we have that ry,ϕ(z) = (x′, ϕ′) where r(y ⋅ z) = (x ⋅
x′, ϕ′). As (Tr, r) is a successful run on Aϕ0 , we have that ρ(ϕ
′, V (x ⋅ x′)) = θ is satisfied by
some subset Q = {(c0, ϕ0), . . . , (cp, ϕp)} ⊂ {0, . . . , kn − 1} × cl(ϕ0). However, because of the
definition of (T x, V x, Cx), we also have that ρ(ϕ′, V (x ⋅x′)) = ρ(ϕ′, V x(x′)), thenQ also satisfies
ρ(ϕ′, V x(x′)). Moreover, we also have that y ⋅ z ⋅ i ∈ Tr and r(y ⋅ z ⋅ i) = (ci, ϕi) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ p,
thus z ⋅ i ∈ T y,ϕr and ry,ϕ(z ⋅ i) = (ci, ϕi) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ p. Therefore, (T
y,ϕ
r , r
y,ϕ) is an accepting
run of (T x, V x, Cx) on Aϕϕ0 .
Notice that (T ǫ,ϕ0r , rǫ,ϕ0) = (Tr, r) and A
ϕ0
ϕ0 = Aϕ0 .
We are going to prove the following claim.
Claim 5. For any y ∈ Tr with r(y) = (x,ϕ), if (T
y,ϕ
r , r
y,ϕ) is an accepting run of (T x, V x, Cx) on
A
ϕ
ϕ0 , then (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ.
Proof. The proof is done inductively on the structure of ϕ.
● Assume that ϕ is a proposition p. As (T y,pr , ry,p) is an accepting run on A
p
ϕ0 , we must
have ρ(p, V (x)) = ⊺. Then, assume that V (x) = (π, a), we must have p ∈ π. Hence,
(T,V,C), x ⊧ p.
● Assume that ϕ is a proposition ¬p. As (T y,¬pr , ry,¬p) is an accepting run on A
¬p
ϕ0 , we must
have ρ(¬p, V (x)) = ⊺. Then, assume that V (x) = (π, a), we must have p ∉ π. Hence,
(T,V,C), x ⊧ ¬p.
● Assume that ϕ is ϕ1∧ϕ2. As (T
y,ϕ1∧ϕ2
r , r
y,ϕ1∧ϕ2) is an accepting run onAϕ1∧ϕ2ϕ0 , there must
be a setQ ⊆ {0, kn −1}× cl(ϕ0) satisfying ρ(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, V (x)) = ρ(ϕ1, V (x))∧ρ(ϕ2, V (x)).
Then, Q satisfies both ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) and ρ(ϕ2, V (x)). Using Q as a set which satisfies
ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) and repeat the proof of Claim 4, we imply that (T
y,ϕ1
r , r
y,ϕ1) is an accepting
run of (T x, V x, Cx) on Aϕ1ϕ0 . By the induction hypothesis, we have that (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1.
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Apply the same argument as above, we also have that (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ2. Therefore, (T,V,C), x ⊧
ϕ1 ∧ϕ2.
● Assume that ϕ is ϕ1∨ϕ2. As (T
y,ϕ1∨ϕ2
r , r
y,ϕ1∨ϕ2) is an accepting run onAϕ1∨ϕ2ϕ0 , there must
be a setQ ⊆ {0, kn −1}× cl(ϕ0) satisfying ρ(ϕ1 ∨ϕ2, V (x)) = ρ(ϕ1, V (x))∨ρ(ϕ2, V (x)).
Then, Q satisfies either ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) or ρ(ϕ2, V (x)). Without loss of generality, let us as-
sume that Q satisfies ρ(ϕ1, V (x)). Using Q as a set which satisfies ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) and repeat
the proof of Claim 4, we imply that (T y,ϕ1r , ry,ϕ1) is an accepting run of (T x, V x, Cx) on
A
ϕ1
ϕ0 . By the induction hypothesis, we have that (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1. Therefore, (T,V,C), x ⊧
ϕ1 ∧ϕ2.
● Assume that ϕ is ⟪Ab⟫◯ψ. As (T y,⟪A
b⟫◯ψ
r , r
y,⟪Ab⟫◯ψ) is an accepting run of (T x, V x, Cx)
on A
⟪Ab⟫◯ψ
ϕ0 , there must be a set Q ⊆ {0, k
n − 1} × cl(ϕ0) satisfying
ρ(⟪Ab⟫◯ψ,V (x)) = ⋁σ∈∆A∶∑i∈AC(x,i,σi)≤b(⋀c∈out(σ)(c,ψ))
Then, there exists a move σ ∈ ∆A with the cost ∑i∈AC(x, i, σi) ≤ b such that for all c ∈
out(σ), (c,ψ) ∈ Q. Let us denote the index of each (c,ψ) ∈ Q by ic, then y ⋅ ic ∈ Tr and
r(y ⋅ ic) = (x ⋅ c,ψ). Then, by Claim 4, we have that (T
y⋅ic,ψ
r , r
y⋅ic,ψ) is an accepting run of
(T x⋅c, V x⋅c, Cx⋅c) on Aψϕ0 . By the induction hypothesis, we have that (T,V,C), x ⋅ c ⊧ ψ for
all c ∈ out(σ). As the cost∑i∈AC(x, i, σi) of σ is no more than b, we have that (T,V,C), x ⊧
⟪Ab⟫◯ψ.
● Assume thatϕ is ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ. As (T y,¬⟪A
b⟫◯ψ
r , r
y,¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ) is an accepting run of (T x, V x, Cx)
on A
¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ
ϕ0 , there must be a set Q ⊆ {0, k
n − 1} × cl(ϕ0) satisfying
ρ(¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ,V (x)) = ⋀σ∈∆A∶∑i∈AC(x,i,σi)≤b(⋁c∈out(σ)(c,∼ψ))
Then, for every move σ ∈ ∆A with the cost ∑i∈AC(x, i, σi) ≤ b, there is an outcome cσ ∈
out(σ) such that (cσ,∼ψ) ∈ Q. Let us denote the index of each (cσ,∼ψ) ∈ Q by icσ , then




an accepting run of (T x⋅cσ , V x⋅cσ , Cx⋅cσ) on A∼ψϕ0 . By the induction hypothesis, we have that
(T,V,C), x ⋅ cσ ⊧∼ψ for all σ ∈ ∆A with the cost ∑i∈AC(x, i, σi) ≤ b. In other words, we
have that (T,V,C), x ⊧ ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ.
● Assume that ϕ is ⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2. As (T
y,⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2
r , r
y,⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) is an accepting run of
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(T x, V x, Cx) on A⟪A
b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2
ϕ0 , there must be a set Q ⊆ {0, k
n − 1} × cl(ϕ0) satisfying
ρ(⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x)) =
ρ(ϕ2, V (x)) ∨ (ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) ∧⋁b1+∞b2=b(ρ(⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x))))
Let us construct a b-strategy for A to satisfy ⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2. We consider b as in the projection
of a bound d ∈ B and b and the construction is done by induction on d.
The base case:
When d = 0¯, we have that
ρ(⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x)) =
ρ(ϕ2, V (x)) ∨ (ρ(ϕ1, , V (x)) ∧ ρ(⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x)))
We define a subtree G of (T,V,C) rooted at x on which the strategy is based. A node z ∈ G
is called internal if there is a node z ⋅ c ∈ G for some c ∈ {0, kn − 1}, otherwise it is called
external. Then, we define G inductively as follows.
– Initially, G contains only x,
– In the base case, we consider the external node x ∈ G




is an accepting run of (T x, V x, Cx) on Aϕ2ϕ0 . By the induction hypothesis, we have
(T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ2.
∗ Otherwise, Q must satisfy
ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) ∧ ρ(⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x))
Then applying the same argument as the previous case, we have (T,V,C), x ⊧
ϕ1. Moreover, applying the same argument as in the case of ⟪Ab⟫◯ψ, there is
a move σ ∈ ∆A which costs no more than 0¯b at x such that for all c ∈ out(σ),
(c,⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) ∈ Q. We denote the index of (c,⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) in Q by ic, then
r(y ⋅ ic) = (x ⋅ c,⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2). We add every x ⋅ c where c ∈ out(σ) into G. We
also assign σx⋅c = σ.
– In the induction step, we consider an external node x ⋅ c1⋯cm where r(y ⋅ ic1⋯icm) =
(x ⋅ c1⋯cm,⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2). Then, there is a subset Q′ ⊆ {0, . . . , kn − 1} × cl(ϕ0)
satisfying ρ(⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x ⋅ c1⋯cm)).
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is an accepting run of (T x⋅c1...cm , V x⋅c1...cm , Cx⋅c1...cm) on Aϕ2ϕ0 . By the induction
hypothesis, we have (T,V,C), x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⊧ ϕ2.
∗ Otherwise, Q′ must satisfy
ρ(ϕ1, V (x ⋅ c1 . . . cm)) ∧ ρ(⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x ⋅ c1 . . . cm))
Then, we have (T,V,C), x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⊧ ϕ1 and there is a move σ ∈ ∆A which costs
no more than 0¯b at x ⋅ c1⋯cm such that for all c ∈ out(σ), (c,⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) ∈ Q′.
We denote the index of (c,⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) in Q′ by ic, then r(y ⋅ ic1⋯icm ⋅ ic) =
(x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⋅ c,⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2). We add every x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⋅ c into G. We also assign
σx⋅c1⋯cm⋅c = σ.
The construction of G terminates when no new node is added. G must be finite as otherwise,
there is an infinite path λ = x,x ⋅ c1, x ⋅ c1 ⋅ c2, . . . in G such that r(y ⋅ ic1⋯icm) = (x ⋅
c1⋯cm,⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) for all m ≥ 0. Then, inf(λ) ∩ F = ∅ which contradicts the fact
that (Tr, r) is an accepting run. Then we define a strategy FA by assigning FA((x) . . . (x ⋅
c1⋯cm)) = σx⋅c1⋯cm+1 for every path (x) . . . (x ⋅c1⋯cm) where (x ⋅c1⋯cm) ∈ G for allm ≥ 0
and there is some x ⋅ c1⋯cm+1 ∈ G. For all other inputs of FA, we simply define the output as
idle actions for all agents in A which cost 0¯.
By defining such FA, we have that for every λ ∈ out(x,FA) whose cost for agents in A is
always 0¯b, there is a prefix which is a finite path in G and ending with an external node in
G such that ϕ1 is satisfied on all internal nodes of G on this prefix and ϕ2 is satisfied on the
external node of G at the end of the prefix. In other words, (T,V,C), x ⊧ ⟪A0¯⟫ϕ1Uϕ2.
The induction case:
When d > 0¯, we have that
ρ(⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x)) =
ρ(ϕ2, V (x)) ∨ (ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) ∧⋁b1+∞b2=db(ρ(⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪A0¯b⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x))))
We also define a subtree G of (T,V,C) rooted at x on which the strategy is based. G is
defined inductively as follows.
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– Initially, G contains only x,
– In the base case, we consider the external node x ∈ G




accepting run of (T x, V x, Cx) on Aϕ2ϕ0 . By the induction hypothesis, we have
(T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ2.
∗ Otherwise, if Q satisfies
ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) ∧ ρ(⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x))
for some b1 +∞ b2 = db where b2 < db, then we have (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1. More-
over, there is a move σ ∈ ∆A costing at most b1 at x such that for all c ∈ out(σ),
(c,⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) ∈ Q. We denote the index of (c,⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) in Q by ic, then
r(y ⋅ ic) = (x ⋅ c,⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2). We add every x ⋅ c intoG. We also assign σx⋅c = σ.
∗ Otherwise, Q must satisfy
ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) ∧ ρ(⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x))
Then we have (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1. Moreover, there is a move σ ∈∆A which costs no
more than 0¯b at x such that for all c ∈ out(σ), (c,⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) ∈ Q. We denote
the index of (c,⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) in Q by ic, then r(y ⋅ ic) = (x ⋅ c,⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2).
We add every x ⋅ c into G. We also assign σx⋅c = σ.
– In the induction step, we consider an external node x ⋅ c1⋯cm at which r(y ⋅ ic1⋯icm) =
(x ⋅ c1⋯cm,⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2). Then, there is a subset Q′ ⊆ {0, . . . , kn − 1} × cl(ϕ0)
satisfying ρ(⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x ⋅ c1⋯cm)).




is an accepting run of (T x⋅c1...cm , V x⋅c1...cm , Cx⋅c1...cm) on Aϕ2ϕ0 . By the induction
hypothesis, we have (T,V,C), x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⊧ ϕ2.
∗ Otherwise, if Q′ satisfies
ρ(ϕ1, V (x ⋅ c1 . . . cm)) ∧ ρ(⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x ⋅ c1 . . . cm))
for some b1 +
∞ b2 = db where b2 < db, then we have (T,V,C), x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⊧ ϕ1 and
there is a move σ ∈∆A costing at most b1 at x ⋅ c1⋯cm such that for all c ∈ out(σ),
(c,⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) ∈ Q′. We denote the index of (c,⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) in Q by ic, then
r(y ⋅ ic1⋯icm ⋅ ic) = (x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⋅ c,⟪A
b2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2). We add every x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⋅ c into
G. We also assign σx⋅c1⋯cm⋅c = σ.
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∗ Otherwise, Q′ must satisfy
ρ(ϕ1, V (x ⋅ c1 . . . cm)) ∧ ρ(⟪A0¯b⟫◯⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x ⋅ c1 . . . cm))
Then we have (T,V,C), x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⊧ ϕ1 and there is a 0¯b-cost move σ ∈ ∆A at x ⋅
c1⋯cm such that for all c ∈ out(σ), (c,⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) ∈ Q. We denote the index of
(c,⟪Adb⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) inQ by ic, then r(y ⋅ic1⋯icm ⋅ic) = (x⋅c1⋯cm ⋅c,⟪A
db⟫ϕ1Uϕ2).
We add every x ⋅ c1⋯cm ⋅ c into G. We also assign σx⋅c1⋯cm⋅c = σ.
The construction of G terminates when no new node is added. G must be finite as other-
wise, there is an infinite path λ = x,x ⋅ c1, x ⋅ c1 ⋅ c2, . . . in G such that r(y ⋅ ic1⋯icm) =
(x ⋅ c1⋯cm,⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) for all m ≥ 0. Then, inf(λ) ∩ F = ∅ which contradicts the fact
that (Tr, r) is an accepting run. Then we define a strategy FA by assigning FA((x) . . . (x ⋅
c1⋯cm)) = σx⋅c1⋯cm+1 for every path (x) . . . (x ⋅ c1⋯cm) where (x ⋅ c1⋯cm) ∈ G for all
m ≥ 0 and there is some x ⋅ c1⋯cm+1 ∈ G. For external nodes x ⋅ c1⋯cm of G where
r(y ⋅ ic1⋯icm) = (x ⋅ c1⋯cm,⟪A
b2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) for some b2 < db, by the induction hypoth-
esis, there is a b1-strategy F
′
A at x ⋅ c1⋯cm for A which makes ⟪A
b2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2 true. We
simply define FA((x) . . . (x ⋅ c1⋯cm)λ) = F ′A(λ). It is also straightforward to prove that
∑i≤m cost(σx⋅c1⋯ci) ≤ b1 where b1 +
∞ b2 = db. For all other input of FA, we simply define
the output as idle actions for all agents in A which cost 0¯.
By defining such FA, we have that for every λ ∈ out(x,FA) whose cost for agents in A
is always no more than db, there is a prefix which is a finite path in G and ends with an
external node in G such that ϕ1 is satisfied on all internal nodes of G on this prefix and ϕ2 or
⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2 where b1+∞ b2 = db and b2 < db is satisfied on the external node ofG at the end
of the prefix. In the later case, i.e. the external node satisfies ⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, by the induction
hypothesis, there is a b1-strategy for A at the external node to make ⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2 while the
total cost of actions from x leading to this external node is no more than b1. In other words,
(T,V,C), x ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2.
● Proofs are similar for the case of ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, ⟪Ab⟫◻ψ and ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ψ.
Therefore, the result of Claim 5 shows us that (T,V,C), ǫ ⊧ ϕ0.
Let us now prove the other direction of the lemma. We show that for every tree model in
Tree(kn, b0) which satisfies the formula ϕ0, there is an accepting run on the automaton Aϕ0 .
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Assume that we have a tree model (T,V,C) ∈ Tree(kn, b0) where (T,V,C), ǫ ⊧ ϕ0. We
now construct an acceptance run (Tr, r) on Aϕ0 . The construction is done inductively as follows.
Initially, we add ǫ to Tr and assign r(ǫ) = (ǫ,ϕ0). We continue adding nodes to the run
and always make sure that if y is added into Tr with r(y) = (x,ϕ), we must have (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ.
It is straightforward to see that this property holds for the root ǫ of Tr.
We now consider a leaf y in Tr with r(y) = (x,ϕ) and (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ. We will prove
the following:
● There exists a setQ ⊆ {0, kn −1}× cl(ϕ0) which satisfies the formula ρ(ϕ,V (x)). Then, we
expand Tr as follows. For every (c,ϕc) ∈ Q, let ic be the index of c in Q, we add ic as a child
of y and assign r(y ⋅ ic) = (x ⋅ c, (ϕc, dc)).
● (T,V,C), x ⋅ c ⊧ ϕc.
The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ϕ.
● If ϕ is p, as (T,V,C), x ⊧ p, let V (x) = (π,C(x)), we must have p ∈ π. Therefore,
ρ(p, V (x)) is satisfied by an empty Q.
● If ϕ is ¬p, as (T,V,C), x ⊧ ¬p, let V (x) = (π,C(x)), we must have p ∉ π. Therefore,
ρ(p, V (x)) is also satisfied by an empty Q.
● If ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, then (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 implies that (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1 and (T,V,C), x ⊧
ϕ2. By the induction hypothesis, there are two setsQ1 andQ2 which satisfy ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) and
ρ(ϕ2, V (x)), respectively. Moreover, for every (c,ϕc) ∈ Q1 orQ2, we have that (T,V,C), x⋅
c ⊧ ϕc. Because ρ(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, V (x)) = ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) ∧ ρ(ϕ2, V (x)) is a positive Boolean
formula, we have that Q = Q1 ∪Q2 satisfies ρ(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, V (x)).
● If ϕ = ϕ1∨ϕ2, then (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1∨ϕ2 implies that (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1 or (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ2.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1. By the induction hypothe-
sis, there is a set Q which satisfy ρ(ϕ1, V (x)) and for every (c,ϕc) ∈ Q, we have that
(T,V,C), x ⋅ c ⊧ ϕc. It is also straightforward that Q satisfies ρ(ϕ1 ∨ϕ2, V (x)).
● If ϕ = ⟪Ab⟫◯ψ, (T,V,C), x ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫◯ψ implies that there is a move σ ∈ ∆A with the
cost ∑i∈AC(x, i, σi) ≤ b such that for every c ∈ out(σ), (T,V,C), x ⋅ c ⊧ ψ. We define
Q = {(c,ψ) ∣ c ∈ out(σ)}. It is straightforward that Q satisfies ρ(⟪Ab⟫◯ψ,V (x)).
5. RESOURCE-BOUNDED ALTERNATING-TIME TEMPORAL LOGIC 152
● If ϕ = ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ, (T,V,C), x ⊧ ¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ implies that for any move σ ∈ ∆A with the
cost ∑i∈AC(x, i, σi) ≤ b, there exists an outcome cσ ∈ out(σ), (T,V,C), x ⋅ cσ ⊧∼ψ. We
define Q = {(cσ,∼ψ) ∣ σ ∈ ∆A ∶ ∑i∈AC(x, i, σi) ≤ b}. It is straightforward that Q satisfies
ρ(¬⟪Ab⟫◯ψ,V (x)).
● If ϕ = ⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, then (T,V,C), x ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2. This implies that either (T,V,C), x ⊧
ϕ2 or (T,V,C), x ⊧ ϕ1 ∧ ⟪Ab1⟫◯⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2 for some b1 +∞ b2 = b.
In the first case, by the induction hypothesis, there is a set Q which satisfies ρ(ϕ2, V (x)).
In the second case, firstly, by the induction hypothesis, there must be a set Q1 which satisfies
ρ(ϕ1, V (x)). Secondly, during the construction Tr, we may attach to a node y ∈ Tr a strategy.
The reason of this attachment will be explained later. If y has not been attached with a b-
strategy, because (T,V,C), x ⊧ ⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, there must be a b-strategy FA for coalition A
to make ⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2 true at x. Let b′ be the cost of σ = FA(x) and b2 ∈ B∞ such that
b′b +
∞ b2 = b. If y is already attached with b-strategy FA, similarly, let b′ be the cost of
σ = FA(x) and b2 ∈ B∞ such that b′b +
∞ b2 = b.
Then, for every c ∈ out(σ), we have that (T,V,C), x ⋅ c ⊧ ⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2. We define
Q2 = {(c,⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) ∣ c ∈ out(σ)}. We simple choose Q = Q1 ∪ Q2, then Q satis-
fies ρ(⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, V (x)). Moreover, for every c ∈ out(σ) where (c,⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2) has the
index ic in Q, by the construction of Tr, ic is added into Tr as a child of y with the assign-
ment r(y ⋅ ic) = (x ⋅ c,⟪Ab2⟫ϕ1Uϕ2), we attach a b2-strategy F ′A to y ⋅ ic which is defined
as F ′A(λ) = FA(x ⋅ λ). The idea of attaching a strategy to a node in the run Tr is that when
the construction continues at y ⋅ ic, we still follow the strategy FA which has been chosen at y
to satisfy the eventually formula ⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2. As this formula is satisfied in the model, fol-
lowing a fixed strategy helps us to not generate a formula in the form ⟪Ab
′′
⟫ϕ1Uϕ2 infinitely
often along some specific branch of the run Tr.
● The case when ϕ = ¬⟪Ab⟫◻ψ is treated in a similar way as for the above case. However,
instead of using strategies, we can make use of the co-strategies. Because of the similarity,
we omit the proof here.
● The cases when ϕ = ⟪Ab⟫◻ψ and ϕ = ¬⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2 is also treated in a similar ways
as for the above cases. However, making use of strategies (or co-strategy, respectively)
will produce on the run Tr infinite branches on which states of the form (⟪Ab⟫◻ψ, d) (or
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(¬⟪Ab⟫ϕ1Uϕ2, d), respectively) appear infinitely often. This fact satisfies the condition for
accepting the run Tr on infinite branches.
We have the following decidability result.
Proposition 2. RB-ATL is decidable.
The proof is rather straightforward. Given a formula ϕ in RB-ATL, we construct the cor-
responding alternating-tree automaton as described above. Then, the decidability of the satisfiability
of ϕ is determined by deciding whether the corresponding alternating-tree automaton is non-empty.
As this problem is decidable, hence RB-ATL is decidable. We already know from the definition
of cl(ϕ0) that the size of cl(ϕ0) is bounded by 22
mr×∣ϕ0 ∣
, where m is the maximal bound of any
resource appearing in ϕ0 and r is the number of resources. Moreover, from [Goranko & van Drim-
melen, 2006] we have that the emptiness problem for ATA automata is decidable in exponential
time with respect to the size of the input automaton. Therefore, the algorithm for deciding the emp-
tyness problem of ATA automata gives us an triple exponential time procedure for the satisfiability
problem of RB-ATL.
5.8 Conclusion
In comparison with BMCL and RBCL, RB-ATL is the most fully-fledged logic so far for specifying
and reasoning about resource-bounded multi-agent systems. The logic RB-ATL is an extension of
ATL where resource bounds are attached to every coalition appearing in a formula of ATL. Similar
to the case of RB-CL, resource bounds attached to a coalition restrict the abilities of the coalition
where the greater resource bounds are attached, the more abilities a coalition may have. Moreover,
we also introduce the symbol ∞ in resource bounds in order to remove the limitation of particular
resources. Rather than always set a concrete bound on every resource like RBCL, the extension
of the set of resource bounds in RB-ATL enables us to reason about more properties of resource-
bounded multi-agent systems. For example, the formula ⟪A(x,∞,y,∞)⟫⊺Uϕ where x, y are some
natural numbers allows us to reason about the ability of the coalition A when there is no restriction
on the usage of particular resources (those have the bound ∞, respectively). Similarly, RB-ATL
also allows us to investigate the importance of resources when a coalition does not have an expected
ability when it is not allowed to spend any of such resources while other resources have no restriction
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on usage. Then, we could use the formula ⟪A(0,∞,0,∞)⟫⊺Uϕ where 0’s are the bounds for resources
which are considered to be investigated.
In this chapter, we have defined the syntax and semantics of RB-ATL. In order to simplify
the proof of the soundness and completeness of the logic, as well as the satisfiability of RB-ATL, we
also presented the normal form RB-ATL where negation can only appear in front of a propositional
variables or temporal operators. Then, to define the semantics of the normal RB-ATL, apart from
the notions of moves and strategies as in the semantics of RB-ATL, we presented the notions of
co-moves and co-strategies which help the definition of semantics for formulas where negation is in
front of temporal operators.
Before ending this chapter, let us briefly discuss the relationship between RBCL and RB-
ATL. Firstly, RB-ATL allows modelling more types of coalitional strategies through the help of until
(U) operator. Therefore, the statements such as a coalition can maintain a certain condition until it
achieves some goal under a resource bound is not expressible in RBCL. Furthermore, RBCL does
not allow modelling coalitional abilities with unbounded conditions for some resources. However,
RB-ATL is defined for reasoning about resource-bounded multi-agent systems where combined
costs are defined only by means of addition operator. Therefore, the question of whether the re-
sults of RB-ATL that we have in this chapter are still hold for the case of general cost-combining




In this thesis we have discussed logic-based formalisms for specifying and reasoning about resource-
bounded multi-agent systems. In our models of resource-bounded multi-agent systems, in order to
perform a particular action, each agent has to pay a certain amount of resources. The bounds on
the amount of resources which can be used by agents in the system effectively limit the abilities of
each agent or group of agents. The thesis has presented a series of logic-based formalisms which
allow us to specify and reason about the abilities of agents or groups of agents in resource-bounded
multi-agent systems under resource bounds.
6.1 Review of the chapters
The first logic for modelling resource-bounded multi-agent systems presented in Chapter 3 of this
thesis is named Bounded Memory Communication Logic (BMCL). The logic, which is an extension
of CTL, allows reasoning about the ability of systems of multiple reasoning agents. Agents in
those systems are assumed to operate by using only two types of resources, namely memory and
communication. In the semantics of BMCL, each model is associated with a fixed resource bound
for each resource and the usage of every resource is recorded at each state so that actions available
for each agent at a state are limited by the cost of the action, the fixed resource bound and the
recorded usage of the resources at that state. In other words, BMCL allows reasoning about the
ability of a system of multiple reasoning agents under a certain resource bound where the only
resources are memory and communication. Moreover, as BMCL is based on CTL, we cannot reason
about the properties of individual agents or groups of agents in the system.
In order to overcome the drawbacks of BMCL, we have introduced Resource-Bounded
Coalition Logic (RBCL) and Resource-Bounded Alternating-time temporal logic (RB-ATL) in Chap-
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ter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively. As its name suggests, RBCL is an extension of Coalition Logic
where each coalitional modality is extended with a resource bound determining the maximal amount
of resource agents in a coalition can use. In the semantics of RBCL, a model associates each action
with a finite set of resources that the agents in the system must use when performing this action.
Rather than record the amount of resources which has been used by agents from state to state, we
define for each action a certain cost. Then, the question whether an agent can perform an action from
a state is answered by comparing the cost of the action with the resource bound of the agent. Fur-
thermore, RBCL not only allows reasoning about single strategies under resource bounds but also
enables us to reason about multi-step strategies for an individual agent or a group of agents under
resource bounds for obtaining a certain goal. As usual, we study the soundness, the completeness
and the satisfiability problems of RBCL in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, we have presented a more expressive logic for reasoning about resource-
bounded multi-agent systems, namely RB-ATL. Because of basing on ATL, RB-ATL enables the
reasoning about strategies for an individual agent or a coalition of agents under resource bounds
where strategies are not only for obtaining a certain goal but also for maintaining a condition. Fur-
thermore, we introduce the unlimited symbol (∞) in resource bounds so that bounds on certain
resources can be ignored while reasoning about the ability of a coalition. Therefore, RB-ATL al-
lows more properties to be formalised. We have also shown in Chapter 5 the soundness and the
completeness of RB-ATL, and that RB-ATL is decidable.
6.2 Future work
The thesis has presented a theoretical framework for reasoning about resource-bounded multi-agent
systems. For each logic introduced in the thesis, we concentrated on theoretical results which are
sound and complete axiomatisation systems for these logics and their satisfiability problems. In
the case of BMCL, practical results in the model-checking problem of BMCL have been presented
in [Alechina et al., 2008c,Alechina et al., 2008b]. Although the model-checking algorithms for both
RBCL and RB-ATL have been presented in [Alechina et al., 2009b,Alechina et al., 2010b], there is
no implementation for them yet. Therefore, in the future, one direction is to devote more effort to
more practical results on the work with resource-bounded multi-agent systems where a framework
for verifying properties of resource-bounded multi-agent systems is developed by implementing
model-checking algorithms for RBCL and RB-ATL.
For the future work, there is also other direction to extend the current theoretical results
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of the thesis. In this thesis, we have presented logic-based formalisms for modelling and reasoning
about resource-bounded multi-agent systems. In these systems, agents only spend resources rather
than produce them. In the consequence, logical languages presented in this thesis only allow us
to work with multi-agent systems where agents do not have the ability to produce resources. The-
oretical work on such systems have been initiated in [Bulling & Farwer, 2009] where the authors
has extended CTL and CTL∗ for formalising properties of those system. However, they have not
had axiomatisation and decidability results where the model-checking problem is only solved in for
a limited sub-logic. In other words, the questions of modelling and reasoning about such systems
where agents can both consume and produce resource are still open and a direction for the future
work is to extend our current results (particularly, RBCL and RB-ATL) to cover those systems. Fur-
thermore, we would also like to study the relationship between RB-ATL with other derivations of
ATL such as ATLBM [A˚gotnes & Walther, 2009] (Alternative-time Temporal Logic with Bounded
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